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T HE past year witnessed a number of innovative developments in Texas
corporation law, due primarily to a major overhaul o fthe Texas Busi-
ness Corporation Act (TBCA) and related statutes. In addition to a variety
of changes designed to further modernize 'the TBCA, the close corporation
was dealt with specifically by name for the first time' and the basic rules
relating to shareholders' preemptive rights,2 derivative suits, 3 and corporate
guaranties4 were codified. The Texas Securities Act was amended to
strengthen its administrative enforcement and penal sanctions. Corporate
criminal responsibility and prosecution became a reality with enactment of
the new Texas Penal Code and companion amendment of the Code of Crim-
inal Procedure. 5 Case law developments, on -the other hand, were much less
dramatic, although there were several important decisions on shareholder
voting," dividends, 7 and repurchase of shares.a
The TBCA amendments were prepared by the Committee on Revision of
Corporation Law of the State Bar Section on Corporation, Banking and Busi-
ness Law (hereafter referred to as the Bar Committee).° Except for its pro-
posed liberalization of a corporation's power to indemnify its directors or offi-
cers, 10 the 'Bar Committee's handiwork came through the legislative process
virtually unaltered. The primary impetus for revision came from the large
* Editor's Note: This Article is an expanded version of what would otherwise
have been the Corporations section of the 1974 Annual Survey of Texas Law. It is in
two parts: Part I contains sections I-V infra. Part II will appear in the Winter issue,
28 Southwestern Law Journal No. 5, and will contain sections VI and VII, which deal
with the topics of "Corporate Finance" and "Other Developments." The latter topic in-
cludes coverage of developments under the Texas Securities Act.
** B.A., J.D., Baylor University; LL.M., New York University. Professor of Law,
University of Texas at Austin.
1. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.30-1 to -5 (Supp. 1974); see text accom-
panying notes 512-70 infra.
2. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.22-1 (Supp. 1974); see text accompanying
notes 713-74 infra.
3. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14 (Supp. 1974); see text accompanying notes
663-704 infra.
4. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06(B) (Supp. 1974); see text accom-
panying notes 105-46 infra.
5. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 7.21-.24, 12.51 (1974); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. arts. 17A.01-.09 (Supp. 1974); see text accompanying notes 147-84 infra.
6. Salgo v. Matthews, 497 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973); see text ac-
companying notes 298-356 infra.
7. Ramo, Inc. v. English, 500 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. 1973).
8. Williams v. Nevelow, 501 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973),
error granted; Hall v. Weller, Hall & Jeffrey, Inc., 497 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
9. See Doty & Parker, Changes in the Texas Business Corporation Act and Re-
lated Statutory Provisions, 10 HOUsTON L. REv. 1009 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Doty
& Parker]; Wolf, Section Report, Section on Corporation, Banking & Business Law, 36
TEX. B.J. 537 (1973); BULL. OF THE SECTION ON CoRP., BANKING & Bus. L., June 1973,
at 2.
10. See text accompanying notes 102-04, 796-98 infra.
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number of changes that had been made since 1955 in the Model Business
Corporation Act," the basic guide for the original TBCA. In addition, a
great many states (including such bellwether jurisdictions in the field of cor-
poration law as Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania) sub-
stantially revised their corporation acts in the intervening years, 12 with sev-
eral giving special consideration to problems of the close corporation.'" Thus,
beginning in 1969 and with greater effort in 1971 and 1972, the Bar Com-
mittee undertook an analysis of the TBCA, comparing it with the 1969 -revi-
sion of the Model Act and modern legislation elsewhere. In general, those
changes in the Model Act which were deemed desirable for Texas formed
the basis for most of the Bar Committee's proposals, although the Delaware
and Maine laws provided much of the inspiration for the new close corpora-
tion provisions. The Bar Committee also sponsored an expansion of the
guaranty power set out in the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act
(TMCLA) 14 and the repeal of several antiquated statutes relating to judicial
jurisdiction over foreign corporations 5 that were considered inconsistent with
comparable provisions in the TBCA l6 and the Texas long-arm statute.' 7
In this survey, the TBCA and -other changes are discussed by subject rather
than in numerical order, as they have been competently treated seriatim else-
where.' 8 Because of their number, only the more significant amendments
are dealt with at length here.
I. CORPORATE STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION, PURPOSES,
AND POWERS
Organic Documents. The articles of incorporation and bylaws comprise the
fundamental documents that prescribe within permitted legal limits a corpo-
ration's scope of operations and basic internal structure and delineate the re-
11. The Model Business Corporation Act is the product of the Committee on Cor-
porate Laws of the Section on Corporation, Banking & Business Law of the American
Bar Association. Patterned originally on the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1933,
the Act was first published in 1950. 1 ABA MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNO-
TATED 3 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA MODEL BUS. CORP. AT ANN. 2d].
It was largely that version which was used to structure the TBCA. Carrington, The
Texas Business Corporation Act as Enacted and Ten Years Later, 43 TEXAs L. REV.
609, 612 (1965); Carrington, A Corporation Code for Texas, 10 ARK. L. REV. 28, 34
(1955); Carrington, Experience in Texas With the Model Business Corporation Act, 5
UTAH L. REV. 292, 295 (1957). After several piecemeal changes, the Model Act was
substantially revised in 1969. 1 ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, at 4; Scott,
Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 24 Bus. LAw. 291 (1968). Many of
the 1973 amendments to the TBCA are based on these revisions.
12. See generally Folk, Corporation Statutes 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875; Sow-
ards & Mofsky, Factors Affecting the Development of Corporation Law, 23 MIAMI L.
REV. 476 (1969). Since 1955, twenty-two states have adopted new or substantially re-
vised general corporation laws. 1 ABA MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, at 4.
13. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 341-56 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN.
99 608.70-.77 (Supp. 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 100-11 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1371-86 (Supp. 1974).
14. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06B (Supp. 1974).
15. Ch. 63, § 2, [1973] Tex. Laws 125, repealing TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts.
2031, 2031-1, 2031a (1964).
16. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.10 (Supp. 1974).
17. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964).
18. Doty & Parker 1009. Also quite helpful are the Bar Committee's Comments
on the new amendments found in 3A TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1974).
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lationship between the shareholders and the corporation. Because of the im-
portance of these documents, the law establishes criteria for their content and
sets bounds on how and by whom they can be altered. Historically, only
the shareholders possessed the power to amend these instruments, 19 but in
recent years there has been a noticeable shift toward granting the power to
the directors, especially with regard to the bylaws. 20  Modern legislation of-
ten requires that amendments to the articles originate with the board21 and
has increasingly lessened the percentage of shares needed for ultimate ap-
proval.2 2  This developing pattern is evident among several of the 1973
TBCA amendments that deal with the articles and bylaws.
Articles of Incorporation and Amendments Thereto. To accommodate the
new close corporation articles, 23 a subsection has been added to article 3.02
to authorize inclusion in the articles of incorporation of provisions that allow
the shareholders of a close corporation to manage its affairs in lieu of a board
of directors or that give one or more of its shareholders an option to dissolve
,the corporation. 24 Similar authorization was added to article 4.0125 to permit
an existing corporation to amend its articles to take advantage of 'the same
close corporation privileges or later to eliminate them. 26 Because of their
innovative nature, any of the close corporation provisions being added or de-
leted by amendment must be approved by a proper percentage of each class
19. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 588 (1933); see H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS
121 (rev. ed. 1946) [hereinafter cited as BALLANTINE]; W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CORPORATIONS 156 (4th ed. unabr. 1969) [hereinafter cited as CARY]; H. HENN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 361(2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as HENN]; N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
343, 400 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as LATriN].
20. CARY 156.
21. See, e.g., ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 59; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 242(d)(1) (Supp. 1968); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 4.02(A)(1) (Supp. 1974).
See C. ISRAELS, CORPORATE PRACTICE § 12.06 (2d ed. 1969); 9 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 201.04[1] (1973).
22. In addition to Texas, thirty-one states now either require or permit certain or
all amendments to the articles of incorporation to be approved by the vote of the holders
of a majority of outstanding shares, unless the articles call for the vote of a greater num-
ber or in the instances where the law requires approval by more than one class of shares.
ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21(19) (Supp. 1973); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-321 (Supp.
1974); CAL. CORP. CODE § 3632 (West Supp. 1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242
(Cum. Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.18 (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-
902 (1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-146 (1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-1-4-3 (1972);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.56 (Supp. 1974); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6602 (Supp.
1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.295(c) (Supp. 1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.-
31B (Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 805c (Supp. 1973); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 156, § 70 (1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1611(4) (1973); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 301.37 (Supp. 1974); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 351.090 (1966); MONT.
REy. CODE ANN. § 15-2253 (1967); NEy. REV. STAT. § 78.390 (1973); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 294.40 (1966); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14A:9-2(4)(c) (Supp. 1974);
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 803(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-100(b)(3) (Supp. 1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.71 (Page 1964); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 1.153a (1953); ORE. REV. STAT. § .57.360 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1805A (Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-1.1-54(c) (1970); TENN.
CoDE ANN. § 48-302(1)(c) (Supp. 1973); UTAH CODE § 16-10-55(d) (1973); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-12 (1972). See generally ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d,§ 59; 9 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 201.04[2].
23. Tax. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.30-1 to -5 (Supp. 1974).
24. id. art. 3.02(A)(9).
25. Id. arts. 4.01(B)(18), (20).
26. Id. arts. 4.01(B)(19), (20).
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of shares 27 as well as the shareholders overall.
Another change of significance allows :the articles of incorporation to be
amended by a vote of the holders of less than two-thirds of the shares but
no less than a majority, if .the articles so provide. 28  The amendment is a
compromise between the 1969 revision of the Model Act, 29 which, to be "in
accord with contemporary practices, '3 0 had shifted from its former two-thirds
requirement to the fashionable majority vote sanctioned by more permissive
corporation codes, and the long-standing two-thirds requirement of the
TBCA. 31 If the articles are silent, the two-thirds vote is still required; this
is in contrast to the Model Act and the statutory provisions of a majority
of other jurisdictions -which require the articles to specify a greater number
than a majority if that is desired. 32  At the same time, the permission pre-
viously given to require an even greater number of votes than two-thirds to
amend if provided for in the articles remains unchanged.3 3  Permitting the
reduction to a majority vote makes some sense for a large publicly held cor-
poration that might have difficulty in getting a sufficient number of proxies
returned for a two-thirds or greater approval,3 4 but its desirability for smaller
27. Id. arts. 4.03(B)(l1)-(13). Section C of this article was repealed; this section
denied the class voting privilege as to amendments increasing the number of shares or
altering the relative priorities of a class if the articles permitted such changes to be made
within specific limitations and restrictions. Ch. 545, § 32, [1973] Tex. Laws 1507.
See text accompanying notes 273-88 infra.
28. "Whenever, with respect to any action to be taken by the shareholders of a cor-
poration, the articles of incorporation require the vote or concurrence of the holders of
a greater or lesser number of shares, or of any class or series thereof, than is required
by this Act with respect to such action, the provisions of the articles of incorporation
shall control, provided the lesser number constitutes a majority or more." TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 9.08 (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
29. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 59(c).
30. Id. at 255.
31. Ch. 64, arts. 4.02(A)(3), 9.08, [1955] Tex. Laws 239, as amended, TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 4.02(A)(3), 9.08 (Supp. 1974); cf. ABA MODEL BUS. CoRP. ACT
ANN. § 54 (1966).
32. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 143. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 242 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 803(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1805(A) (Supp. 1974). Louisiana and Ohio provide another stat-
utory alternative: a two-thirds vote is required, but the articles can provide for a lesser
number, but no less than a majority. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.31(B) (1969); Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.71 (Page 1964). Tennessee calls for approval by the holders
of a majority of outstanding shares or two-thirds of all shares whose holders are present
or represented at the meeting at which the vote is taken. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-302
(1)(c) (Supp. 1973). See generally 2 ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 59,
3.03(5), at 257; 1 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE 154 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as HORNSTEIN].
33. TEX. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 9.08 (1956).
34. Cf. N. LATrIN, R. JENNINGS & R. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS, CASES AND MATE-
RIALS 387 (4th ed. 1968); Note, State Regulation of Corporate Procedure for Electing
Directors, 58 YALE L.J. 795, 798 (1949). Several brief stories reported within the space
of a month in the Wall Street Journal in 1968 illustrate this point. Though sharehold-
ers of Royal Industries of Pasadena, California, mustered the simple majority vote
needed to increase the company's authorized shares, the proxies received fell short of
the two-thirds majority needed to change the company's state of incorporation to Dela-
ware from California. Wall St. J., April 26, 1968, at 13, col. 2. Alpha Portland Ce-
ment Co. of Easton, Pennsylvania, dropped its effort to authorize a new class of pre-
ferred, eliminate preemptive rights, and permit two-thirds of the shares present at a
meeting to authorize actions requiring a two-thirds vote of outstanding shares, because
proxies for only 63% instead of the needed 66.6% of the shares needed for approval
had been returned. Wall St. J., April 1, 1968, at 4, col. 3. Standard Kollsman Indus-
tries, Inc. of Syosett, New York, failed to win approval of a proposed new issue of pre-
ferred shares because proxies for fewer than the two-thirds vote needed had been re-
[Vol. 28
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corporations where dangers of abuse of the rights of minority shareholders
are more prevalent is doubtful. 35  Despite the need for a specific provision
in the articles to authorize a lesser percentage, which would require a two-
thirds vote for its approval as an amendment, a majority-vote proviso can
easily be made part of the original articles by the promoters or can be added
thereto while the corporation is in -their control before any shares are publicly
issued.36 As a consequence, the ability of future minority shareholders to
block an amendment that adversely affects their interests can be readily
diminished.
Restated Articles of Incorporation. One of the useful features of the
TBCA allows a corporation that has repeatedly amended its articles of incor-
poration over the years to restate them so that all the changes and supplemen-
tation can be found in a single document.3 7 Heretofore such action required
shareholder approval by a vote of the holders of two-thirds or more of the
outstanding shares whether the restatement included additional amendments
or not.3 s  This has been changed so that now if the restatement makes no
further amendment of the articles, the directors alone need authorize the re-
statement procedure. 39  If, however, the restated articles include an amend-
ment, the directors' resolution proposing the same for shareholder approval
must state that except for the designated amendment the restated articles cor-
rectly set out the text of the original articles as previously amended and 'that
the restated articles together with the proposed amendment will supersede
the original articles and prior amendments thereto. 40
ceived. A company spokesman said the number of shares cast in favor fell a few per-
centage points below the minimum required. The situation was attributed to the com-
pany's failure to seek approval far enough in advance and to the fact that a large number
of shares were held in street names and beneficial owners had not sent the necessary
authorization to their brokers to vote the shares. Wall St. J., May 3, 1968, at 3, col. 5.
35. On the desirability of higher rather than lower percentages for shareholder ac-
tion as to fundamental changes in the corporate structure of a close corporation, thus
affording a minority shareholder a "veto" power to protect himself, see 1 F. O'NEAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.10 (1971) [hereinafter cited as F.
O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS]. See generally 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS PRACTICE:
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 686 (1973) [hereinafter cited as R. HAMILTON, TEXAS
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS]; HENN 525; 1 HORNSTEIN § 129; W. PAINTER, CORPORATE
AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS § 3.6 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
W. PAINTER, CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS]; Pelletier & Marsh, Incorporation Planning
in Texas, 23 Sw. L.J. 820, 843 (1969).
36. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 4.02(A)(1) (Supp. 1974), permitting the
board of directors named in the original articles of incorporation to amend the articles
if no shares have been issued. See text accompanying note 75 infra.
37. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 4.07 (Supp. 1974).
38. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 4.07(A) (1956), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
The statute stated that a corporation could restate its articles "by following the proced-
ure to amend the articles of incorporation provided by this Act." The 1973 amendment
adds the parenthetical phrase, "(except that no shareholder approval shall be required
where no amendment is made)."
39. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 4.07(A) (Supp. 1974); see note 38 supra. The
effect of the change is to simplify greatly the restatement process when no amendment
is made; it also "eliminates the expense of notifying shareholders and obtaining their
approval of an action that is essentially meaningless to them." Comment of Bar Com-
mittee to Art. 4.07, 3A TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. 119 (Supp. 1974). The Model Act
allows the directors to restate the articles, but unlike its previous version in former § 59,
upon which the Texas provision is based, does not permit an amendment to be made
via the restatement. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 64. The Texas proce-
dure seems preferable.
40. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 4.02(A)(1) (Supp. 1974).
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Incorporation by Reference. As originally enacted, the TBCA provided
that if a corporation issued preferred shares or series thereof or limited or
denied preemptive rights or imposed restrictions on transferability of shares,
such preferences, limitations, denials, or restrictions had to be set out in full
or in summary form on the face or back of the share certificates. 4' 'Because
statements of preferences or restrictions on transfer are often quite lengthy,
the original requirement posed the practical problem of squeezing a detailed
yet legible statement on essentially a small piece of paper.42  If a summary
were used, there was some concern whether it would accurately reflect the
underlying provisions. 43 As a consequence, article 2.19 was amended in
1957 by adding a section F that permitted preferences, limitations, restric-
tions, etc., whether found in the articles or bylaws, to be referred to on the
share certificates rather than be set out in full or summary form, provided
any applicable bylaw provision or any resolution of the directors fixing the
relative rights and preferences of a series of preferred was filed with the
secretary of state by following the procedure outlined in the amendment. 44
This 2.19(F) filing, as it became known, was also extended to allow filing
of an agreement restricting transferability to be incorporated by reference
into the articles or bylaws if required to be set out therein by the Act. 45
Interestingly enough, nothing in the Act directly required inclusion of such
agreements in the articles or bylaws;4 6 nevertheless they were often filed, not
41. Ch. 64, arts. 2.19(B), 2.22(A), 2.22(C), [1955] Tex. Laws 239, as amended,
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.19(B), 2.22(A), 2.22(C) (Supp. 1974). As origin-
ally enacted, provisions imposing restrictions on transferability or limiting or denying
preemptive rights had to be set forth in full on the face or back of the share certificate,
but a 1957 amendment to article 2.22 permitted a statement in summary form in either
circumstance. Ch. 54, § 4, [1957] Tex. Laws 111, amending TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT
ANN. arts. 2.22(A), (C) (1956). See Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.22, 3A
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1972).
42. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.19, 3A TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Supp.
1972).
43. Id.
44. Ch. 54, § 2, [1957] Tex. Laws 111, as amended, Tax. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN.
art. 2.19(F) (Supp. 1974).
45. "To the extent that this Act requires that any agreement restricting the transfer
of shares of a corporation be set forth within the articles of incorporation or by-laws
of a corporation, such requirement shall be fully complied with by a reference to such
agreement in the articles of incorporation or by-laws; provided that such agreement
shall have theretofore been filed with the Secretary of State in accordance with the pro-
visions of this Article." Ch. 54, § 2, [1957] Tex. Laws 111, as amended, TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.19(F)(1) (Supp. 1974).
46. Such inclusion may have indirectly been authorized by Ch. 64, art. 2.22, [1955]
Tex. Laws 253, as amended, TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.22 (Supp. 1974). Section
A of that article (before its 1973 amendment) permitted a corporation to impose restric-
tions on transferability "if each such restriction is expressly set forth in the articles of
incorporation or by-laws" and on the stock certificates. Section B, however, stated that
in addition to any other restrictions which the corporation might reasonably impose, in
the above manner, restrictions giving the corporation or its shareholders of record a pre-
emptive or prior right to purchase shares or giving the corporation or any other person
or persons an option or first refusal on such shares were also permissible. Since any
such right given the corporation, if not set out in the articles or bylaws, presumably
would be provided for in an agreement to which the corporation was a party, it is argu-
able that such an agreement would have been required to be made part of the articles
or bylaws or incorporated by reference therein to permit its enforcement by the corpo-
ration. See Irwin v. Prestressed Structures, Inc., 420 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1967), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Amsler, Corporations, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 98, 107 (1969), so intimating. Alternatively, it can be argued,
as a student commentator pointed out, that section A referred only to unilaterally im-
[Vol. 28
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only for that purpose, but also to permit a reference to the restrictions on
transfer they imposed to be placed on the share certificates, even though
again article 2.19(F) contained no such specific authorization. 47
The 1973 amendments extensively revised article 2.19,48 including a new
section F to replace the former section.49 Because part of the revision of
article 2.19 provided for alternative statements that could be utilized to
shorten the required legend on share certificates relative to preferences, limi-
tations of preemptive rights, or transfer restrictions,5 ° the Bar Committee felt
there was no longer a need for their separate filing to permit incorporation
by reference on the share certificates. 5 1 Nevertheless the committee decided
there was merit in allowing often lengthy shareholders' agreements restricting
transferability of shares to be incorporated by reference within the articles
or bylaws and hence determined to salvage that remaining part of the old
section by rewriting it as a new section F that would clarify some of the
former ambiguities.52  At the same time, section E was amended, first as
a saving clause to validate outstanding share certificates -that contained re-
ferences to other documents under the former procedure, and secondly,
to prohibit the practice in the future whether in connection with the issue
or -transfer of shares "or otherwise. '53
posed restrictions by the corporation and only these need be placed in the articles or
bylaws, whereas section B-type restrictions, being based on consensual arrangements
with others, could be enforced by the corporation without reference to the section A re-
quirements. 38 TEXAs L. REV. 499, 500-01 (1960). Professor Hamilton believes the
first construction was the correct one in light of the statutory language, citing the Com-
ment of the Bar Committee as consistent with this view. 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS Busi-
NESS ORGANIZATIONS § 673, at 147-48 n.82. Actually the Bar Committee's Comment
which said only that the restrictions set out in section B were not intended to be an
exclusive list and that other restrictions might be valid, did not really address itself to
whether the section A mandate also applied to section B restrictions. Comment of Bar
Committee to Art. 2.22, 3A TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 105 (1956). The 1973 revision
of art. 2.22 makes the controversy academic since it specifically recognizes agreements
to which the corporation is a party as one of the sources for the imposition of restric-
tions on transfer. See text accompanying notes 563-64 infra.
47. See 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 676; Doty & Parker
1014; Pelletier & Marsh, supra note 35, at 841. Although article 2.19(F)(1) did not
specifically state an agreement incorporated by reference into the articles or bylaws
thereunder could also be referred to on stock certificates, except as inferred by the first
sentence of section F(1 ), it was undoubtedly the intent of the Bar Committee that such
could be done under the statute. Thus the committee stated as its opinion that "the pro-
visions of the last sentence of paragraph (1) of Section F will permit the incorporation
by reference of all or part of agreements restricting the transfer of shares not only in
stock certificates but also in the articles of incorporation and by-laws" if article 2.19(F)
were otherwise complied with. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.19, 3A TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. 43 (Supp. 1972).
48. Ch. 545, § 10, [1973] Tex. Laws 1490, amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.19 (1956).
49. Former section F was not repealed, as stated in the Comment of the Bar Com-
mittee, 3A TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 53 (Supp. 1974), but was substantially revised
as indicated in the text. At one point in its deliberations, the Bar Committee considered
eliminating the incorporation by reference procedure entirely and present sections G and
H were designated sections F and G, respectively. When present section F was ap-
proved by the committee, it was regarded as new legislation and assigned its section let-
ter only because the former section which it would replace also dealt with incorporation
by reference. Hence in the committee's view, as reflected in its Comment, the old sec-
tion was being repealed.
50. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. arts. 2.19(B), (G) (Supp. 1974).
51. Cf. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.19, 3A TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
53 (Supp. 1974); Doty & Parker 1014.
52. See note 49 supra.
53. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.19(E) (Supp. 1974).
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As rewritten, article 2.19(F) allows a corporation that has adopted a bylaw
or is party to an agreement restricting transferability to incorporate either
document into its articles of incorporation or the agreement into its bylaws
by complying with the proper procedure to amend the articles or bylaws and
by filing the bylaw (if incorporated into the articles) or agreement (if incor-
porated into either) with the secretary of state. 54  By permitting a bylaw
as well as an agreement to be incorporated by reference into the articles,
the new section goes beyond the old. By specifying that the effect of such
incorporation by reference is tantamount to an amendment of the articles
or bylaws, the Bar Committee sought to eliminate the somewhat dubious
practice formerly followed by the secretary of state that allowed an agreement
restricting transferability to be incorporated by reference into the articles
through a 2.19(F) filing without requiring that the reference made in the
articles to the agreement be added through the formal amendatory procedure
set out in the Act. 55 All that the form previously promulgated by the secre-
tary of state for the statement of a resolution authorizing incorporation by
reference specified was that the document being filed was a true and correct
copy and that its incorporation by reference was duly authorized by the board
of directors.56 Although the form proposed for use for present 2.19(F) filing
suggests that the corporation's word may again be taken that the provisions
of the Act for amending the articles or bylaws have been complied with,5 7
the corporation division's current policy is to require an amendment to the
articles before accepting the statement if an examination of the corporation's
file shows no reference to or authority for inclusion of the agreement in the
original or amended articles.58 In view of the substantial disparity between
54. Id. art. 2.19(F).
55. Comments on Proposed Forms Under Article 2.19(F), distributed by William
D. Kimbrough, Chief, Corporation Division, Secretary of State, at a meeting of the State
Bar Committee on Revision of Corporation Law, Austin, Texas, November 10, 1973.
The former practice seems even stranger, from the standpoint of collection of revenues,
in view of the substantial difference in the fees collected for filing the 2.19(F) statement
and articles of amendment. See note 59 infra. The only comparable filing permitted
under the Act that affects the articles of incorporation without formal amendment (and
has the same filing fee of $10 as the 2.19(F) statement) is the resolution which is filed
by the board of directors whenever a series of preferred or special class of shares are
to be issued and which sets out the relative rights and preferences of the series. TEx.
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.13(D) (1956). However, the articles must expressly au-
thorize the directors to issue such classes in series (or have generally authorized their
issuance) and the statute expressly states that upon such filing the resolution becomes
an amendment to the articles of incorporation. There is no comparable statement in
article 2.19(F).
56. The form is found in 3A TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 53 (Supp. 1974); 20 R.
HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 684; 5 R. STAYTON, TEXAS FORMS § 2495(Supp. 1974). Use of the form was optional. Despite the rather drastic revision of
article 2.19(F), the old form still appears in the 1974 Supplement to 3A TEx. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN.
57. Three proposed forms for use under article 2.19(F) were distributed at the Bar
Committee meeting referred to in note 55 supra. One was a statement of incorporation
by reference of a bylaw into the articles; another for incorporation of an agreement into
the articles; and the third for incorporation of an agreement into the bylaws. The first
two forms require that a statement be made that the incorporation by reference has been
authorized by the board and that "the provisions of the act for amendment of Articles
of Incorporation have been complied with."
58. Interview with William D. Kimbrough, Chief, Corporation Division, Secretary
of State, March 4, 1974.
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the fee for filing articles of amendment and a 2.19(F) statement59 and the
fact that the agreement can just as readily be made part of the bylaws, some
counsel may elect to save their clients the ninety-dollar difference by having
the agreement incorporated by reference into the bylaws. On the other
hand, some thought should be given to the fact that making the agreement
part of the articles protects the parties more effectively against later
changes.6 0 If 'that is an important consideration, the money saved by going
the bylaw route may well prove to be penny-wise, pound-foolish.
Amending the Bylaws. As the document prescribing the corporation's in-
ternal government and methods of operation, the bylaws play an important
role in defining .the authority of the shareholders, directors, and officers to
act in its behalf. Indeed, the TBCA specifies a number of corporate matters
to be resolved in the bylaws alone"' or, alternatively, with the charter.6 2
As a consequence, the ability to alter, amend, or repeal the bylaws means
having effective power to mold ;the corporation along desired lines. Until
the 1973 amendments, the shareholders held -that power, although they could
delegate it to the board. 63  With the amendments, the delegation to the board
has become 'the law. 64
As article 2.23 has been amended, the directors still adopt the initial by-
laws, as before. The difference is that they may also repeal, change, or add
to the bylaws in their discretion unless the articles reserve that power in the
shareholders. Nevertheless, 'the shareholders' residual power over the by-
59. The fee for filing articles of amendment is $100, TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 10.01(A) (2) (Supp. 1974); for filing a statement of provisions incorporated by ref-
erence, $10, id. art. 10.01 (A)(14).
60. See HENN 564; 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 3.79, 7.07a.
61. E.g., imposing restrictions on the transfer of shares, TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.22(B) (Supp. 1974); setting time and place for annual shareholders' meeting, id.
art. 2.24(B) (1956); setting record date for determination of shareholders eligible to re-
ceive dividends or vote, id. art. 2.26(A); classifying directors and fixing their terms
when the board consists of nine or more directors, id. art. 2.33; providing for notice of
directors' meetings, id. art. 2.37(B); prescribing manner of election of officers and es-
tablishing their authority and scope of duties, id. art. 2.42. For a complete listing see
1 H. KENDRICK & J. KENDRICK, TEXAS TRANSACTION GUIDE § 3.07[2] (1972).
62. E.g., prescribing qualifications for directors, TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
2.31 (1956); establishing greater than a majority vote for action at shareholders' meet-
ings, id. art. 2.28; fixing or providing manner of determining number of directors after
initial board and prescribing quorum and voting requirements for action by directors,
id. art. 2.35 (Supp. 1974); creating executive or other committees, id. art. 2.36; restrict-
ing the authority of the directors to take action without a meeting, id. art. 9.10(B). For
a complete list see 1 H. KENDRICK & J. KENDRICK, supra note 61, § 3.07[2]. The arti-
cles of incorporation, of course, can include any matter which the TBCA allows or per-
mits to be set out in the bylaws. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN., art. 3.02(A)(10) (Supp.
1974).
For helpful guides on drafting bylaws for a Texas corporation, see 19 R. HAMILTON,
TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 276-80; 1 H. KENDRICK & J. KENDRICK, supra note
61, §§ 3.160[1]-.221[2]; 5 R. STAYTON, TEXAS FORMS §§ 2480-81 (1959); TEXAS
FORMS §§ 20:11-209 (1969); Bromberg, ByLaws of ABC Corp., in INCORPORATION
PLANNING IN TEXAS 77 (G. Pelletier ed. 1973); Pelletier, Incorporation Planning in
Texas, in id., at 21.
63. "The power to alter, amend, or repeal the bylaws or to adopt new bylaws shall
be vested in the shareholders, but such power may be delegated by the shareholders to
the board of directors." Ch. 64, art. 2.23, [1955] Tex. Laws 239, as amended, TEX.
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.23 (Supp. 1974).
64. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.23 (Supp. 1974).
65. The draftsmen of section 27 of the Model Business Corporation Act, to which
amended article 2.23 is now identical, rationalized their decision to vest the power to
amend the bylaws in the directors as "consistent with the modern tendency in corpora-
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laws has been preserved by a specification that any alteration made by the
directors remains "subject to repeal or change by action of the share-
holders." 66 This recognition of the shareholders' right 'to veto or undo the
directors' handiwork goes far, of course, in mitigating the shift in power, even
-though the language employed leaves some doubt as to whether shareholders
can adopt an entirely new bylaw. 67
tion statutes." 1 ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, at 555. Professor Folk's ob-
servation seems more accurate; he perceives in such statutes "a subtle shift in the direc-
tion of consolidating by-law control ever more firmly in exclusive control of the direct-
ors." Folk, supra note 12, at 902. At present, 32 states other than Texas give the di-
rectors primary or concurrent power to amend the bylaws. ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21(59)
(1959); ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.135 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-513 (1966); CAL.
CORP. CODE § 500 (West 1955); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-9 (1963); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 29-909 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608-.07 (1956); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-807(1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, 157.25 (1954); IND. CODE § 23-1-2-8 (1972); IOWA
Bus. CORP. ACT § 26 (1962); LA. REV. STAT. § 12.28 (1960); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13A, § 601 (Supp. 1973); MICH. COMP. LAws § 21.200(231) (Supp. 1973); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 79-3-51 (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-2225 (1947); NEB. Bus.
CORP. ACT § 21-2026 (1970); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.120,(2) (1967); N.J. REV. STAT.§ 14A:2-9 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-24-26 (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-
16 (Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-25 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701-
59 (Page Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.141 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.1
(c) (Supp. 1973); S.D. CODE § 47-2-49 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-812 (Supp.
1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-25 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-24 (1950); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1875 (1973); WIs. STAT. § 180.22 (Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-22 (1957).
See generally ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 27, 3.01-.04; 2 Z. CAVITCH,
supra note 21, § 62.04[1]; Note, Exclusive Control of the Adoption and Amendment
of By-Laws or Regulations by the Corporate Directors, 25 U. CIN. L. REV. 362 (1956).
66. This reservation, found in section 27 of the Model Business Corporation Act,
was not contained in the Bar Committee's proposal when introduced, S.B. 202, 63d
Legis., Reg. Sess. § 14 (1973), but was added at the suggestion of Professor Robert
Hamilton by legislative committee amendment. Even when the power to amend the by-
laws has been delegated to the directors, the better view has always been that the share-
holders retain the power to override the authority granted the directors and make their
own changes in the bylaws. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 589 (1933); Auer v. Dressel,
306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954); 8 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4178 (1966) [hereinafter cited as W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
CORPORATIONS]; 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 279. Also, bylaws
amendable by the directors that thwart shareholder action thereon may be found to im-
properly circumvent the concept of corporate suffrage embodied in the federal proxy
rules, where applicable. See SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948); F. EMERSON & F. LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER
DEMOCRACY 99 (1954); 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 903 (2d ed. 1961).
67. Professor Hamilton believes the limiting of the shareholders' reserved power to
repeal or to make changes, and not adoption of new bylaws, is inadvertent, "since one
would expect the power of shareholders over the bylaws to be at least as broad as the
power of directors." 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 279, at 22
(Supp. 1974). Nevertheless, the difference in terminology could well be attributed to
a desire to give the directors primary authority for determining the content of the by-
laws, subject only to a limited veto by the shareholders, in order to strengthen still
further their power of management. See note 65 supra. Georgia and New Jersey, for
example, in revising their corporation laws, apparently recognized the limiting effect of
the Model Act language and chose to follow the Virginia statute which, after giving the
directors the power to adopt and amend the bylaws, provides: "But bylaws made by the
board of directors may be repealed or changed, and new bylaws made, by the stockhold-
ers and the stockholders may prescribe that any bylaw made by them shall not be al-
tered, amended, or repealed by the directors." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-24 (1973) (em-
phasis added). See GA. CODE ANN. § 22-807 (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-9
(1969). According to the Comment to the Georgia statute, prepared by Professor Pasco
M. Bowman II of the University of Georgia, the Virginia-type language gives the di-
rectors the power to make bylaws that govern internal housekeeping, "while at the same
time permitting the shareholders, when their concern is aroused, to exercise both a veto
and an independent legislation power." 22 GA. CODE ANN. 119 (1970) (emphasis
added). Similarly, the Commissioners' Comment to the New Jersey statute notes that
the last proviso permits the shareholders to lock in any bylaw from subsequent alteration
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In reality, probably very little has been changed by the revision. Even
under the former law, while 'the directors could not be granted the amenda-
tory power in 'the original articles of incorporation,68 it could easily be delega-
ted to them at any time after the initial issuance of shares, especially during
the interim when the organizers were in control. The only significant impact
will be on those corporations whose bylaws for some reason or other do not
adequately provide how 'they are to be amended.
Organization: Role of Incorporators. As originally enacted, the TBCA speci-
fied a few limited duties the incorporators were required or permitted to per-
form. Thus, in addition to their primary function of signing, verifying, and
delivering the articles of incorporation to the secretary of state6 9 and in turn
receiving the certificate of incorporation once issued,70 the incorporators were
to call the organizational meeting of the board of directors named in the arti-
cles, 7' and, if no business had 'been commenced and shares issued, the incor-
porators were granted power to amend the articles72 or dissolve the corpora-
tion.73  Under 'the 1973 amendments, their role and potential power have
been further diminished; correspondingly, the power of the first board has
been enhanced.
Now, a majority of the directors named in the articles call the organiza-
tional meeting of the board provided for in article 3.06. 7 4  Similarly, if no
shares have been issued it is the directors and no longer the incorporators
who may amend the articles. 75 Somewhat inconsistently, the incorporators
or repeal by the board. 14A N.J. RFV. STAT. 99 (1969). In view of the ambiguity
implicit in the Model Act (and the Texas Act) provision, something along the lines of
the Virginia legislation should certainly be incorporated into article 2.23 just to make
certain the residual power the shareholders should always retain over corporate rule-
making is adequately preserved.
68. Keating v. K-C-K Corp., 383 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964)
(holding provision in articles giving directors power to amend contra to article 2.23 and
thus to be regarded as surplusage); cf. Dixie Glass Co. v. Pollak, 341 S.W.2d 530 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1960), error ref. n.r.e. (bylaws gave both directors and shareholders
power to amend with each having power to alter or repeal bylaws made by other; facts
not clear whether shareholders or directors or both had approved same; subsequent
unanimous approval of long-term employment contract of officer by both shareholders
and directors treated as implied amendment of bylaws). See 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 279, indicating that under article 2.23 before its amendment
a provision in the bylaws or articles giving the directors the power to amend was prob-
ably ineffective. But cf. id. § 280 where article VIII of the suggested bylaws gives the
directors, as well as the shareholders, the amendatory power. Possibly, as Professor
Hamilton suggests, a provision of this sort would have been upheld had the adoption
of the bylaws as a whole or the specific bylaw been ratified by the shareholders. Id.
§ 279. See also Pelletier, Incorporation Planning in Texas, 23 Sw. L.J. 820, 847 n.165
(1969), quoting statistics to show that out of a sample of 1,000 charters filed in 1968,
11.3% contained a provision giving the directors the power to amend the bylaws. This,
four years after the Keating decision!
69. TEX. Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. art. 3.01 (1956).
70. Id. art. 3.03(B).
71. Ch. 64, art. 3.06, [1955] Tex. Laws 239, as amended, TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT
ANN. art. 3.06 (Supp. 1974).
72. Ch. 657, § 7, [1967] Tex. Laws 1719, adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
4.02(C), repealed, ch. 545, § 32, [1973] Tex. Laws 1507.
73. Ch. 64, art. 6.01, [1955] Tex. Laws 239, as amended, TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT
ANN. art. 6.01 (Supp. 1974).
74. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 3.06 (Supp. 1974).
75. Id. art. 4.02(A)(1). Section C of article 4.02, giving the incorporators the
power to amend the articles by a written unanimous consent if no shares had been is-
sued, was repealed. Ch. 545, § 32, [1973] Tex. Laws 1507.
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still retain the power to dissolve the corporation if no business has been com-
menced nor shares issued, but now presumably so may the directors. 76
In light of the acknowledged pattern of eliminating the duties of the
incorporators, 77 it is surprising no change was made in the archaic require-
ment that there be at least three incorporators, two of whom have to be citi-
zens of Texas, and all of whom must be twenty-one years old or more.78
These requisites seem especialy chauvinistic and unenlightened in these days
of societal mobility and youthful emancipation. The current trend is
moving rapidly away from the traditional concept that corporateness can
only be attained by at least a trinity of natural persons in favor of permit-
ting a single incorporator to perform the role whether human or a legal en-
tity. 79 To continue to insist that there be at least three incorporators to create
a corporation that conceivably could be governed by a one-man board of
directors ° and all of whose stock may be owned by a single individual or
entity makes little sense. It is equally incongruous to empower a Texas cor-
poration to act as an incorporator in other states where allowed, 81 but not
76. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 6.01 (Supp. 1974). The amendment also elimi-
nates the two-year time limit for such dissolution. Through Bar Committee oversight,
even though the directors alone approve such dissolution, the articles of dissolution must
still recite that a majority of the incorporators elected that the corporation be dissolved,
id. art. 6.01 (A)(1) (g), and the certificate of dissolution is still to be delivered "to the
incorporators or their representatives." Id. art. 6.01(A)(3).
77. See Doty & Parker 1023.
78. TEX. Bus. CORP. AT ANN. art. 3.01 (1956). The requirement that incorpora-
tors must be 21 years of age or more would seem to be indirectly amended by TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5923b (Supp. 1974), giving all the rights, privileges and obligations
of majority to persons 18 years of age or older. Under the statute a law that extends
a right, privilege, or obligation to a person on the basis of a minimum age of 21 years
"shall be interpreted as prescribing a minimum age of 18 years." Id. § 2. As a conse-
quence, the secretary of state will accept articles that recite the incorporators are 18
years of age or more. 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 259, at 20
(Supp. 1974). By the same token, article 2.01 of the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation
Laws Act (TMCLA), TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.01 (1962), permitting mar-
ried women to serve as incorporators, shareholders, officers, or directors, has become
obsolete in view of the full capacity married women are presently accorded by Texas
law. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.03 (1973).
79. In 1960, only four states (Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, and Wisconsin) allowed
incorporation by a single incorporator. 2 ABA MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, at
162. Presently, 34 states do so. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-501 (1966); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 300 (West Supp. 1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-289 (Supp. 1973); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.03(1) (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE
ANN. § 22-801 (1970); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.46 (Supp. 1974); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 23-1-3-1 (Code ed. 1972); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496 A.48 (1962); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-6001 (Supp. 1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271A.265 (Supp. 1972); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.21 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 402(1) (Supp.
1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 12 (1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1201
(1973); MINN. COMP. LAWS § 301.03 (1969); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.050 (1966);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-2247 (1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2051 (1970); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-6 (1969): N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-25-1 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 401 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-6 (Supp. 1973); Omo REv.
CODE ANN. § 1701.04 (Pace Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.306 (1973); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-1.1-47 (Supp. 1973); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 12-14.2 (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-201 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 1925 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-48 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 23A.12.010 (1973); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.44 (Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-
36.45 (Supp. 1973).
See generally 3 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 62.03[1]; HENN 220; Garrett, John Doe
Incorporates Himself, 19 Bus. LAw. 535 (1964); Spoerri, One Incorporator, One Di-
rector, 19 Bus. LAW. 305 (1963).
80. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.32 (Supp. 1974).
81. See id. art. 2.02(A)(18).
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to so empower it in Texas.
Purposes. Prior to 1955, a Texas business corporation was generally li-
mited to a single purpose that had to be statutorily authorized.8 2 In one
of the more important changes made by the TBCA,8 3 a corporation was per-
mitted to choose any number of lawful or non-prohibited purposes, with
minor limitations, 84 so long as they were set out fully in the articles of incor-
poration.8 5  A 1973 amendment carries Texas to the other end of the spec-
trum: It is now permissible to organize for any purpose or purposes "which
may be stated to be, or to include, the transaction of any or all lawful business
for which corporations may be incorporated" under the Act.86  Moreover,
specific purposes need no longer be set out fully in the articles of incorpora-
tion.8 7  Despite the sweeping authorization thus granted, some consideration
should be given, especially in drafting articles for small, closely-held busi-
nesses, whether such generality of corporate objects is desirable. There is
something to be said for keeping the scope of some business ventures, parti-
cularly closely-held enterprises, within agreed bounds ss  Needless to say,
adopting a comprehensive purpose clause of -this sort virtually eliminates the
ultra vires doctrine in its traditional sense.8
82. Ch. 81, § 1, [1945] Tex. Laws 119 (codified as TEX. REv. CIV. STAT.
ANN. arts. 1302-1302i (1945)), repealed, ch. 229, § 1, [1961] Texas Laws 458; see
1 I. HILDEBRAND, THE LAW OF TEXAS CORPORATIONS § 26 (1942) [hereinafter cited
as I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS].
83. See Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.01, 3A TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
18 (1956).
84. The following combination of purposes are still prohibited: cattle-raising and
and meat packing; oil production and engaging directly in the oil and pipe line business.
TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. arts. 2.01(B)(3)(a), (b) (1956). These are vestiges of
the old corporation law that were carried over into the TBCA to minimize opposition
to adoption of the Act. See Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.01, 3A TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. 19 (1956); Carrington, Experience in Texas With the Model Business
Corporation Act, 5 UTAH L. REV. 292, 298 (1957). Even these prohibited combinations
can probably be circumvented through use of subsidiary or affiliated corporations. Cf.
State v. Swift & Co., 187 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945), error ref. (meat
packer not in violation of antitrust decree forcing it from cottonseed oil business
through ownership of subsidiary engaged in same business). But see 19 R. HAMILTON,
TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 355, at 384-85.
85. Ch. 64, art. 2.01(A), [1955] Tex. Laws 239, as amended, TEX. Bus. CORP.
ACT ANN. art. 2.01(A) (Supp. 1974).
86. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 3.02(A) (3) (Supp. 1974).
87. Id. art. 2.01(A). Before its amendment, this section required the purposes of
the corporation to be "fully stated" in the articles of incorporation.
88. See 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 3.10; C. RoIrRLICH, ORGANIZING
CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 296 (4th ed. 1967).
89. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.01(A), 3A TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 9
(Supp. 1974); Doty & Parker 1011. However, no matter how expansive the corpora-
tion's purpose clause, there remain a few transactions to which the ultra vires doctrine
will continue to apply, mainly because of limits Texas law imposes on the exercise of
certain corporate powers. These include: (1) Corporate guaranties; see, e.g., Cooper
Petroleum Co. v. LaGloria Oil & Gas Co., 423 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 436 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1969); Empire Steel
Corp. v. Omni Steel Corp., 378 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1964), error
ref. n.r.e., noted in 43 TEXAS L. REV. 792 (1965). But see text accompanying notes 105-
46 infra. (2) Loans to directors or officers; see TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.02
(A)(6) (1956); cf. Whitten v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 397 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1965), noted
in 20 Sw. L.J. 861 (1966). (3) Acquisition of excess real property; see TMCLA art.
4.01, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-4.01 (1962). See generally 19 R. HAMILTON,
TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 351-62; Brimble, Ultra Vires Under the Texas
Business Corporation Act, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 677 (1962).
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General Powers. Several of the general powers enumerated in article
2.02(A) have been clarified or made more specific, although it is probable
all the matters added or altered were reasonably implied within the powers
granted by that article before its amendment. For example, 'the language
of article 2.02(A)(11) now allows a Texas corporation to operate "within
or without this State," rather than "in any state, territory, district or possession
of the United States, or any foreign country." 90  The change eliminates any
question that might be raised respecting such activities as offshore exploration
and drilling, maritime shipping, or, in the not too distant future, outer space. 91
Similarly, current ambiguities in determining the existence of a state of war 2
so as to allow a corporation to "make donations in aid of war activities" 93
or "in time of war" to conduct any lawful business that will aid the govern-
ment in the prosecution of the war94 has led to amendments deleting the
war activities donation power9" and enlarging the corporation's power to
transact any lawful business the board finds "will be in aid of govern-
mental policy." 90 This expansion of power is a significant one. A corporation
whose management has a strong sense of social responsibility, for example,
can now properly participate in governmentally-sponsored programs to com-
bat such matters as poverty, crime, pollution, or discrimination without need
for amending its articles to authorize such activities. 97  Indeed, given the
90. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(11) (Supp. 1974), formerly ch. 64,
art. 2.02(A)(11), [1955] Tex. Laws 239.
91. See Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.01, 3A TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
13 (Supp. 1974); Doty & Parker 1012. Another reason for the change was to clear
the ambiguity implicit in the term "foreign country" with respect to such areas as
trusteeships under United Nations mandate or Antarctica. See 1 ABA MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, at 154.
92. The obvious example is the Vietnam War and the controversy it engendered as
to its constitutionality and legality. Most of the legal arguments were raised in the lit-
erature. See, e.g., AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE VIETNAM WAR AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Falk ed. 1968); Faulkner, The War in Vietnam: Is It Constitu-
tional?, 56 GEO. L.J. 1132 (1968); Robertson, Debate Among American International
Lawyers About the Vietnam War, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 898 (1968). The issue was never
resolved by the Supreme Court, despite the efforts of Mr. Justice Douglas. See, e.g.,
DaCosta v. Laird, 405 U.S. 979 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Massachusetts v.
Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Hart v. United States, 391 U.S.
956 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
93. Ch. 64, art. 2.02(A)(14), [1955] Tex. Laws 239, as amended, TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(14) (Supp. 1974).
94. Ch. 64, art. 2.02(A)(15), [1955] Tex. Laws 239, as amended, TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(15) (Supp. 1974).
95. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(14) (Supp. 1974).
96. Id. art. 2.02(A)(15). The change in language will still allow the corporation
to assist the Government in times of belligerency through donations or war activities
but now makes clear it may also join in governmental efforts in domestic and other "pol-
icy areas." Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.02, 3A TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
13, 14 (Supp. 1974); Doty & Parker 1012.
97. Scott, supra note 11, at 292. Aside from the narrower legal issue of whether
a corporation has power to participate in programs that seek to solve or at least mitigate
societal problems, whether governmentally-sponsored or not, there is the broader ques-
tion of whether a business organization whose purported primary objective is to maxi-
mize the value of its owners' investment therein should become involved at all in such
matters. The developing body of writings on the propriety of such participation is be-
coming extensive. See, e.g., P. BLUMBERG, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN A CHANGING
SOCIETY: ESSAYS ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (1972); THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY (E. Mason ed. 1959); R. EELLS, CORPORATE GIVING IN A FREE SOCI-
ETY (1956); N. JACOBY, CORPORATE POWER AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (1973); H.
MANNE & H. WALLICH, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (1972);
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broad scope of governmental interests these days, the provision comes close
to giving carte blanche authority to the directors to undertake almost any
endeavor they choose to pursue, so long as some relation to public policy
can be found.
A new power has been added that makes clear a corporation can organize,
join, or manage any partnership, joint venture, or other enterprise it may
enter,98 although such authority would seem to be implied in article
2.02(A)(7). 99 In addition, it may serve as an incorporator in any other
jurisdiction permitting foreign corporations to serve as such. 100 The specific
authorization to enter into a partnership should lay -to rest for once and for
all the old common law view that a corporation cannot 'be a partner.10'
Another amendment sanctions the procurement of liability insurance on
behalf of present or former directors, officers, employees, or agents or persons
serving in any of those capacities in other enterprises at the corporation's re-
quest even if the corporation might otherwise lack power to indemnify any
of these persons against liability under the Act.10 2
As originally proposed by the Bar Committee, the provision was part of
a much more comprehensive subsection liberalizing the indemnification
power;103 however, due to opposition expressed to its broader terms, the
present language on indemnification was retained, with only the liability
insurance authorization being added.10 4
Guaranty Power. For many years, the status of corporate guaranties con-
stituted a troublesome area of -the Texas law. Much of the difficulty arose
from a narrow view the Texas courts took of the guaranty power. Insisting
Hacker, Do Corporations Have a Social Duty?, in THE CORPORATION IN THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY (H. Trebing ed. 1970); Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders,
Managers and Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REV. 248 (1969); Sommer,
Longstreth & Loomis, Corporate Social Responsibility Panel: The Role of the SEC, 28
Bus. LAw. 215 (1973).
98. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(18) (Supp. 1974). Former subsec-
tions (18) and (19) (empowering corporations to dissolve and to exercise all powers
necessary or appropriate to carry out its purposes, respectively) have been renumbered
as subsections (19) and (20), respectively. Ch. 545, § 3, [1973] Tex. Laws 1486.
99. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(7) (1956), authorizing the corporation
to acquire, among other securities, interests in partnerships. Cf. Port Arthur Trust Co.
v. Muldrow, 155 Tex. 612, 614, 291 S.W.2d 312, 314 (1956), noted in 35 TEXAS L. REV.
265 (1956) (noting, but not deciding whether this subsection changed the former hold-
ings of the Texas courts that a corporation cannot become a partner); compare with
Texas Uniform Partnership Act that includes corporations within its definition of per-
sons who may form a partnership. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 2 (1970).
See 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 121, at 108; Comment,
Can a Corporation Be a Partner in Texas?, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 210 (1972).
100. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(18) (Supp. 1974); see text accom-
panying notes 71-75 supra.
101. See, e.g., Port Arthur Trust Co. v. Muldrow, 155 Tex. 612, 614, 291 S.W.2d
312, 314 (1956), noted in 35 TEXAS L. REv. 265 (1956) (dictum); Luling Oil & Gas
Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 144 Tex. 475, 483, 191 S.W.2d 716, 722 (1945) (dic-
tum); Thomas v. Southern Lumber Co., 181 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1944); Sabine Tram Co. v. Bancroft, 40 S.W. 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897), error ref. See
generally 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 121; 1 I. HILDEBRAND,
TEXAS CORPORATIONS 268; 1 HORNSTEIN § 117.
102. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(16) (Supp. 1974). For further discus-
sion, see text accompanying notes 792-820 infra.
103. S.B. 202, § 4, 63d Legis., Reg. Sess. (1973). The indemnification provisions
would have been added as a new article 2.02-1.
104. Wolf, supra note 9, at 537; see text accompanying notes 795-98 infra.
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that only those guaranties shown to directly benefit 'the corporation are
proper, 105 the courts refused to enforce guaranties for the benefit of
customers, 10 6 employees, 10 7 or affiliated companies, 10 8 despite their demon-
strable economic advantages in building customer good will, encouraging
employee loyalty and tenure, or assisting related enterprises with their financ-
ing. 10 9 Enactment of the TBCA and other legislative changes alleviated the
problem to some extent, primarily by curtailing use of the ultra vires de-
fense, but even with these innovations, the law remained in a muddled state.
To begin with, despite the expansion of permissible purposes for which
a Texas corporation can be formed under the TBCA, 1 0 a general business
corporation cannot include the making of guaranties as one of its stated pur-
poses. The reason given is that it would then be considered as engaged in
the insurance business, 1' something prohibited under the Act."12  Secondly,
while article 2.02(A) of the Act enumerates a variety of powers every busi-
ness corporation may utilize to carry out the objects or purposes for which
it was formed, 113 the guaranty power is not among them. 1 4 Even if it were,
any exercise of the power would also be governed by article 2.06 of the Mis-
cellaneous Corporation Laws Act that, in the words of the Texas Constitu-
105. The view was based on the belief that a corporation should not lend its credit
to another because it might then be risking its assets on enterprises alien to the purposes
for which it was formed. Northside Ry. v. Worthington, 88 Tex. 562, 568-69, 30 S.W.
1055, 1056 (1895). See, e.g., Rio Refrigeration Co. v. Thermal Supply of Harlingen,
Inc., 368 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1963); Ingram v. Texas Christian
Univ., 196 S.W. 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1917), error ref. See generally W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2588; 1 I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS
§ 76.
106. E.g., W.C. Bowman Lumber Co. v. Pierson, 110 Tex. 543, 221 S.W. 930 (1920);
Deaton Grocery Co. v. International Harvester Co., 47 Tex. Civ. App. 267, 105 S.W.
556 (1907), error ref.
107. E.g., L.G. Balfour Co. v. Gossett, 131 Tex. 348. 115 S.W.2d 594 (1938); Al
& Lloyd Parker, Inc. v. Cameron County Lumber Co., 56 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1932), alf'd, 122 Tex. 487, 62 S.W.2d 63 (1933).
108. E.g., Northside Ry. v. Worthington, 88 Tex. 562, 30 S.W. 1055 (1895).
109. Other obvious advantages attainable through use of guaranties are assuring
sources of supplies and components, aiding franchise operations of franchisees, and as-
sisting subsidiary corporations in their operations. Generally, guaranties for the benefit
of subsidiaries are sustained on the basis of the direct benefit derived in protecting the
parent's investment in such entities. See, e.g., Baker v. Edson Hotel Operating Co., 99
S.W.2d 998 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1936); Ingram v. Texas Christian Univ., 196
S.W. 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1917), error ref. For a good summary discus-
sion of the economic benefits that can be gained from guaranties, see Comment, The
Guaranty: A Dilemma For Corporate Managers, 23 Sw. L.J. 872 (1969).
110. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.01(A) (1956); see text accompanying notes
82-89 supra.
111. TEx. Ar'y GEN. OP. No. WW-440 (1958).
112. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.01(B)(4)(d), 9.14(A) (1956).
113. Id. art. 2.02 (Supp. 1974).
114. At the time the TBCA was originally drafted, the 1950 version of the Model
Business Corporation Act on which the TBCA was based did not include the guaranty
power among those enumerated in § 4 of that Act. It was added as an amendment in
1957 to § 4(h), which parallels TBCA art. 4.02(A)(9), by inserting the phrase "and
guarantees" following the introductory words: "To make contracts . . ." 1 ABA MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 104 (1960). Article 2.02(A), as first enacted, closely followed § 4
of the Model Act as it then read. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.02, 3A TEX.
REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. 24 (1956). Thus, in simply following the Model Act pattern in
omitting the guaranty power from that article the Bar Committee had no intention of
precluding the exercise of the guaranty power by Texas corporations. Indeed it couldbe argued the power was inferred by other provisions of the article, e.g., arts. 2.02(A)(5), (7), (9), (10), and (20). See 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
§ 360, at 399 n.50 (1973).
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tion,115 prohibits the creation of any indebtedness whatever except for money
paid, labor done, or property actually received, although recognizing the con-
clusiveness of the -board's or shareholders' judgment as to the value of the
consideration received for such indebtedness, in the absence of fraud. 116
Thirdly, when -the legislature did endeavor to specifically recognize the guar-
anty power by an amendment added to article 2.06 in 1963,117 the provision
was so narrow in scope, being limited to guaranties among corporations in
a one hundred percent stock ownership relation with each other,"" it was
of little use ,to most corporations. 1 9 And while the amendment took pains
to say it was not intended to limit any power corporations not meeting its
terms might otherwise have, 120 this was of no great aid, other than dispelling
any notion of exclusivity, because it meant the validity of the power would
still have to be resolved by the largely silent statutory law or by unsatisfactory
common law principles. 'Finally, there was (and still is) article 1349, one
of -the remnants of the old corporation law left unrepealed after adoption
of the TMCLA, 121 which prohibits a corporation from using its assets, directly
115. TEx. CONST. art. XII, § 6.
116. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06(A) (1962). The statute does not
precisely track its constitutional source. Thus both "labor done" and "property actually
received" as proper consideration for creation of indebtedness are qualified by the
phrase, "which is reasonably worth at the least the sum at which it is taken by the cor-
poration," a phrase not found in the constitution. Nor does the latter provide for the
"in absence of fraud" determination of the value of such consideration, a standard de-
rived from TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. art. 2.16(C) (1956).
117. Ch. 469, § 3, [19631 Tex. Laws 1184, adding TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 1302-2.06(B) (Supp. 1964).
118. The 1963 amendment (which was not Bar Committee-sponsored), empowered
a corporation doing business in the state to enter into written contracts of guaranty or
to become liable on, or to mortgage, pledge, or make itself or its assets responsible for
the lawful indebtedness of parent, subsidiary, or affiliated corporation, as those terms
were defined in the section. As defined, the relationship between the guarantor and
debtor corporations had to be based on a parent's ownership of 100% of the outstanding
stock of its subsidiaries. A guarantor that ended up paying any of the indebtedness be-
cause of the up-stream, down-stream or cross-stream obligation was granted a cause of
action to recover that amount, less any offset the other corporation might be entitled
to. TMCLA art. 2.06(B), ch. 469, § 3, [1963] Tex. Laws 1184, as amended, TEx. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06(B) (Supp. 1974).
119. For example, even a parent corporation owning as much as 90% of a subsidi-
ary's outstanding stock that desired to guarantee the latter's obligations was forced to
rely on the more general provisions of TMCLA art. 2.06(A) or on case precedents (see
authorities cited in note 109 supra), even though it had sufficient ownership to effect
a short form merger under Tax. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.16 (Supp. 1974). For
critical comments on the limited applicability of TMCLA art. 2.06(B), see 19 R. HAM-
ILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 360, at 400; Drury, Amendments to Corpo-
rations Laws, 33 TEX. B.J. 961 (1970); Witt, Corporate Guaranties: The Quest for
Legislative Clarification, 36 TEX. B.J. 907 (1973).
120. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06(B) (Supp. 1974).
121. When first enacted in 1955, the TBCA was applicable only to corporations
formed or seeking to transact business in Texas after its effective date and to domestic
and qualified foreign corporations adopting the Act, TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
9.14(D) (1956). Virtually none of the old corporation statutes found in title 32 of the
Texas Revised Civil Statutes were repealed. Instead a period of 5 years was prescribed
before the Act applied to all corporations, id. art. 9.14(E), and in the interim other pre-
TBCA business corporations continued to be governed by the unrepealed laws. Id. art.
9.14(B); see Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 9.14, 3A TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN.
422 (1956). After the Act became applicable to all corporations in September 1960,
the Bar Committee proposed a repeal of all the old laws that conflicted with the TBCA
and with the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act, passed under its sponsorship in 1959.
TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1396-1.01 to -11.01 (1963), adopted by ch. 162, [1959]
Tex. Laws 286. At one time, the committee proposed enactment of a Texas Corporation
Code that would have included the TBCA, the Non-Profit Act, statutes dealing with spe-
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or indirectly, to accomplish other than the legitimate business of its crea-
tion,122 on penalty of forfeiting its charter,' 2 3 that has been invoked at times
as a ground for invalidating a corporate guaranty.' 2 4
On the other hand, some relief has been afforded through judicial applica-
tion of article 2.04 of the TBCA to prevent the corporation, at least, from
avoiding liability on its guaranty by asserting its ultra vires nature125 or claim-
cial types of corporations, and miscellaneous provisions applicable to all corporations,
Amsler, Report of Committee on Revision of Corporation Laws, 23 TEx. B.J. 327(1960), but decided instead to seek passage of legislation that would recodify the general
provisions of the old law worth retaining into a Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws
Act, leave the statutes pertaining to special types of corporations untouched, and repeal
the rest. Amsler, Proposed Corporation Law Revisions, 23 TEX. B.J. 709 (1960). Its
proposals were all enacted, except that the legislature chose to exclude a few of the old
statutes from the general repealer, ch. 229, § 1, [1961] Tex. Laws 458, mainly because
those laws provided a further basis for state action to forfeit a corporation's charter or
permit to do business for engaging in ultra vires acts or creating watered stock or indebt-
edness or to force cancellation of watered securities. See 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSI-
NESS ORGANIZATIONS § 1, at 7. Interestingly, article 1348, which prohibited creation of
indebtedness except for receipt of the constitutionally prescribed consideration, see note
116 supra, was retained even though it had been substantially recodified in TMCLA art.
2.06; it was repealed in 1963 at the time section B was added to that article to permit
the 100% ownership intercorporate guaranties (with the former provision becoming sec-
tion A) at the suggestion of this author to the amendment's legislative sponsor. Ch.
469, § 1, [1963] Tex. Laws 1184. However, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1351(1963), continues to provide that a violation of article 1348 or article 1349 (prohibiting
ultra vires business) will furnish grounds for forfeiture of a corporation's charter or per-
mit to do business in Texas. Arguably any violation of TMCLA art. 2.06(A), because
of its derivation from article 1348, would be subject to the same sanction.
122. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1349 (1962). Despite its sweeping terms, the
statute has been repeatedly interpreted as being no more than a declaration of the com-
mon law principle confining a corporation's activities to the purposes for which it was
formed with the consequence that an act violative of its provisions is not illegal, but
ultra vires only. See, e.g., Continental Assurance Co. v. Supreme Constr. Corp., 375
F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1967); Whitten v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 397 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1965);
Staacke v. Routledge, ll Tex. 489, 241 S.W. 994 (1922); Bond v. Terrell Cotton &
Mfg. Co., 82 Tex. 309, 18 S.W. 691 (1891); 1 I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS
189. It is also to be interpreted so as not to nullify or conflict with article 2.04 of the
TBCA. Republic Nat'l Bank v. Whitten, 383 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1964), aff'd on other grounds, 397 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1965).
123. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1351 (1962).
124. E.g., East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Pollock Paper & Box Co., 197 S.W.2d
883 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1946), rev'd on other grounds, 145 Tex. 634, 201 S.W.2d
228 (1947); Newton v. Houston Hot Well Improvement Co., 211 S.W. 960 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1919) (dictum); Carla Land & Irrigation Co. v. Asherton State Bank,
164 S.W. 1066 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1914) (dictum). The most recent deci-
sion is Cooper Petroleum Co. v. LaGloria Oil & Gas Co., 423 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 436 S.W.2d 889 (Tex.
1969), discussed in Amsler, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J.
98, 103 (1969), in which the court rejected an argument that a family-owned corpora-
tion's guaranty of performance of contracts of another corporation controlled by the
same family was illegal and void because it contravened articles 1349 and 1302-2.06(A).
The court held that at most the guaranty was ultra vires, a defense the corporation could
not assert under TBCA art. 2.04(B). The supreme court reversed and remanded be-
cause of improper admission of documentary evidence to prove the guaranteed indebted-
ness. Upon retrial, the plaintiff again recovered on the guaranty and his judgment was
affirmed by the Houston first court of civil appeals in an unreported opinion that once
more rejected the argument of illegality based on violation of the two statutes. An ap-
plication for writ of error was refused for no reversible error. Witt, supra note 119;
see Fagan v. LaGloria Oil & Gas Co., 494 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1973), a sequel to this protracted litigation.
125. Cooper Petroleum Corp. v. LaGloria Oil & Gas Co., 423 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 436 S.W.2d 889 (Tex.
1969), discussed in Amsler, supra note 124; Empire Steel Corp. v. Omni Steel Corp.,
378 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Forth 1964), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in 43
TEXAS L. REV. 792 (1965), and 3 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON CORP., BANKING & Bus.
L., Nov. 1964, at 1-3.
[Vol. 28
TEXAS CORPORATION LAW
ing its illegality under article 1349.126 But even -the benefit of these deci-
sions has been offset somewhat by the holding in Inter-Continental Corp. v.
Moody127 permitting a shareholder to intervene in a proceeding between the
corporation and the third party to prevent enforcement of an obligation
claimed ,to be ultra vires.128  It is of no wonder then that Texas commenta-
tors, 129 in lamenting the unresolved state of the law, asked for legislative re-
form.' 3 0
Hopefully the call for reform has been answered by a Bar Committee spon-
sored amendment of TMCLA article 2.06(B) that endeavors to cut the
Gordian knot of uncertainty and spell out for once and for all the corporate
guaranty power in Texas. Under the amendment,' 3 ' either a domestic or
qualified foreign corporation is empowered to make a guaranty of contracts,
securities or other obligations of another individual or entity if the guaranty
"may reasonably be expected to benefit, directly or indirectly, the guarantor
corporation.' 1 32 However, in keeping with the prohibition on lending money
to officers or directors,'1 33 guaranties cannot be made for those officials. The
126. Cooper Petroleum Corp. v. LaGloria Oil & Gas Co., 423 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 436 S.W.2d 889 (Tex.
1969);see notes 122, 124 supra.
127. 411 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in
Amsler, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 59, 72-73 (1968),
noted in 21 Sw. L.J. 562 (1967), 45 TEXAs L. REV. 1422 (1967).
128. The defendant corporation had been sued on a note which it claimed had been
executed solely to compensate a lender for making a personal loan to its controlling
shareholder and from which it received no benefit. Apparently the intervention was suc-
cessful because on retrial the corporation's liability was confined to the proportion of
the benefit it was shown to have derived from the primary loan, but not for the balance.
Witt, supra note 119, at 911-12.
129. 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 360; Pearce Corporate
Guaranties-A Rationale for Enforceability, 5 BULL. OF THE SEcTION ON CORP., BANK-
ING & Bus. L., Jan. 1967, at 1; Slover, Enforceability of Guaranties Made by Texas Cor-
porations, 10 Sw. L.J. 134 (1956); Witt, supra note 119; Comment, The Guaranty: A
Dilemma for Corporate Managers, 23 Sw. L.J. 872 (1969); Comment, Ultra Vires Un-
der the Texas Business Corporation Act, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 677, 688 (1962).
130. See, e.g., Drury, Amendments to Corporation Laws, 33 TEX. B.J. 961, 962
(1970); Comment, The Guaranty: A Dilemma for Corporate Managers, 23 Sw. L.J.
872, 883 (1969). The latter sets out the text of a suggested amendment to TBCA. Id.
at 887.
131. Ch. 285, § 1, [1973] Tex. Laws 676, amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
1302-2.06(B) (Supp. 1974). Adoption of the amendment culminated a long and some-
times frustrating effort by the Bar Committee to revise the statute and clarify the law
on corporate guaranties. In 1967 the Committee drafted a bill to reduce the 100%
stock ownership required for intercorporate guaranties to 50%, but it was withdrawn af-
ter running into objections by the State Bar Legislative Liaison Committee questioning
its constitutionality under article XII, § 6 of the Texas Constitution. Comment, supra
note 130, at 882 n.88. The committee came back with a revised version in 1971 that
expanded the guaranty power to encompass any guaranty that could be expected to be
of either direct or indirect benefit to the corporation if so determined by the directors
in the absence of fraud, but when this bill encountered some unexpected opposition in
the legislature, passage was not pushed and it died in committee. See Drury, supra note
130, at 962; Lebowitz, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 86 n.7
(1972). Undaunted, the committee returned a third time with an expanded version of
the 1971 bill and finally attained success. See Kerr, Proposed Amendments to Corpora-
tion Laws, 35 TEx. B.J. 1133, 1134 (1972); Witt, supra note 119, at 912.
132. TMCLA art. 2.06(B), TEX. REV. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06(B) (Supp.
1974).
133. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. arts. 2.02(A)(6), 2.41(A)(4) (1956). Consistent
with the approach taken by the courts to ultra vires guaranties, these statutes are re-
garded as limitations on the exercise of the corporate power to lend, not proscriptions
of illegal acts; hence a loan to an officer or director will be regarded as no more than
an ultra vires act. See Whitten v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 397 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1965),
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decision of the board of directors concerning the presence of the benefit,
whether direct or indirect, the corporation may reasonably expect to gain
thereby is binding upon it unless the party seeking to enforce the guaranty
induced its making by fraud on the guarantor corporation or else had notice
of such fraud before he acquired his rights under the guaranty. If the guar-
anty has not yet been made, a shareholder acting in his representative capa-
city can seek to enjoin its making if he can show no reasonable expectation
of direct or indirect benefit to the corporation. But once the guaranty has
been entered into, the corporation is bound thereby and it is doubtful -that
even shareholder intervention as in Inter-Continental can avoid its liability
thereon.134  Presumably any authorization of the making of the guaranty by
the board implies a decision on its part that the guaranty will be of benefit
to the corporation, but in view of the statutory language 35 it would be wise
to have the guaranty recite the board's decision as to such benefit.
Although, in the absence of fraud, the corporation must honor the guaranty
once it has been made, there still may be recourse against the directors who
approved or assented to its making if no reasonable expectation of benefit
can be shown to have existed.' 36  The action can be brought by the corpora-
tion or its legal representative or by a shareholder in a representative action,
seeking damages or other relief. The directors are entitled to assert any de-
fenses they have under "any other laws of the State of Texas.' 37  The
quoted phrase undoubtedly covers the defense of reliance in good faith and
in the exercise of ordinary care on a written opinion of an attorney for the
corporation, set out in TBCA article 2.41(D); presumably it would also en-
compass the safe harbor sometimes afforded by the general business judg-
ment rule138 or other affirmative defenses.' 89
discussed in Pelletier, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 134, 150(1967), noted in 20 Sw. L.J. 861 (1966); 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANI-
ZATIONS § 361.
134. A shareholder is given standing to enjoin the making of a guaranty not reason-
ably expected to benefit the corporation, but such action must be brought "prior to the
making of a guaranty by a corporation." TMCLA art. 2.06(B), TEx. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 1302-2.06(B) (Supp. 1974). In contrast, the comparable provision in the
TBCA, relied on in the Inter-Continental case, permits an action by a shareholder to
enjoin the doing of an ultra vires act or the ultra vires transfer of any real or personal
property and the requested relief may be granted if the unauthorized act or transfer "is
being, or is to be, performed." TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.04(B)(1) (1956).
Since litigation involving a guaranty is not likely to occur until the corporation is called
upon to carry out its obligation, a shareholder would normally have sufficient time to
bring an original injunctive proceeding, or intervene as permitted in Inter-Continental,
under article 2.04(B), were it not for the more explicit language in TMCLA art. 2.06(B). The latter statute reinforces the need for prompt shareholder action before the
guaranty is made by providing that once it has been entered into, the only recourse the
shareholder then has is to bring a derivative or representative action against the direct-
ors responsible therefor for damages or other relief.
135. "The decision of the Board of Directors that the guaranty may reasonably be
expected to benefit, directly or indirectly, the guarantor corporation shall be binding
upon the guarantor corporation .... ." TMCLA art. 2.06(B), TEX. REv. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 1302-2.06(B) (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. In essence, this rule exonerates directors or officers from liability for honest
mistakes and errors in judgment that may cause economic or other harm to the corpora-
tion if they have acted in good faith, for the best interests of the corporation, and with-
out violation of their duties of care and loyalty. It is also used at times to justify judi-
cial refusal to interfere with management's business decisions on the ground that a court
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The amendment reiterates the former language that the section is not in-
tended to limit or deny any other power the corporation is permitted to exer-
cise under the law but adds a proviso that the section is not to apply to or
enlarge the powers of any corporation subject to regulation under the Texas
Insurance Code' 40 nor permits any corporation not subject to such regulation
"to engage in any character, type, class, or kind of fidelity, surety or guaranty
business or transaction subject to regulation under the Insurance Code."' 1'
In one regard, however, the amendment might seem to be more restrictive
than the former provision. Insofar as the latter sanctioned a guaranty of
the indebtedness of any parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of the guarantor cor-
poration, 142 the amendment explicitly encompasses such entities within its
terms.14  Yet the old section spoke not only of guaranteeing such indebted-
ness, but also of becoming liable thereon and "-to mortgage, pledge or make
itself or its assets responsible" therefor.144 Although these words are not con-
tained in the amendment, the general power to secure obligations by mort-
gage or pledge is already conferred ,by the TBCA145 and the power to guar-
ought not to substitute its own judgment as to the wisdom of such decisions if the di-
rectors seem to be acting properly in their determination. Invocation of the rule by a
court frequently signals a decision not to find the directors or officers liable for the ques-
tioned transaction. See, e.g., Cates v. Sparkman, 73 Tex. 619, 11 S.W. 846 (1889);
Bounds v. Stephenson, 187 S.W. 1031 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1916), error ref.; Farwell
v. Babcock, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 162, 65 S.W. 509 (1901). See generally 20 R. HAMIL-
TON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 720; HENN 482; Lebowitz, Director Misconduct
and Shareholder Ratification, 6 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1953); Lewis, The Business
Judgment Rule and Corporate Directors' Liability for Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L.
REV. 157 (1970); Note, The Continuing Viability of the Business Judgment Rule as a
Guide for Judicial Restraint, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562 (1967); Note, The Business
Judgment Rule: A Guide to Corporate Directors' Liability, 7 ST. Louis U.L.J. 151
(1962).
139. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 94; 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
§ 360 (Supp. 1974).
140. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 1.01-22.23 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
141. TMCLA art. 2.06(B), TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06(B) (Supp.
1974). The proviso was added at the insistence of the Texas State Board of Insurance
and the commissioner of insurance who feared that, because of the general applicability
of the corporation laws to insurance companies when not inconsistent with the Insurance
Code, TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 2.18 (1963), the remedial legislation passed in 1971
regulating transactions within insurance holding company systems and prohibiting cer-
tain transactions by insurers with their corporate insiders might be weakened. TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. arts. 1.29, 21.49-1 (Supp. 1974); see Lebowitz, supra note 131, at 90-96.
For example, an insurance company cannot make a loan to "or guarantee the financial
obligation" of any director, officer, or shareholder owning 10% or more of any equity
class of security, either directly or indirectly, or through its subsidiaries, nor can any
of those persons accept such loan or guaranty. Id. art. 1.29, § 1. Similarly, the regis-
tration statement of an insurer which is a member of an insurance holding company sys-
tem must report all "guarantees or undertakings for the benefit of an affiliate" resulting
in contingent liability outside of ordinary insurance contracts. Id. art. 21.49-1, § 3(b)
(3) (iv). Moreover, any material transaction by an insurer with another entity in the
holding company system must have terms that are fair and equitable. Id. art. 21.49-
1, § 4(a)(1). Although TMCLA art. 2.06(B), as noted in the text, prohibits guaranties
for the benefit of any director or officer, there is no comparable provision as to control-
ling shareholders.
142. TMCLA art. 2.06(B)(1), TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2.06(B)(1) (Supp.
1964).
143. The amendment speaks in terms of guaranteeing the obligations of any other
person but defines "person" to include any domestic or foreign corporation and other
entities.
144. TMCLA art. 2.06(B)(1), TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2.06(B) (Supp.
1964).
145. TEx. Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. art. 2.02(A) (5) (1956).
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anty now expressly conferred undoubtedly implies a power to mortgage or
pledge assets for another corporation's benefit. 146
Criminal Liability. In a sense, the most revolutionary change in the Texas
law of corporations was not made by amendments to the TBCA and
TMCLA but resulted from the complete revision of the Texas Penal Code
and conforming amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure and other
laws which become effective on January 1, 1974.147 For years Texas stood
alone as the only jurisdiction in which corporations bore no general criminal
responsibility. 148 While there were a few statutes that imposed criminal lia-
bility in limited situations, mainly for pollution or willful violations of econo-
mic regulatory legislation,'14 even these were virtually negated by the absence
of a procedure under which Texas corporations could be prosecuted. 1 0 Under
the new criminal legislation,' 5 ' all this has changed. Texas corporations have
become both criminally responsible and prosecutable. So, for that matter,
have all business or non-business associations. 152
146. Comment of Bar Committee to TMCLA art. 2.06, 3 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN.
132 (Supp. 1974); Doty & Parker 1027.
147. Ch. 399, §§ 1-8, [1973] Tex. Laws 883. The new Penal Code represents the
first overall revision of the substantive law of crimes in Texas since the Code was first
enacted in 1856. The revision culminates a seven-year effort by the State Bar Commit-
tee on Revision of the Penal Code and the Texas Legislative Council. Bubany, The
Texas Penal Code of 1974, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 292 (1974).
148. 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 239 (1973); Hamilton,
Corporate Criminal Liability in Texas, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 60 (1968); Hildebrand, Corpo-
rate Liability for Torts and Crime, 13 TEXAS L. REV. 253, 275 (1935); Keeton & Searcy,
A New Penal Code for Texas, 33 TEx. B.J. 980, 985 (1970); Lebowitz, supra note 131,
at 114 n.154.
149. E.g., TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5b, §§ 1(2), (4) (Supp. 1974) (air
pollution); Tax. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 21.551-.553 (1972) (water pollution); TEx.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6008, §§ 2, 23 (1962) (regulation of natural gas production);
id. art. 4477-6, §§ 2(m), 19(a) (Supp. 1974) (Texas Renderers' License Act); various
consumer protection statutes in id. art. 5069: -1.01, -1.06 (1971) (usury), -2.01(a),
-8.03 (1971) (lending without license), -11.01(g), -11.09 (Supp. 1974) (improper debt
collection), -51.02(a), -51.17(a) (Supp. 1974) (operating pawnshops without license);
and TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.45(3), 17.62(a) (Supp. 1974) (deceptive
trade practices).
150. Thompson v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 348 S.W.2d 274, 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1961), error ref. n.r.e., noted in 40 TEXAS L. REV. 1057 (1962); cf. McCollum v. State,
165 Tex. Crim. 241, 305 S.W.2d 612 (1957); see Hamilton, supra note 148, at 62;
Hamilton, Corporations and Partnerships, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 91,
93 (1970).
151. The provisions relating to criminal responsibility of corporations and associa-
tions were derived from MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.07, 6.04 (Proposed Official Draft
1962) and were based on a study and recommendations by Professor Hamilton who
served as reporter to the Texas Penal Code revision project on the subject. Hamilton,
supra note 148, at 76.
152. Prior to the 1973 revision there was considerable doubt whether a partnership,
firm, or an unincorporated association of any type could be prosecuted for a crime.
Several cases indicated by way of dicta they could not be. Overt v. State, 97 Tex. Crim.
202, 209, 260 S.W. 856, 859 (1924); Judge Lynch Int'l Book & Pub. Co. v. State, 84
Tex. Crim. 459, 208 S.W. 526 (1919); Petersen & Fitch v. State, 32 Tex. 477 (1870);
cf. Mills v. State, 23 Tex. 295, 301 (1859) (partnership not a company or association
of individuals within penal statute against illegal banking). See 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 154, at 147; 44 TEx. JUR. 2d, Partnership § 94, at 421(1963). Moreover, a 1969 attorney general's opinion ruled that it would be unconstitu-
tional to make associations, partnerships, firms, trusts, and estates subject to criminal
sanctions for air or water pollution and under specific procedures applicable to corpora-
tions and other entities for such acts, as provided in two bills then pending in the 61st
Legislature, although corporations could properly be brought within the provisions of the
proposed statutes. Tax. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. M-348, at 1723 (1969). As a conse-
quence, the two statutes when enacted confined their definitions of "person" to individu-
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The revised criminal statutes deal with corporations and associations in
several ways. First, the term "person" is defined in both Codes153 to include
a corporation or association. The latter in turn is defined to include a trust,
partnership, or two or more persons having a joint or common economic in-
terest.154  To describe the corporate or associational representatives whose
acts can give rise to criminal liability, "agent" is used to mean a director, offi-
cer, employee or other authorized representative,' 55 and "high managerial
agent" to designate a partner in a partnership, an officer in a corporation,
or association, or an agent of either whose duties and responsibilities are such
that it may be assumed his conduct represents the organization's policy.' 0
A specific subsection sets out the substantive bases for the criminal respon-
sibility of corporations and associations and those who act in their behalf and
at the same time creates a due diligence defense against some prosecutions.' 57
Since a corporation can only carry on its business through its representatives,
responsibility is assessed in terms of who performs the criminal act. If com-
mitted by an agent who acts in the corporation's behalf and within the scope
of his office or employment, the corporation can be found guilty if the offense
is one defined in the code or in another statute where it is clear the legislature
intends to impose corporate criminal responsibility or else create strict liabi-
lity without regard to culpable mental state, unless the contrary intent ap-
pears.' 58  Whether the agent is acting within the scope of his duties is an
issue that should be resolved on the basis of general agency principles.5 9
als and private corporations. Ch. 153, § 1, [1969] Tex. Laws 480 (air pollution), codi-fied as TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 698d, § 1(2) (Supp. 1973), §§ 1-6 transferred to
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5b, §§ 1-6 (Supp. 1974), and § 7-12 repealed
effective Jan. 1, 1974, by ch. 399, § 3(a), [1973] Tex. Laws 991; ch. 154, § 1, [1969]
Tex. Laws 483 (water pollution), codified as TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 698c, § 1(4),
recodified in TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 21.551-.564 (1972), repealed by ch. 399, § 3(a), [1973] Tex. Laws 991 and ch. 653, § 7, [1973] Tex. Laws 1780. Professor Ham-
ilton quite properly criticizes the opinion both for its reasoning and its failure to con-
sider the effect of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
6132b, §§ 1-46 (1962) which leans heavily toward an entity approach, see Kirshenbaum
v. Smith, 480 S.W.2d 500, 503 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972); Bromberg, Comment
to § 1, Texas Uniform Partnership Act, 17 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. 234 (1962), and
case law elsewhere, see, e.g., United States v. A & P Trucking CO., 358 U.S. 121 (1958),
noted in 1 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 109 (1959); 47 GEO. L.J. 807 (1959); 8 KAN.
L. REV. 486 (1960); 33 ST. JoHs L. REV. 404 (1959). See generally A. BROMBERG,
CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 319 (1968). As is obvious from the text, the
draftsmen of the new Penal Code decided there was no valid objection, in their opinion,
to subjecting unincorporated associations to criminal liability and were confident the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals would agree. Committee Comment to § 7.23, PRO-
POSED TEXAS PENAL CODE (1970).
. 153. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(27) (Supp. 1974); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 17A.01(b) (4) (Supp. 1974).
154. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(5) (Supp. 1974); TEx. CODE CRiM. PROC.
ANN. art. 17A.01 (b) (2) (Supp. 1974).
155. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.21(1) (Supp. 1974); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN.
art. 17A.01(b)(1) (Supp. 1974).
156. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.21(2) (Supp. 1974); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN.
art. 17A.01(b) (3) (Supp. 1974).
157. Ch. 7, subch. B, "Corporations and Associations," TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. (Supp.
1974).
158. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.22(a) (Supp. 1974); see Committee Comment to
§ 7.22, PROPOSED TEXAS PENAL CODE (1970).
159. Committee Comment to § 7.22, PROPOSED TEXAS PENAL CODE (1970). See,
e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909); Egan v. United
States, 137 F.2d 369, 379 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943); Common-
wealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 71-94 (Mass. 1971); Vulcan Last Co. v.
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The requisite -that he act in behalf of the corporation refers to the capacity
in which he performs the act and not his motivation which may be for his
own personal benefit and indeed may harm the corporation. 1 0  On the other
hand, responsibility for a -felony offense is limi-ted to cases where its commis-
sion was either initiated, performed, or recklessly tolerated by a majority of
the board acting in their capacity as such or by a high managerial agent acting
for the corporation and in the scope of his office or employment. 16' Given
these limits, there are not likely to be many felony prosecutions. 16 2 In addi-
tion, the corporation or association may assert as an affirmative defense that
the high managerial agent who had supervisory responsibility over the subject
matter of the offense used due diligence to prevent its being committed. 6 s
Even so, the defense cannot be used if it would be inconsistent with the law
defining the particular offense,' 64 or if the prosecution is under a non-Code
statute imposing strict liability for its violation or is for a felony offense. 16
State, 194 Wis. 636, 643, 217 N.W. 412, 415 (1928). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 217D (1958); R. MATHEWS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW
OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 345 (2d ed. 1957) (fine note on imputation of criminal
and penal responsibilities); P. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY §§ 407-11
(4th ed. 1952); Burns, The Test of Vicarious Criminal Liability, 1967 CRIM. L. REV.
702; Fisse, The Delegation Principle: Vicarious Liability in Regulatory Offenses, 10
CiuM. L.Q. 417 (1968); Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43
HARV. L. REV. 689 (1930).
160. Committee Comment to § 7.22, PROPOSED TEXAS PENAL CODE (1970); Hamil-
ton, supra note 148, at 70. See, e.g., Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study
of the Model Penal Code on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. Prrr. L. REV.
21 (1957); Note, Corporate Criminal Liability for Acts in Violation of Company Pol-
icy, 50 GEO. L.J. 547 (1962); Note, Criminal Liability of Corporations for Acts of
Their Agents, 60 HARv. L. REV. 283 (1946).
161. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.22(b) (Supp. 1974).
162. Hamilton, supra note 148, at 79, listing as possible examples an officer's sending
of an employee truck driver to deliver goods knowing he is intoxicated or a mine super-
intendent's reckless ordering of employees into a mine he knows is unsafe. See, e.g.,
People v. Canadian Fur Trappers, 248 N.Y. 159, 161 N.E. 455 (1928) (larceny prosecu-
tion: company policy to sell coats being held in layaway); Rex v. Fane Robinson, Ltd.,
(1941] D.L.R. 409 (prosecution for obtaining money under false pretenses: officers col-
laborated with insurance adjuster to pad repair bills on insured cars); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.07, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
163. TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.24(a) (Supp. 1974). Perhaps the most famous ap-
plication of the "due diligence" defense is that afforded by § 11(b)(3)(A) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 to persons other than the issuer signing a registration statement
against civil liability under that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1972), and the
heightened concern over its applicability engendered by two federal district court opin-
ions that have become almost household words among securities lawyers: Escott v. Bar-
Chris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), and Feit v. Leasco Data Proc-
essing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). The BarChris case especially
stimulated a flood of writings and speeches on the dimensions of the defense. See, e.g.,
H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 8.14 (1972); Folk, Civil
Liability Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case: Part 1--Section 11
of the Securities Act of 1933, 55 VA. L. REV. 1, 19 (1969); Jordan, BarChris and the
Registration Process, 22 Sw. L.J. 790, 796 (1968); Symposium, The BarChris Case:
Prospectus Liability, 24 Bus. LAW. 523 (1969); Comment, Escott v. BarChris:
How Much Diligence Is Due?, 17 KAN. L. REV. 651 (1969); Comment, BarChris:
Easing the Burden of "Due Diligence" Under Section 11, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 735
(1969); Comment, Due Diligence and the Expert in Corporate Securities Registrations,
42 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1969).
164. TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.24(b) (Supp. 1974).
165. The defense is limited to prosecutions under § 7.22(a)(1) or (a)(2). It would
obviously be inconsistent with a statute imposing strict criminal liability. As to felony
offenses, as set out in § 7.22(b), the defense is precluded because if a majority of the
board of directors or a high managerial agent is involved, the corporation should be
bound even if other directors or high managerial agents exercise due diligence. Commit-
tee Comment to § 7.24, PROPOSED TEXAS PENAL CODE (1970).
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Even though the corporation may be found guilty of a criminal act, the
person committing the crime is not exonerated. If he acted in the corpora-
tion's name or behalf or if he fails to discharge a duty imposed on the cor-
poration by law for which he has primary responsibility, he is as culpable
as if he acted for himself or the duty were imposed on him, and is subject
to the same penalty any individual convicted of the offense would receive. 16"
Since obviously a corporation cannot be imprisoned or executed, the sanc-
tion for committing a crime must either be in the nature of a fine or penalty
or else termination of the corporation's existence in the state by forfeiting
its charter or, if a foreign corporation, cancelling its permit to do business.
The revision provides both. If an offense is punishable by a fine only, then
it is the sanction imposed; if imprisonment is part of the punishment or if
no penalty is prescribed for an offense, -the court may substitute a fine, the
amount of which, depending on the gravity of the offense, may range from
$200 to $10,000,167 or as an alternative, if the offense is one from which
the corporation gained some material benefit, such as obtaining property or
credit by a false statement' 68 or deceptive business practices,1 9 -the court may
fine -the corporation an amount up to double the economic gain, unless
the offense was a class C misdemeanor.170  Unlike individuals, the corpora-
tion or association is not eligible for probation.171  In addition to the fine
imposed, the court is obligated to notify the attorney general of a corpora-
tion's conviction or that of a high managerial agent with regard to an offense
committed while conducting the corporation's affairs.' 72  The attorney
general in turn may seek involuntary dissolution or revocation of a certificate
of authority to transact business in Texas if the offense committed by either
the corporation or the high managerial agent was a felony.' 73 However, to
gain this ultimate sanction the court must be shown both that the corporation
or the high managerial agent acting in its behalf has engaged in a persistent
course of felonious conduct and that dissolution or revocation is required to
prevent future conduct of the same character. 174 In view of the limited basis
166. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.23 (Supp. 1974). Thus, either the corporation or
the agent or both can be prosecuted. Committee Comment to § 7.25, PROPOSED TEXAs
PENAL CODE (1970). See also discussion in text accompanying notes 830-37 infra. The
rule is, of course, the same for civil liability. See, e.g., A.H. Belo & Co. v. Fuller, 84
Tex. 450, 452, 19 S.W. 616, 617 (1892) (dictum) (libel); Penroc Oil Corp. v. Donahue,
476 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972), error ref. n.r.e. (fraud), discussed
in Lebowitz, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 85, 93 (1973);
Sutton v. Reagan & Gee, 405 S.W.2d 828, 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966),
error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Pelletier, supra note 133, at 144.
167. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12.51(a), (b) (Supp. 1974). The maximum fine for
a felony is $10,000; for a class A or class B misdemeanor, $2,000; for a class C misde-
meanor, $200.
168. TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. § 32.32 (Supp. 1974).
169. Id. § 32.42.
170. Id. § 12.51(c).
171. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17A.08 (Supp. 1974). This is a rejection
of one of the 1970 proposals which in a very detailed section sought to extend to legal
entities the same benefits of probation available to individuals under id. art. 42.12.
Committee Comment to Conforming Amendments, Chapter 17A, Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, PROPOSED TEXAS PENAL CODE (1970).
172. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17A.09 (Supp. 1974). This section is de-
rived from TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.02(A) (1956).
173. Tax. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 7.01(F), 8.16(F) (Supp. 1974).
174. Id. arts. 7.01(F)(1), (2), 8.16(F)(1), (2).
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on which involuntary dissolution or revocation can be obtained, it is not clear
why the attorney general must be notified of misdemeanor convictions unless
to alert him to a potential corporate wrongdoer whose activities might provide
some other basis for action by the state.175
Finally, to deal with the hiatus in the law that precluded prosecution of
corporations except in very limited circumstances, 176 a new chapter has been
added to the Code of Criminal Procedure that sets out some of the procedural
rules applicable to crimes of corporations and associations. 1 77  These deal
primarily with the method of alleging the corporation's name,' 7 8 the use of
a summons as the means of notification that a complaint has been filed or
an indictment or information presented against it79 and -the mode of service
of the summons,'5 0 and the manner a corporation appears""' or manifests
its presence in the prosecution against it.182 The rules are not exclusive; other
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply if not inconsistent. 8 3
Thus, Texas has finally rejoined the ranks on corporate criminal responsi-
bility. Perhaps now Dean Prosser's famous lyric that "Texas has, of all
states, the most peculiar law"' 1 4 has become outdated-at least as to this
aspect of the law.
I. CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF CORPORATIONS
A. Shareholder Action
Shareholders' Meetings. Several changes have been made in TBCA article
2.24 relating to shareholders' meetings.' 85 The most important is one
designed to provide a greater flexibility in determining where and when
meetings are to be held. Previously, all meetings had to take place at
the locale, and the annual meeting at -the time specified in the bylaws,' 86
unless the bylaws were silent on the matter.'8 7 Now other methods for fixing
175. E.g., involuntary dissolution under TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.01 (1956),
forfeiture of charter under TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 22 and TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 4408 (1960), or by quo warranto proceedings under id. art. 6253 (1962); see 20
R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 937.176. In 1969 the legislature adopted two statutes dealing with air and water pollution
that also provided specific procedures by which corporate violators could be prosecuted.
Ch. 153, § 1, [1969] Tex. Laws 480 (air pollution), codified as TEX. PEN. CODE alt.698d, and ch. 154, § 1, [1969] Tex. Laws 483 (water pollution), codified as TEX.
PEN. CODE art. 698c. R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 239, at 261;
Hamilton, supra note 150, at 93. For the subsequent legislative history and treatment
of these statutes, see note 152 supra.
177. Ch. 17A, "Corporations and Associations," TEX, CODE CRIM. PROC. (Supp.
1974).
178. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17A.02 (Supp. 1974).
179. Id. art. 17A.03.
180. Id. arts. 17A.04, 17A.05.
181. Id. art. 17A.06.
182. Id. art. 17A.07.
183. Id. art. 17A.01 (a).
184. Prosser, The Common Law of Texas, in LAW SCHOOL ASSOCIATION LYRICS 68(undated oamphlet in University of Texas Law Library).
185. Ch. 545, § 15, [1973] Tex. Laws 1494, amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.24 (1956).
186. Ch. 64, art. 2.24(A), [1955] Tex. Laws 239, as amended, TEX. Bus. CORP ACT
ANN. art. 2.24(A) (Supp. 1974).
187. In that case meetings were to be held at the registered office of the corporation.
There has been no change in this provision. Id.
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time and place can be used if "in accordance with" the bylaws.' 88 For ex-
ample, it may be wise to give the board of directors or the president discre-
tionary power to call the annual meeting at varying locations, possibly as
a means of improving shareholder relations, or to fix a more suitable time
for the meeting if the usual date becomes inconvenient for some reason or
another. 189
Another change simplifies a shareholder's course of action if the an-
nual meeting is not held at the time designated in or fixed as permitted by
the bylaws. Under the former law, if the 'board failed to call the meeting
at the designated time, the shareholder had to demand it be held within a
reasonable period and then, only if sixty days elapsed without his demand
being satisfied, could he seek judicial redress to have the meeting held, 9 0
he being specifically given a sufficient justiciable interest to institute such ac-
tion.' 91 Under the amendment, if the annual meeting is not held within any
thirteen-month period, a shareholder may apply directly to a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction' 92 in the county where the principal office is located asking
that it summarily order the meeting be held. Apparently the corporation and
188. TEX. Bus. CoRP'. ACT ANN. art. 2.24(A) (Supp. 1974).
189. For example, the corporation may be negotiating a merger which will require
approval' by the shareholders at a date quite near the time usually set for the annual
meeting but which cannot be delayed until that time. Considerable expense could be
avoided by having the power to advance the annual meeting date to coincide with the
date on which the merger needs approval. The example is suggested in the helpful arti-
cle by Kerr & Wolf, Shareholders' Meetings Under the Texas Business Corporation Act,
43 TEXAS L. REV. 713, 714 (1965).
190. Ch. 64, art. 2.24(B), [1955] Tex. Laws 239, as amended, TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 2.24(B) (Supp. 1974).
191. "Each and every shareholder is hereby declared to have a justiciable interest suf-
ficient to enable him to institute and prosecute such legal proceedings." Id. The 1973
amendment omits this sentence, mainly because the Bar Committee felt the proposition
stated was so self-evident that its statutory formulation was superfluous. Even in the
absence of statute, the courts have always recognized a shareholder's standing to seekjudicial aid, primarily by mandamus, whenever there has been a wrongful refusal or ne-
glectful omission to hold the annual meeting. Otherwise "a board of directors by ignor-
ing the demand of the by-laws for stated elections, could perpetuate themselves in office
and rob stockholders of all voice in the affairs of the corporation." Bard v. Kapp, 15
S.W.2d 719, 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1929), error ref. The Bard case is the
only Texas decision in point and follows the general rule that courts have power to com-
pel corporate officers to call meetings to elect directors. See generally 5 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2000; Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 615 (1956).
192. Presumably this would be the district court on the assumption the order sought
would be in the nature of a writ of mandamus, although conceivably the same result
could be accomplished by a mandatory injunction. See 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21,
§ 117.03[2], at 443; Annot., supra note 191, at 617. While the county court has power
to grant mandamus, TEx. CONST. art. V, § 16; TEx. REy. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1957(1964), its original jurisdiction to issue the writ is dependent on the requisite amount
in controversy being in issue. Johnson v. Hanscom, 90 Tex. 321, 38 S.W. 761 (1897).
If no amount in controversy is alleged, as would typically be the case where a share-
holder seeks to compel the holding of a meeting to elect directors or inspect corporate
records, then only the district court has jurisdiction. TEx. CONST. art. V, § 8; TEx. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1913, 1914 (1964). See, e.g., Anderson v. Ashe, 99 Tex. 447,
90 S.W. 872 (1906); Pounds v. Callahan, 337 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1960); City of Lubbock v. Green, 312 S.W.2d 279, 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1958) (dictum); cf. Repka v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 143 Tex. 542, 186 S.W.2d 977(1945); Hood v. Cain, 32 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1930), error ref. See
generally 6 L. LowE, TEXAS PRACTICE-REMEDIES-INJUNCTIONS AND OTHER EXTRAOR-
DINARY PROCEEDINGS §§ 332-33 (2d ed. 1973); A. MITCHELL & C. GILBERT, TEXAS
METHODS OF PRACTICE §§ 3488-89 (1970); Comment, Courts-Jurisdiction of District




not the board is to be the defendant; 1 93 whether individual officers need be
joined may well depend on the nature of the order. Based on the amend-
ment's apparent derivation from the Delaware practice,19 4 it would appear
to give the court plenary power to directly order the meeting be held at a
time and place and with such notice as may be prescribed in its order, with-
out commanding the board or specific officers to do so.'9 5 But if assumed
to be in the nature of a writ of mandamus, 196 the president, secretary, or
other officer having the duty of calling the meeting might be made the de-
fendant. 197 In any event, failure to hold the meeting at the designated time
continues to provide no basis for dissolving the corporation.' 9 8
193. See Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.24, 3A TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN.
68 (Supp. 1974). Compare with Bard v. Kapp, 15 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1929), error ref., a pre-TBCA case holding the corporation is not a neces-
sary party to a mandamus action to compel officers to call a meeting.
194. Most of the changes made in article 2.24 are taken from section 28 of the Model
Act which, as revised in 1969, in addition to providing greater flexibility as to the man-
ner of determining the time and place of shareholders' meetings, see text accompanying
notes 186-89 supra, also added the summary order procedure to compel the holding of
a passed meeting that had been part of the Delaware law for many years. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 211(c) (Supp. 1968); E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 206(1972). Given the novelty of the procedure it would have been helpful to have added
a sentence or two to the section as Delaware has done to spell out some of the matters
that may be provided for in the court's order and, if necessary, to have a master ap-
pointed to conduct the election. Id. §§ 211 (c), 227(b).
195. See e.g., Prickett v. American Steel & Pump Corp., 251 A.2d 576 (Del. Ch.
1969); In re Gulla, 13 Del. Ch. 1, 114 A. 596 (1921). See generally 6 Z. CAVITCH,
supra note 21, § 117.03[2], at 444.
196. Although as noted in the text accompanying note 195 supra, the summary order
differs from mandamus in that the court may itself order the passed meeting called
rather than direct an officer or the board to do so, it is likely the Texas courts, because
of their familiarity with mandamus, will apply its other requisites to such orders, includ-
ing the prohibition against granting mandamus in an ex parte hearing. TEXAs R. Civ.
P. 694. On the other hand, because of the derivation of the summary order procedure
from the Delaware chancery practice, see note 194 supra, the action may well be equit-
able in nature and thus could be deemed to involve a type of injunctive relief that in
some instances is obtainable through an ex parte temporary restraining order. TEx. R.
CIv. P. 680. However, the showing of irreparable injury, loss or damage that permits
a temporary restraining order to be issued without notice probably could not be made
to justify ordering the election of directors on an ex parte basis. Still, the need for de-
termining the legal or equitable nature of this summary remedy may well be academic,
since in Texas at least the issuance of mandamus is largely governed by equitable princi-
ples anyway, despite its origin as a common law writ. E.g., Callahan v. Giles, 137 Tex.
571, 575, 155 S.W.2d 793, 795 (1941); Schooler v. Tarrant County Medical Soc'y, 457
SW.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970). Presumably it will not be necessary
to show a demand on the board or some corporate official that the meeting be held was
made, as article 2.24(B) required before its amendment, although this is frequently a
requisite for the common law mandamus action. E.g., Bard v. Kapp, 15 S.W.2d 719,
720 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1929), error ref.; see 6 Z. CAVrrCH, supra note 21,§ 117.03[2], at 445; Annot., supra note 191, at 630. And in view of the policy expressed
in the statute that the annual election should not be delayed beyond 13 months, there
may be a more limited discretion that can be exercised in determining whether to order
the meeting held or not. See E. FOLK, supra note 194, at 206.
197. In Bard v. Kapp, 15 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1929), error
ref., the pre-TBCA case in point, mandamus was sought against the president and secre-
tary, the court specifically ruling the corporation was not a necessary party. See note
193 supra. In an analogous situation involving efforts by shareholders to inspect cor-
porate books and records, mandamus has been invoked more frequently but with no con-
sistency in the type of corporate defendants sued. See, e.g., Moore v. Rock Creek Oil
Corp., 59 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933), recommendation adopted (corporation
and apparently president and secretary mandamused); Texas Infra-Red Radiant Co. v.
Erwin, 397 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965), error ref. n.r.e. (corporation);
Grayburg Oil Co. v. Jarratt, 16 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1929) (president
and secretary).
198. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.24(B) (Supp. 1974). The provision is a very
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In a somewhat belated recognition of technological developments, 199 per-
mission has been granted to shareholders (and directors and members of
board-designated committees) to participate in or hold meetings by confer-
ence telephone or similar communications equipment that enable all the par-
ticipants to hear one another. 200  Participation in this manner constitutes
presence at a meeting unless it is for purposes of objecting that the meeting
has not been lawfully called or convened. 201 The articles or bylaws may re-
strict the use of the procedure202 and in any event notice of the meeting must
continue to be given as required or permitted by law,'20  unless waived in
writing before or after the meeting.20 4
From a practical standpoint, it is obvious the conference telephone pro-
cedure will only be useful or economically feasible for small meetings. While
this limited utility should not unduly hamper conducting board or committee
meetings in this fashion, the only shareholders' meetings where the procedure
common one in American corporation statutes, see 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 117.02,
at n.14, although some, such as Delaware's, go further and provide that failure to hold
the annual meeting will also not affect the validity of corporate acts, DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 211(c) (Supp. 1972). However, if the reason for not electing directors is a
deadlock among shareholders in voting power which has not been broken for two con-
secutive annual meeting dates, the corporation may ultimately be involuntarily dissolved;
but a receiver to rehabilitate the corporation would ordinarily have to be appointed first.
TEx. Bus. CoR. ACr ANN. arts. 7.05(A)(1)(e), 7.06 (Supp. 1974). In any case, fail-
ure to hold the annual meeting on the designated date will not affect the validity of ac-
tion taken at a meeting on another date if all the shareholders participate without objec-
tion. Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 515, 348 S.W.2d 517 (1961); cf. Caldwell v. Kings-
berry, 451 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1970), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in
Hamilton & Shields, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 88, 104(1971) (shareholder who attended and participated in irregularly called meeting waived
any defects in notice).
199. Another 1973 amendment seeking to accommodate the law to technological ad-
vances permits minutes of meetings, as well as other books and records, to be recorded
by means of modern recording and transcribing devices or stored in computer-based in-
formation retrieval systems, without being reduced to writing so long as the data can
be converted into written form within a reasonable time if the need arises. TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.44(A) (Supp. 1974). The amendment is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 498-502 infra.
200. Ch. 545, § 44, [1973] Tex. Laws 1511, adding TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
9.10(C) (Supp. 1974). The section is derived from DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(i)(Supp. 1972), see Doty & Parker 1026; several other states have comparable provisions.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-316(e) (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 608.09(5) (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.37 (Supp. 1974). However,
these statutes are narrower in scope than the Texas provision in that they limit use of
the conference telephone to directors' and committee meetings. They also seem in-
tended to validate participation by individual board or committee members who cannot
be present at a meeting, if linked by such form of communication with those who do
attend, rather than utilizing the technique as a means of conducting a meeting. See
E. FOLK, supra note 194, at 66.
201. The Delaware statute does not contain the proviso enabling the shareholder or
other participant using the telephone communications set-up to object to the call of the
meeting and thus avoid being deemed present. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(i) (Supp.
1972). The proviso tracks TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.37(B) (1956) which cre-
ates a similar privilege for an objecting director.
202. Professor Folk doubts the wisdom of thus inhibiting a useful procedure. Quite
to the contrary, he believes the bylaws should spell out the internal procedures for con-
ducting meetings or facilitating individual participation therein by means of conference
telephone. E. FOLK, supra note 194, at 66. The Bar Committee also feels the conveni-
ence of this form of communication will "encourage and permit more frequent meetings
with savings of time and expense." Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 9.10, 3A TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. 181 (Supp. 1974).
203. TEX. Bus. CORP. AT ANN. art. 9.10(C) (Supp. 1974). On required notices
for shareholders' and directors' meetings see id. arts. 2.25, 2.37(B), 9.09 (1956).
204. Id. art. 9.09 (1956).
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might conveniently be employed would almost of necessity be those of close
corporations with very few shareholders. On !the other hand, there appears
no reason why a publicly-held corporation employing, say, closed circuit tele-
vision to conduct simultaneous shareholders' meetings around the country
should not be allowed to do so; arguably it would be in compliance with the
statute so long as any shareholder desiring to speak could be heard (,to say
nothing of being seen) by those in attendance wherever the various meetings
are being held.205
Voting of Shares: Legislative Changes. Certainly among the more innova-
tive of the 1973 amendments were several that added new dimensions to the
manner in which shareholder voting can be arranged in the corporation,
including further clarification of the cumulative voting right.
Disproportionate Voting. At one time at common law, a shareholder
could cast no more -than one vote at a shareholders' meeting no matter how
many shares he held, i.e., one man, one vote. 206 While this made sense for
non-profit membership corporations, it made very little sense in the context
of business corporations dependent on varying contributions of capital. As
a consequence, either by legislation or judicial holdings, the rule became
firmly established that each share would be entitled to a vote, i.e. one share,
one vote. 207  Although Texas law prior 'to the adoption of the TBCA was
silent on the matter as to general business corporations, Dean Hildebrand had
no doubt they were governed by the general rule. 20 8 In 1955, the TBCA
adopted the prevailing law by specifically providing that each outstanding
share, regardless of class, was entitled to one vote except to the extent the
voting rights of a class might be limited or denied by the articles of incorpora-
tion.20 9 The language used, in contrast to statutes in other states establishing
the one vote per share principle except as otherwise provided in the ar-
ticles, 210 made it doubtful 'the corporation could grant any class more or less
'than one vote per share, 211 even though a class could be denied voting rights
205. To come under the statute, closed circuit television would have to be regarded
as "communications equipment" "similar" to a conference telephone. See TEx. Bus.
CORP. AcT ANN. art. 9.10(C) (Supp. 1974). The ambiguity is undoubtedly due to the
derivation of the statute from the more limited Delaware provision. See note 200 supra.
206. 5A Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 109.03[l]; 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA COR-
PORATIONS 205; 2 1. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS 477. The leading American
case so holding is Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N.J.L. 222 (1834). But see Ratner, The Gov-
ernment of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of "One Share, One
Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1970), where Professor Ratner shows that historically
the rule giving one vote per each member of a business corporation was not an absolute;
rather some of the earliest English and American corporations permitted voting by
shares or allowed large shareholders to have a limited number of multiple votes depend-
ing on the size of their investment. Id. at 3-9.
207. 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2045, at 206.
208. 2 I. HILDEBRAND, TExAs CORPORATIONS 479.
209. Ch. 64, art. 2.29(A), [1955] Tex. Laws 239, as amended, TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 2.29(A) (Supp. 1974).
210. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-608(a) (1970); IND. CODE § 23-1-2-9(e) (1972);
LA. REV. CODE § 12:75A (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-67(a) (1965); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.44A (1964); see HEN 367 n.32.
211. See Seamans & Barger, Multiple Votes Per Share, 16 Bus. LAW. 400 (1961),
discussing a ruling of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Corporations under that state's Busi-
ness Corporation Law of 1933 that the only deviation from one vote per share is no
vote per share and that limited voting rights, as used in the statute, mean that the right
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as to many corporate actions. 212 A 1973 amendment,2 13 following the 1969
revision of the Model Act,214 has removed the doubt: a Texas business cor-
poration may provide for multiple or fractional voting of its shares if its
articles of incorporation so authorize. 215  If this choice is made, then any
shareholder action required by the Act, the articles, or bylaws to have the
approval of a majority or other percentage of shares or class or series of
shares can be effected by the approval of -the same percentage of the total
number of votes per shares or class or series, based on the multiple, straight,
cumulative,2 16 or fractional voting permitted by the articles.21 7
Disproportionate voting can be used, of course, only when there is more
than one class of shares or series within a class of shares,21 8 but in such sit-
uations it should prove a useful business planning tool in a number of circum-
stances. For example, it can be utilized to equalize voting power among
shareholders in a close corporation when some of the participants agree to
provide most of the financing for the enterprise while the others are to pri-
marily contribute their skills and services. Or it might be employed in a
family corporation, possibly as a form of estate planning, to permit the father-
to vote can only be curtailed as to certain issues, thereby precluding a Pennsylvania cor-
poration from utilizing multiple voting.
212. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.12(A) (1956). However, there are a number
of matters which may require approval by a class vote whether or not the class is entitled
to vote by the articles of incorporation; e.g., amendments to the articles affecting the
rights of the class, id. art. 4.03(B) (Supp. 1974); sale of all the assets not in the ordi-
nary course of business, id. art. 5.10(A)(3); merger and consolidation, id. art. 5.03(B);
voluntary dissolution, id. art. 6.03(A) (3 ).
213. Ch. 545, § 16, [1973] Tex. Laws 1495, amending TEx. Bus. CORP. AT ANN.
art. 2.29(A) (1956).
214. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 33. An increasing number of states
have amended their corporation statutes to permit disproportionate voting, with most
utilizing the revised Model Act language. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a)
(Supp. 1972); IOWA CODE § 496A.32 (Supp. 1974); Ky. RE. STAT. § 271A.165(1)
(Supp. 1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 43(a) (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-32
(1973); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.25(1) (Supp. 1973).
215. The amendment has restructured section A so as to first state the one share,
one vote principle, then list as exceptions: (a) the extent the articles provide for more
or less than one vote per share, or, to the extent permitted by the Act, limit or deny
voting rights to any class or series, or (b) "as otherwise provided by this Act." The
latter has reference to article 5.13 which disenfranchises a dissenting shareholder who
has demanded payment for his shares pursuant to the right given in article 5.11 and the
procedure set out in article 5.12. A specific reference to article 5.13 had been added
to article 2.29(A) at the time the dissent statutes were amended in 1967 to tighten up
the dissent process, ch. 657, §§ 6, 12-13, [1967] Tex. Laws 1719, 1721, 1723, see
Amsler, supra note 127, at 62, but was deleted by the 1973 amendment in favor of the
more general language quoted.
216. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.29(D) (Supp. 1974). Of course cumulative
voting itself provides a form of multiple voting, but is limited in that it can only be
used for the election of directors. See discussion in text accompanying notes 227-60 in-
Ira.
217. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.29(A) (2) (Supp. 1974). This subsection was
added to avoid amending all the provisions of the Act referring to approval by the
holders of a specified number of shares. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.29, 3A
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 71, 72 (Supp. 1974).
218. HENN 367. Equal treatment of all shares within a single class would seem to
be mandated by article 2.12(A) except to the extent that varying rights can be given
to different series of preferred or special classes, including the right to vote, as permitted
by article 2.13. However, disproportionate voting can be provided for in a one-class sit-
uation through an agreement among all the shareholders of a close corporation (as de-
fined in article 2.30-1 (A)) that meets the requisites of article 2.30-2. Among the mat-
ters that may be provided for in such agreements are provisions that regulate the division
of voting power. TEx. Bus. COlR,. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-2(A)(3) (Supp. 1974); see dis-
cussion in text accompanying notes 538-43 infra.
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founder 219 to keep control by retaining a class of stock having many votes
per share even though most of the equity has been donated to family mem-
bers whose stock ownership, alternatively, may have only a fractional vote
per share. Larger corporations may want to use such voting for shares given
in mergers or purchases of assets to avoid dilution of control or possibly in
voluntary reorganization situations to mollify preferred shareholders if it be-
comes necessary to split or increase the common stock to facilitate financ-
ing.22 0'
Despite its apparent novelty in Texas law, many of the desired advantages
afforded by disproportionate voting were attainable under the TBCA even
before its amendment, mainly through classification of shares. 221 Thus, it
has always been possible under the Act to set up two classes of stock each
having the same number of shares but issuable for different par values or if
no par shares for varying consideration.2 22 For example, A, a shareholder
whose principal contribution will be his entrepreneurial talents can be given
10,000 shares of class A stock having low or no par value; whereas B who
is providing the venture capital may be issued all 10,000 shares of class B
having a par value of $10 a share, so that under the one-share, one-vote prin-
ciple, each has equal voting power.223  In addition, fractional shares were
(and still are) given voting rights, 224 although given the limited reasons for
their issuance, 225 they have been less useful for control purposes. Because
the new provisions -are much more straightforward, the thoughtful corporate
planner should now give serious consideration to the flexibility disproportion-
ate voting affords both in aiding the acquisition-minded big corporation and
in molding the structure of the close corporation. 226
Cumulative Voting. The TBCA provisions on cumulative voting 227 have
been shortened, yet clarified by one of the 1973 amendments, while another
has eliminated a device that has been used to avoid its effect.
The legislative history of cumulative voting in Texas is a checkered one
that has been recounted elsewhere. 228 In short, prior to 1955 the corporation
219. See 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 3.22, noting that in England it is not
uncommon to have "founders'" shares giving their holders a large number of votes per
share on particular issues.
220. See Seamans & Barger, supra note 211, at 400, using this example to show the
need for multiple voting.
221. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.12(A) (1956).
222. Id. arts, 2.12, 2.15.
223. In general on classification of shares as a control or equalizing device, see 1
HORNSTEIN § 153; 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 3.23-.26; W. PAINTER,
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS 134.
224. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.20 (Supp. 1974).
225. Such shares are usually generated by stock dividends and splits, reclassifications,
and mergers where as a result of these transactions a shareholder may be entitled to
receive more or less than an equal multiple of shares based on his holdings. ABA
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, at 501. See generally Sobieski, Fractional Shares in
Stock Dividends and Splits, 16 Bus. LAw. 204 (1960); Waring, Fractional Shares Under
Stock Dividend Declarations, 44 H.xv. L. REV. 404 (1931).
226. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.29, 3A TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. 71,
72 (Supp. 1974).
227. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.29(D) (Supp. 1974).
228. 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 491, at 516; Lebowitz,
Cumulative Voting Under Texas Law, 3 BULL. OF TRE SECTION ON CORP., BANKING &
Bus. L., Dec. 1964, at 1; Sierk, Shareholders Rights Under the Texas Business Corpora-
tion Act, 26 Tax. B.J. 25, 26 (1963).
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statutes made no mention of such voting, 229 then with adoption of the TBCA
in 1955 and until 1957, cumulative voting was permitted unless denied in
the articles; 230 from 1957 to 1964, the right had to be conferred by the arti-
cles, 231 and from 1964 to the present, it is again permitted unless expressly
prohibited by the articles. 23 2  When the last change of substance was made
in 1961,233 a special subsection was added prohibiting adoption of an amend-
ment denying the right unless approved by a vote of the holders of two-thirds
of the shares of each class entitled to vote thereon,234 even though the TB-
CA's general provisions on amendments would have authorized such an
amendment by the same vote.2 35  Because of the duplicative nature of the
subsection, it has been removed and the cumulative voting section renum-
bered.2 3 e
The TBCA, along with some other state corporation laws, 237 has always
229. 3 I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAs CORPORATIONS 482. However, Dean Hildebrand be-
lieved cumulative voting was permissible if provided for in the charter or bylaws. SeeQuilliam v. Hebbronville Util,, Inc., 241 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1951), error ref. But cf. Robertson v. State ex rel. Clements, 406 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1966), error ref. n.r.e., where in ruling cumulative voting was not
available to elect directors of state banks because of non-applicability of the TBCA to
such banks and a specific provision in the Texas Banking Code for straight voting, TEx.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-402 (1973), the court stated: "The right of cumulative
voting for directors does not exist at common law. It must have been conferred, if at
all, by an operative constitutional or statutory provision." 406 S.W.2d at 94.
230. Ch. 64, art. 2.29(D), [1955] Tex. Laws 239.
231. Ch. 54, § 4A, [1957] Tex. Laws 111, amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.29(D) (1956). As enacted, shareholders of corporations formed or adopting the
TBCA before the effective date of the 1961 amendment retained the right to vote cumu-
latively unless expressly denied by the articles, whereas those of corporations formed or
adopting the Act after the effective date were denied the right unless expressly author-
ized by the articles.
232. Ch. 393, § 1, [1961] Tex. Laws 893, amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.29(D) (Supp. 1960). For some inexplicable reason the change did not become
effective until June 1, 1964; as a consequence a shareholder was denied the right to vote
cumulatively in 1963 because his corporation's charter made no provision for such vot-
ing, it having become subject to the TBCA in 1961. Wilson v. Scruggs, 368 S.W.2d
891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963), error ref. n.r.e. Unlike the 1957 amendment, the
1961 law did not state whether shareholders of corporations formed under, adopting, or
becoming subject to the Act between May 23, 1957 (the effective date of the 1957
amendment) and June 1, 1964, had the cumulative voting right if the articles said noth-
ing about it. The 1973 amendment is equally silent on the matter. The Bar Committee
and this author believe shareholders of those corporations do have that right, construing
the legislature's non-inclusion of a savings clause in 1961 as a conscious decision to con-
fer the right unless denied. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.29, 3A TEX. REV.
CrV. STAT. ANN. 71 (Supp. 1974); Lebowitz, supra note 228, at 1. Professor Hamilton,
however, believes there still may be some possible controversy about the matter. 19 R.
HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 491, at 517.
233. Ch. 393, § 1, [1961] Tex. Laws 893, amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.29(D) (Supp. 1960).
234. Ch. 393, § 1, [1961] Tex. Laws 893 (repealed 1973).
235. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 4.01, 4.02 (Supp. 1974), but note that because
of the revision of article 9.09, see discussion in text accompanying notes 28-36 supra,
an amendment denying cumulative voting can now be adopted by a majority vote if the
articles of incorporation permit. Interestingly, a change in cumulative voting rights is
not among the specific amendments listed in article 4.01 (B) nor for which class voting
is specifically required in article 4.03(B) except as it might affect the relative rights of
a class as stated in subsection (B) (5).
236. Ch. 545, § 17, [19731 Tex. Laws 1495, amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.29(D) (Supp. 1972). Subsection (3) dealing with notice of intent to vote cumula-
tively has been renumbered as subsection (2).
237. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-325(b) (1960); HAwAI REV. LAWS § 416-
74 (1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 622 (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
301.26(3) (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-67(c) (Supp. 1973); Oiuo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.55(c) (Page 1964); S.C. CODE ANN. art. 12-16.20(b) (Supp. 1973).
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required that written notice be given by a shareholder that he intends to vote
cumulatively on or before the day preceding the election 288 in order to alert
the other shareholders who may then want to reconsider their own mode of
voting.239  Otherwise, majority shareholders could conceivably lose control
if they voted straight and the minority shareholders voting cumulatively had
a sizeable percentage of the shares being voted. 240  If other shareholders
decided to vote cumulatively, too, to counteract the minority group, they
might be faced with a technical objection that they could not for want of
proper notice.241 Thus, in an effort to further "prevent the possible unfair
use of technical procedures to gain undue influence in corporate affairs, ''242
a sentence had been added to the notice requirement 'that once any share-
holder gives written notice of his intent to vote cumulatively all other share-
holders may.243
The cumulative voting right, which is almost always opposed by manage-
ment of publicly-held corporations, 244 but which is of considerable benefit in
238. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.29(D) (2) (Supp. 1974).
239. 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 491, at 518; LATTIN 378;
FOLK, supra note 12, at 919; Lebowitz, supra note 228, at 2.
240. For example, assume that in a corporation with 1,000 shares outstanding, the
majority group owns 60% and the minority 40%. There are 5 directors to be elected.
If the minority faction cumulates, it will have 2,000 votes which if divided among three
of its nominees will give each 666% votes to 600 for each of the majority's 5 nominees
if they vote straight. In a few older cases, control was shifted in this fashion and upheld
by the courts. E.g., Chicago Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Boggiano, 202 111. 312, 67 N.E. 17(1903); Tomlin v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 52 Mo. App. 430 (1893); Schwartz v.
State ex rel. Schwartz, 61 Ohio St. 422, 56 N.E. 201 (1900); Wright v. Commonwealth,
109 Pa. St. 560, 1 A. 794 (1885); Pierce v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. 150 (1883). See
generally C. WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DIRECTORS 42 (1951); Bowes & De-
Bow, Cumulative Voting at Elections of Directors of Corporations, 21 MINN. L. REV.
351, 362 (1937).
241. If the minority shareholder wanting to vote cumulatively waited until the very
last hours of the day preceding the election to deliver his written notice to the secretary,
there probably would not be enough time for the other shareholders to file their notice
of intent to qualify for such voting. In such a case, forcing an adjournment of the meet-
ing for lack of a quorum, if the majority refused to attend, or asking for a recess until
the next day would have been the only recourse. In a few cases where a shareholder
has announced his intent to vote cumulatively, the courts have allowed the majority time
to recast their votes in the same manner to prevent losing control. See, e.g., State v.
Ellison, 106 S.C. 139, 90 S.E. 699 (1921); State v. Dailey, 23 Wash. 2d 25, 158 P.2d
330 (1945). Maine, North Carolina and South Carolina permit a recess of several
hours to be called upon request or at the discretion of the presiding officer when an
announcement has been made that a shareholder will vote cumulatively, in order to give
the other shareholders time to determining how they will vote. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
13A, § 622 (Supp. 1973) (reasonable time); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-67(c) (Supp.
1973) (one to four hours); S.C. CODE ANN. art. 12-16.20(b) (Supp. 1973) (up to two
hours). A provision of this sort would be desirable for the Texas act, because even
though a day's warning is given and the other shareholders become entitled to vote cum-
ulatively without notice, see text accompanying note 243 Infra, some shareholders may
come to the meeting unaware they have the right and thus need time to consider the
effect of their voting.
242. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.29, 3A TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 71
(Supp. 1974).
243. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.29(D) (2) (Supp. 1974).
244. The arguments usually advanced by management against cumulative voting in-
clude (1) the fear a director elected by a minority faction will represent only his own
constituency and not the shareholders as a whole, (2) the danger the board will divide
into factions and not work harmoniously together, (3) the need for the board being part
of the management team, (4) the fear vital information will be leaked by unfriendly
directors, and (5) the inability to attract qualified outsiders to serve as directors because
of their unwillingness to become involved in intracorporate combat. See Williams,
Cumulative Voting, 33 HxAv. Bus. REv., No. 3, 1955, at 108, 112. See also Axley, The
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close corporations, 245 can be diluted in several ways 24 6 if not expressly abol-
ished by an amendment to the articles. 247  One is through classification of
directors248 so as to reduce the number of directors to be voted on each year
and thereby reduce the total number of votes that can be cast cumula-
tively. 249 Another is simply to reduce the number of directors250 which now
Case Against Cumulative Voting, 25 Wis. L. Rlv. 278 (1950); Campbell, The Origin
and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors, 10 Bus. LAw., No. 3, 1955, at 3; Gib-
son, Should Cumulative Voting for Directors Be Mandatory-A Debate, Negative, 11
Bus. LAw., No. 1, 1955, at 22; Sturdy, Mandatory Cumulative Voting: An Anachron-
ism, 16 Bus. LAw. 550 (1961). Professor Hornstein made a sample check of 204 pub-
lic-issue corporations and found that only 54 were incorporated in states where cumula-
tive voting is mandatory and that of the remaining 150 organized in states where such
voting is permissible only 10 permitted cumulative voting. 1 HORNSTEIN 449.
There are of course a number of arguments to be made for such voting. These in-
clude (1) fairness, (2) need for minority representation, (3) diversity of viewpoint, and(4) to check majority's power of control. Williams, supra, at 111. See also Sobieski,
In Support of Cumulative Voting, 15 Bus. LAw. 316 (1960); Steadman, Should Cumu-
lative Voting for Directors Be Mandatory-A Debate, Affirmative, 11 Bus. LAW., No.
1, 1955, at 9; Young, The Case For Cumulative Voting, 25 Wis. L. REv. 49 (1950).
245. There is some diversity of view as to the desirability of cumulative voting in
close corporations. Both Professors O'Neal and Painter believe it useful as a way for
a close corporation shareholder to gain representation on the board. 1 F. O'NEAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 3.14, 3.58; W. PAINTER, CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS 132; cf.
Axley, supra note 244, at 284 (conceding the utility of cumulative voting in some close
corporation situations); Ballard, Arrangements for Participation in Corporate Manage-
ment, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 131, 139 (1951). Professor Hornstein believes cumulative voting
is rarely relied on in close corporation situations because it can be so easily circum-
vented, although acknowledging that if circumvention can be prevented, it does assure
minority representation on the board. 1 HORNSTEIN 184. Professor Hamilton takes a
somewhat middle ground stating that while a substantial minority shareholder can use
such voting to become a director, caution should be exercised in relying upon it because
of the ways it can be evaded. 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 694.
See Scott, The Close Corporation in Contemporary Business, 13 Bus. LAW. 741, 749(1958) (mechanics of cumulative voting too cumbersome for close corporation).
Sturdy, supra note 244, at 117, argued that cumulative voting is of little help to the mi-
nority in the close corporation and suggested, based on interviews with a number of Cali-
fornia firms specializing in close corporation matters most of whom agreed, that a mi-
nority's best remedy is "divorce" based on the California procedure for involuntary dis-
solution on complaint of a shareholder owning a third or more of the corporation's stock
that he is being persistently unfairly treated by the majority. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN.§§ 4651(e), 4657-9 (West 1955). Cf. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.30-5 (Supp.
1974), discussed in text accompanying notes 554-56 infra, and art. 7.05(A)(1)(c)
(1956). On balance, cumulative voting does assure a shareholder with significant own-
ership in the close corporation representation on the board, but the right definitely must
be protected not only by agreement, as to which one of the 1973 close corporation
amendments, article 2.30-2, should prove quite helpful, but also by giving the shareholder
a veto power through high quorum and voting requirements as permitted in articles 2.28,
2.35, and 9.08 in order to prevent any undesired alteration in the right. See 1 F.
O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 3.58, at 75.
246. On methods of diluting the cumulative voting right, in general see 5A Z.
CAVITCI-I, supra note 21, § 109.04[2][c]; 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS § 494; HENN 365; 1 HORNSTEIN 450; LATrIN 377; C. WILLIAMS, supra note 240,
at 48-61; Williams, supra note 244, at 109; Comment, Cumulative Voting-Removal,
Reduction and Classification of Corporate Boards, 22 U. CHI L. REV. 751 (1955).
247. 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS 74; see note 234 supra.
248. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.33 (1956) (allowing board of directors con-
sisting of nine or more members to be divided into two or three classes with staggered
terms of two to three years).
249. There were a number of noted cases in the 1950s involving the validity of classi-
fication of directors because of its adverse effect on cumulative voting. The cases arose
mainly in states making the right mandatory either by constitution or statute but with
the corporation law permitting classification. Compare Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d 78,
126 N.E.2d 701 (1955), and State ex rel. Syphers v. McCune, 143 W. Va. 315, 101
S.E.2d 834 (1958) (striking down classification statutes as impinging on the constitu-
tional right of cumulative voting), with Bohannan v. Corporation Comm'n, 82 Ariz. 299,
313 P.2d 379 (1957), and Janney v. Philadelphia Transp. CO., 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d
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can be effected more easily by management in view of the power vested in
the board to amend the bylaws. 251  A third is to remove any director elected
by the minority through cumulative voting in a special meeting called for that
purpose after his election, provided the articles or bylaws permit removal of
directors without cause. 252 Since 'the decision to remove a director can only
be resolved by a straight vote, the majority would then prevail. 213  This un-
desired result can normally be dealt with in two ways by proper provisions
in the articles or bylaws, assuming the minority shareholders have sufficient
bargaining power at the -time these documents are drafted or amended to in-
fluence their content. One way, obviously, is to permit removal only if good
cause can be shown or to prohibit removal entirely. The other is to provide
that any director elected by cumulative voting cannot be removed from office
76 (1956) (upholding classification statutes despite constitutional guaranty of cumula-
tive voting), and with Humphrey v. The Winous Co., 165 Ohio St. 45, 133 N.E.2d 780
(1956) (finding classification statute compatible with another statute conferring manda-
tory cumulative voting rights). See McDonough v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 277
F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Mich. 1967), sustaining classification of directors under a Michigan
statute although another Michigan statute prohibited reduction of the number of direc-
tors if it would adversely affect the cumulative voting right. The Wol/son, Janney, and
Winous cases were commented on extensively; see bibliography in 1 ABA MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, at 702. In general on classification as a means of diluting cumula-
tive voting, see CARY 285; 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2048.2 (rev.
repl. 1967); 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 494; 1 HORNSTEIN § 353
at 450; Adkins, Corporate Democracy and Classified Directors, 11 Bus. LAw., No.
1, 1955, at 31; Leckemby, Classification of Directors and Its Effect Upon Cumulative
Voting in Corporate Elections, 56 DICK. L. REV. 330 (1952); Sell & Fuge, Impact of
Classified Corporate Directorates on the Constitutional Right of Cumulative Voting, 17
U. PIT. L. REV. 151 (1956); Stephan, Cumulative Voting and Classified Boards: Some
Reflections on Wolfson v. Avery, 31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 351 (1956); Comment, supra
note 246, at 754.
250. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.32 (Supp. 1974), permitting number of direc-
tors to be reduced by amendment of either the articles or bylaws. See, e.g., Bond v.
Atlantic Terra Cotta Co., 137 App. Div. 671, 122 N.Y.S. 425 (1910) (reduction upheld
although purpose to eliminate minority representation on board through cumulative vot-
ing); Stone v. Auslander, 28 Misc. 2d 384, 212 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (reduction
of number of directors of national bank upheld although National Banking Act, 12
U.S.C. § 61 (1970), required cumulative voting). A few states have statutes that do
not allow a reduction in the number of directors if the votes cast against the amendment
were sufficient to have elected a director cumulatively but would not be enough to have
elected one to the reduced board. Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 351.090(3)(a) (1966); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-25(b) (Supp. 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-1.1-34 (Supp.
1973). See generally 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2048.3; 1 HORN-
STEIN 451; 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 3.58, at 75; W. PAINTER, CLOSELY
.HELD CORPORATIONS 133; Comment, supra note 246, at 753.
251. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.23 (Supp. 1974); see discussion in text ac-
companying notes 61-68 supra.
252. 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2048.3 (rev. repl. 1967); 19 R.
HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 494, at 521, § 495, at 523; 1. HORNSTEIN
451; C. WILLIAMS, supra note 240, at 56; Comment, supra note 246, at 752; cf. TEX.
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.32 (Supp. 1974), discussed in text accompanying notes 427-
45 infra. But cf. In re Rogers Imports, Inc., 202 Misc. 761, 116 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup.
Ct. 1952), noted in 66 HARv. L. REV. 531 (1953), 51 MICH. L. REV. 744 (1953), 27
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 357 (1953), invalidating a bylaw permitting removal of a director
without cause after a cumulative voting provision was added to the charter. See statutes
cited in note 255 infra.
253. However, such removal might be contrary to an agreement among the share-
holders of a close corporation that the shareholder-director being removed was to be a
director during the term of the agreement. Cf. Katcher v. Oshman, 26 N.J. Super. 28,
97 A.2d 180 (Ch. 1953), enforcing an agreement that corporate action could only be
taken if approved by the holders of 90% of the shares so as to override a bylaw permit-
ting removal of a director by a majority vote of the shareholders. See I F. O'NEAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 5.19.
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if the votes cast against his removal would have been sufficient to have elect-
ed him if cumulatively voted at an election, unless the entire board is being
removed.2 54  The latter alternative has now been codified in the TBCA so
that in any case where cumulative voting is permitted and less than all direc-
tors are being removed, the shareholders who have elected a representative
to sit on the board by cumulative voting may block his removal, if they
choose. 25 5 As worded, 25 16 the amendment would seem to preclude removal
even for cause if the minority that elected him objects, although it is not
likely the minority would vote to retain a director who has been guilty of
flagrant misconduct. But suppose the misbehaving director happens to be
the minority shareholder who has elected himself to the board through cumu-
lative voting of his own shares? Whether, in either case, the inherent power
of shareholders to remove for cause 257 would then prevail remains an open
question.258 It should also be noted that the new provision does not protect
the cumulative voting right against dilution through classification of direc-
tors250 or reduction of their number. 260  These must still be guarded against
by agreement or through use of veto powers.
Voting Among Series of Shares. Very often preferred or special classes
of shares can be issued in series if authorized by ithe articles of incorpora-
254. See 2 F. O'NAL, CLOSE CoRRoRaTrONS § 10.26 for the text of a charter clause
so providing.
255. Ch. 545, § 23, [1973] Tex. Laws 1500, amending TEX. Bus. CoRP. ACT art.
2.32 (156). Comparable provisions are found in the statutes of approximately half the
states. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 3810 (West 1955); COLO. CORP. CODE § 31-5-5
(1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-706(b) (1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-1-2-12 (Code ed.
1972); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.195(2) (Supp. 172); La. REv. STAT. § 12:81c(4)(1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 707 (1974); MICH. COMP. LAws § 450.1511
(2) (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.29 (1969); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-75 (1973);
Mo. STAT. ANN. § 351.315.2 (1966); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2039 (Supp. 1972); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-6 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-2Y-38B (Supp. 1973); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 706 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-27(f) (Supp. 1973);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-19-40 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.58(c) (Page
1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.39 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1405A (Supp.
1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-1.1-36.1(c)(1) (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.7
(b)(2) (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-807(2)(a) (Supp. 1973); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 16-10-37 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-42 (1973); WASH REV. CODE §
23A.08.380 (1970).
256. "In the case of a corporation having cumulative voting, if less than the entire
board is to be removed, no one of the directors may be removed if the votes cast against
his removal would be sufficient to elect him if then cumulatively voted at an election
of the entire boaid of directors, or if theie be classes of directors, at an election of the
class of directors of which he is a part." TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.32 (Supp.
1974). The language is taken directly from the Model Act, ABA MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT ANN. 2d, § 39.
257. E.g., Grace v. Grace Institute, 19 N.Y.2d 307, 226 N.E.2d 531, 279 N.Y.S.2d
721 (1967); Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954), noted in 7 BAYLOR
L. REV. 313 (1955); 40 CORNELL L.Q. 370 (1955); 29 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 298 (1955);
see Texlite, Inc. v. Wineburgh, 373 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963), error
ref. n.r.e., discussed in 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS § 495, at 524.
See generally Travers, Removal of Corporate Director During His Term of Office, 53
IOWA L. REV. 389 (1967).
258. See Campbell v. Loew's Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 573, 134 A.2d 852, 858 (1957),
holding shareholders have an inherent right to remove a director for cause even though
he had been elected by minority shareholders through cumulative voting, for "otherwise
a director who is guilty of the worst violation of his duty could nevertheless remain on
the board." Id. at 572, 134 A.2d at 858. But note that Delaware does not have a stat-
ute dealing expressly with removal of directors. E. FOLK, supra note 194, at 57.
259. See notes 248-49 supra.
260. See note 250 supra.
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tion.261 The purpose of such authority is to provide greater flexibility in
meeting the corporation's financial needs by allowing segments of a class of
preferred ,to be sold with differing dividend rates, liquidation rights, redemp-
tion price, sinking funds, and conversion features, the variance among them
frequently being dependent on such matters as market conditions or terms
negotiated in private placements. Because of the latitude given the board
of directors262 in deciding what these variations will be, such shares are fre-
quently referred to as "blank stock.''263  Now, the directors have been given
another blank to fill in if they desire with adoption of a TBCA amendment
adding voting rights to the matters that can be varied from series to series
within senior or special class of shares. 264
The amendment does not spell out in what manner voting rights can differ
from one series to another. The possibility of using multiple or fractional
voting has been suggested26 5 and there appears no reason why one or more
series cannot be denied voting rights,26 ( except to the extent permitted by
the Act, or have them limited to the occurrence of specified contingencies.26 7
How frequently this permissible variation among series will be used is
problematical. 26 8 Quite often preferred share issues carry no voting rights at
261. Tax. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.13 (Supp. 1974).
262. The articles must expressly confer authority on the board to divide a class into
series and determine the relative rights and preferences as between the series established.
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.13(B) (1956). The articles can specify what the vari-
ations shall be but this tends to undo the advantage of allowing such matters to be deter-
mined later in light of then existent conditions. The Act limits the variations to seven
items (dividends, redemption, voluntary and involuntary liquidation, conversion, sinking
fund, and voting); otherwise all shares of the class are to be identical. Id. art. 2.13(A)(Supp. 1974). To establish a series the board must adopt a resolution designating the
series and fixing and determining its relative rights and preferences which is filed with
the secretary of state and then becomes an amendment to the articles of incorporation.
Id. arts. 2.13(C)-(F) (1956).
263. BALLANTINE 502; CARY 1228; HENN 214, 294; LATrIN 518; Berle, Corporate De-
vices for Diluting Stock Participations, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 1239, 1264 (1931); Bux-
baum, Preferred Stock-Law and Draftsmanship, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 247-49 (1954).264. Ch. 545, § 7, [1973] Tex. Laws 1489, adding TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT. ANN. art.
2.13(A) (7) (Supp. 1974). The addition of voting rights is taken from the 1969 revi-
sion of the Model Act. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 16. Only a minority
of states allow variations in voting rights, but the Model Act revision should add impetus
to the change. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §§ 304, 1100-02 (West 1955); COLO.
CORP. CODE ANN. § 31-4-2 (1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(g) (1953); GA. CODE
ANN. § 22-502 (1970); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 502 (1974); MASS. GEN. CODE
ANN. ch. 156B, § 26 (1970); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-1 (1969); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-502 (Supp. 1973).
265. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.13, 3A TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. 42
(Supp. 1974).
266. The Model Act refers to variations in "voting rights, if any" (emphasis added)
and it might be argued that omission of the "if any" clause by the Texas draftsmen
means that if any series is given a voting right, other series may be given different voting
rights but cannot be denied the right to vote altogether. However, article 2.29(A)
amended makes clear that voting rights can be denied or limited to the holders of the
shares of "any class or series." TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.29(A)(1)(a) (Supp.
1974) (emphasis added).
267. The usual contingency is dividends being passea over for several nonconsecutive
dividend periods. Another is required approval of certain corporate transactions that
might affect the rights of the series, such as the issuance of prior preferred shares, volun-
tary dissolution, sale of all the assets, etc. See CARY 1225; LATTIN § 139; Buxbaum,
supra note 263, at 290-98.
268. Professor Hamilton suggests the whole matter of issuing shares in series is of
considerably less importance today than before due to the decline in preferred share fi-
nancing. 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 388, at 426.
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all unless dividends are passed over for a certain period 269 and it is not likely
that if issuable in series, that characteristic would be altered. On the other
hand, the blank check feature does leave the corporation's option open
so 'that if voting preferred can be useful in a merger 270 or make a public offer-
ing more attractive, it will not be necessary to amend the articles to grant
the needed voting rights. It may also be of some aid in structuring the close
corporation 271 where, for example, some investors are willing to take prefer-
red stock but not all desire to have voting power. 272  Or possibly in family
corporation situations, a father might find it convenient to give a series of
voting preferred to older children or those active in the business and a non-
voting series -to minor children or other relatives. The primary concern, how-
ever, should continue to be whether the power thus conferred on the board
to mold the corporation's stock structure will be exercised wisely and for the
best interests of all concerned.
Class Voting. The priorities in payment of dividends or in return of cap-
ital on liquidation that holders of preferred shares enjoy are often counterbal-
anced by the sometimes precarious voting position of such shares. Preferred
shareholders are usually not given voting rights unless 'their dividends are
passed over for several periods. Moreover, the voting effectiveness of the
preferred stock is substantially diminished because of the normally much
larger number of voting common stock that is outstanding. As a conse-
quence, when the number of preferred shares in relation to common are not
enough to block adoption of amendments to the articles of incorporation, the
preferred shareholders may find themselves at the mercy of the holders of
common if the latter choose to amend the articles so as to drastically alter
preferred's priorities. 273  To forestall this potential abuse of power, 27 4 the
269. See note 267 supra.
270. See Scott, supra note 11, at 294 suggesting this as one of the benefits of the
Model Act (and Texas) change. But cfi. Doty & Parker 1013 n.29, questioning the de-
sirability of using a voting series of preferred in effecting an acquisition in light of the
tightened rules on pooling-of-interest accounting limiting such pooling to acquisitions ef-
fected through exchanges of voting common stock. Accounting Principles Bd. of the
Am. Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Accounting Principles Bd. Op. 16, Busi-
ness Combinations (1970) 47, 2 CCH ACCT. PRIN. 6646-49. See, e.g., Scriggins,
Business Combinations-Developments in Combining Techniques and Constraints in
Accounting Rules, 27 Bus. LAw. 1245, 1250 (1972).
271. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.13, 3A TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 42
(Supp. 1974).
272. See W. PAINTER, CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS 72-75 on advantages of senior
securities in close corporations. Cf. F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 3.19, 3.37,
3.38.
273. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 4.01 (Supp. 1974) authorizes a number of
amendments that can adversely affect the rights of preferred shareholders, including cre-
ation of new preferred with preferences superior or equal to the existing class (subsec.(B) (9)), reduction of the dividend rate or preference (subsec. (B) (7)), or cancelling
accrued but unpaid dividends (subsec. (B)(11)). Absent a charter or statutory provi-
sion for class voting on such amendments, the only argument that might be used to
thwart their adoption is that such an amendment somehow deprives the preferred share-
holders of some of their "vested" property rights, as conferred in the charter's preferred
share contract, without due process of law. Cf. Sandor Petroleum Corp. v. Williams,
321 S.W.2d 614, 618 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1959), error ref. n..r.e., discussed in 14
Sw. L.J. 106 (1960), 38 TEXAS L. REV. 499 (1960) (holding adoption of bylaws impos-
ing restrictions on transferability on previously unrestricted shares invalid as an impair-
ment of shareholder's vested property right to realize full value for sale of his stock on
open market, although bylaws specifically permitted their amendment by the directors).
However, the vested rights argument has been largely repudiated with respect to amend-
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Model Act275 and its Texas counterpart 278 have long required that certain
enumerated amendments 277 to -the articles that would materially affect the
rights of a class can only be adopted if also approved by the holders of a
requisite percentage of shares of that class, whether afforded the right to
vote by the articles or not.
The protection of preferred's dividend priority need not depend on statu-
tory policy, however. Quite often the terms of a preferred share contract are
negotiated by underwriters or private placees to provide additional safe-
guards for the preference. 278 These protective provisions may include both
ments adversely affecting the rights of preferred shareholders, largely on the basis that
part of every shareholder's contract with his corporation and the state is the reservation
of power by the state to amend, repeal or alter its corporation laws as it wishes so as to
bind all corporations organized thereunder and their shareholders and the companion
power the state confers on its corporations to amend their charters both generally and
with respect to specific matters. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 9.12 (1956)
(reserve power in state); art. 4.01 (Supp. 1974) (corporation's amendatory power).
These reservations of power originated in reaction to the Supreme Court's famous deci-
sion in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (1819), holding the corpora-
tion's charter is a contract between the state and the corporation and cannot be changed
by legislative act without unconstitutionally impairing the obligation of contract under
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, unless the power of amendment had previously been reserved.
At one time several states, principally New Jersey and Delaware, took a narrow view of
the reserve power so as to invalidate some charter amendments in the absence of explicit
legislation previously authorizing such changes, including several cases dealing with at-
tempts to eliminate arrearages on preferred; see, e.g., Morris v. American Pub. Util. Co.,
14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696 (1923); Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190
A. 115 (1936); Consolidated Film Indus. Inc. v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197 A. 489
(1937); Zabriski v. Hackensack & N.Y.R.R., 18 N.J. Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867), but later deci-
sions either repudiated the earlier views, see, e.g., Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 48
N.J. 450, 226 A.2d 585 (1967), or else permitted other devices to be used to affect pre-
ferred's rights, e.g., Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 11 A.2d 331
(1940) (merger into wholly-owned subsidiary); Shanik v. White Sewing Mach. Corp.,
25 Del. Ch. 154, 15 A.2d 169 (1940) (creation of prior preferred as part of voluntary
reorganization plan). As a consequence, the "vested rights" doctrine has virtually disap-
peared, thus still leaving preferred at the mercy of the majority's legal power to amend
(assuming there are no statutory or charter class voting rights) except as equity might
limit such power to prevent fraud or oppression. In general see, e.g., CARY 1768; LATIIN
§§ 155-59; Conard, Manipulation of Share Priorities, 8 VAND. L. REV. 54 (1954); Cur-
ran, Minority Shareholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters, 32 MICH. L.
REv. 743 (1934); Dodd, Amendment of Corporate Charters, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 585,
723 (1927); Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights, 23 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROn. 282 (1958); Lattin, A Primer on Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1 WESTERN
RESERVE L. REV. 3 (1949); Lynch, The Majority's Power to Effect Fundamental
Changes in Shareholders Rights, 2 CORP. PRAC. COM. No. 4, 1961, at 1.
274. This often involved the elimination of accumulated arrearages. See note 273
supra, and authorities there cited. See, e.g., Becht, Alterations of Accrued Dividends,
49 MicH. L. REV. 363 (1951); Becht, Corporate Charter Amendments: Issues of Prior
Stock and the Alteration of Dividend Rates, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 900 (1950); Dodd, Ac-
crued Dividends in Delaware Corporations-From Vested Right to Mirage, 57 HAv. L.
REV. 894 (1944); Latty, Exploration of Legislative Remedy for Prejudicial Changes in
Senior Shares, 19 U. Cmi. L. REV. 759 (1952); Linde, Elimination of Dividend Arrear-
ages on Cumulative Preferred Stock by Amendment of the Articles of Incorporation, 37
CALIF. L. REv. 129 (1949); Waterbury, Elimination of Dividend Accumulations by Di-
rect Charter Amendment, 48 MicH. L. REV. 657 (1950). As suggested by the number
of articles cited, the literature on alteration of preferred shareholders' rights has been
voluminous. See 2 ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2d, at 239 for a comprehensive
list of references.
275. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2d, § 60.
276. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 4.03 (Supp. 1974).
277. The TBCA lists a total of 13 amendments that require class voting, including
any amendment that would "cancel or otherwise affect dividends on the shares of such
class which had accrued but had not been declared." TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
4.03(B)(10) (Supp. 1974). The last three amendments were added in 1973 to accom-
modate the new close corporation statutes. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
278. On the preferred share contract in general, see LATrIN 501; Buxbaum, Preferred
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voting rights in certain specified situations, primarily contingent rights to
participate in the election of the board if dividends are passed over or to ap-
prove charter amendments or acquisitions that may affect preferred's pre-
rogatives, 279 and varying types of financial restrictions. The latter may in-
clude minimum asset requirements, or retention of sufficient working capital
after dividends are paid, or floors on consolidated net income in relation to
all dividend payouts and repurchases of common.280 Possibly in recognition
of the principle that preferred should be entitled to no more protection than
can be bargained for, article 4.03 was amended in 1967 to preclude class
voting on certain specified amendments if the articles of incorporation rela-
tive to a class denied it the right to vote on such amendments and contained
provisions setting out specific limitations and restrictions within which the
corporation could take action covered by the amendments. 281 Amendments
for which class voting could thus be denied included those that would in-
crease the number of shares of the class, or create a new class with equal,
prior, or superior rights, or increase the rights and preferences of junior
securities to a rank equal to or superior to the class.
28 2
As drafted, the 1967 amendment, which was not sponsored by the Bar
Committee, was scarcely a model of clarity283 (and not just because it did
not have the committee's imprimatur). Despite efforts to rationalize its
thrust and intent, made more difficult by its cryptic legislative history,
2 84 it
was evident the new section would remain a source of confusion as to its
meaning unless revised or repealed. Moreover, its terms were contrary to
,the basic philosophy behind the class voting privilege, namely to afford some
protection to purchasers of preferred stock who after its issuance are seldom
Stock-Law and Draftsmanship, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 243 (1954) (an excellent discussion
and practice guide).
279. See Buxbaum, supra note 278, at 290.
280. See HENN. 298; Buxbaum, supra note 278, at 255.
281. Ch. 633, § 1, [1967] Tex. Laws 1758, adding section C to TEX. Bus. CORP.
Acr ANN. art. 4.03 (1956) (repealed 1973), discussed in Amsler, supra note 127, at
67.
282. Ch. 663, § 1, [1967] Tex. Laws 1758 (repealed 1973).
283. E.g.:
C. The provisions of Paragraph B of this Article 4.03 shall not apply to
the holders of outstanding shares of any class not entitled to vote upon a
proposed amendment by the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation, in
the case of an amendment which would increase the aggregate number of
authorized shares of such class or create a new class of shares having
rights and preferences equal, prior, or superior to the shares of such class,
or increase the rights and preferences of any class having rights or prefer-
ences later or inferior to the shares of such class in such a manner as to
become equal, prior to superior to the shares of such class, if the provi-
sions of the Articles of Incorporation applicable to such class set forth
specific limitations and restrictions within which the corporation may take
the action contemplated by the proposed amendment, and if the action
contemplated by the proposed amendment is within the limitations and re-
strictions so specified.
Id.
284. The amendment's emergency clause stated: "The fact that the Texas Business
Corporation Act may now require voting on amendments by certain classes of stock
which by the original Articles of Incorporation and amendments thereto and by the pro-
visions of the applicable stock certificates are not entitled to vote, and the further fact
that certain amendments are necessary for the continued effective administration of the




in a position -,to renegotiate its terms.28 5 All that could be hoped for, so long
as -the section remained in force, was that somehow the protection provided
in the articles would fairly protect the preferred shareholders from serious
erosion in the value of their holdings. 286 Given this background, it should
not be surprising that when -the Bar Committee recommended the section be
repealed, 287 it was.2 88
Four other amendments, -already noted, may have some impact on class
voting. Although there may now be variations in voting rights among series
of a class of preferred or special class of stock,28 9 all the holders of the class
will continue to be permitted ,to vote on any amendments to the articles that
require the class approval under the Act, 29 0 even though some of the series
are made non-voting. Second, the number of votes needed for approval by
a class can be reduced to that cast by the holders of a majority or more of
the shares. 29 1 Third, a class of shares may be given more or less than one
vote per share.29 2 While this will not affect the percentage required for
approval within the class, it may become a definite factor in determining the
total vote of all the holders of the shares needed for approval of amend-
ments or other actions. Finally, any amendment to the articles of a s tat-
utorily-defined close corporation 293 to permit or rescind the privilege of hav-
ing its business and affairs managed by its shareholders rather than by a
board of directors294 or giving one or more of its shareholders the option to
dissolve the corporation 295 must be approved by the vote to all classes
285. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 60, 2.
286. E.g.:
Earlier purchasers of preferred should, in fairness, be protected in the ar-
ticles from a serious erosion in the value of their holdings by a provision,
for example, that the net worth attributable to the outstanding preferred
shall not be reduced by the new issue below a certain specified amount per
share, or that the common equity shall be maintained at a certain percent-
age in relation to the total preferred outstanding after the additional issue,
or that the additional issue shall not constitute more than a specified per-
centage of the cost of the new capital additions, etc. If these protective
restrictions and conditions in the articles permitting such an amendment
have been complied with, the 1967 addition of Section C to Art. 4.03
makes the limitation or denial of the class vote in the articles effective as
applicable to this type of amendment.
Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 4.03, 3A TFx. REV. CIrv. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1972).Because section C has been repealed, these observations no longer appear in the Com-
mittee's Comment to article 4.03. Nor can they be found in the bound volume con-
taining the original TBCA published in 1956, for the obvious reason that section C was
not enacted until 1967. Thus, due to the ephemeral nature of pocket part supplementa-
tion, this comment, like others formulated after 1956 but subsequently revised, will sim-ply disappear in law libraries that discard supplanted pocket parts, as nearly all do. Per-
haps there ought to be a publication somewhat equivalent to session laws to preserve
replaced legislative commentary as a source of legislative history.
287. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 4.03, 3A TEx. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. 114(Supp. 1974).
288. Ch. 545, § 32, [1973] Tex. Laws 1507, repealing TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 4.03(C) (Supp. 1972).
289. TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 2.13(A)(7) (Supp. 1974), discussed in text ac-
companying notes 261-72 supra.
290. Id. art. 4.03.
291. Id. art. 9.08, discussed in text accompanying notes 28-36 supra.
292. Id. art. 2.29 (A) (1) (a), (2), discussed in text accompanying notes 206-26 supra.
293. Id. art. 2.30-1(A).
294. Id. arts. 2.30-1(B), (C).
295. Id. art. 2.30-5.
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whether a class is otherwise given the right to vote or not.296
Voting of Shares: Proxy Contest. Battles for control of publicly-held cor-
porations 'have tended in recent years to be largely waged on the field of com-
peting or resisted -tender offers. 29 7 Now and then, however, a good old-fash-
ioned proxy contest appears to provide the opportunity for formulating or
further clarifying some of the rules that govern this form of intercorporate
combat. Aside from the federal proxy rules 298 which apply only to large
publicly-held corporations, 299 much of the law in point deals with such mat-
ters as the legality of the call,300 notice, 30 1 and conduct30 2 of the shareholders'
meeting to elect directors, the nature and duration of the proxy power, 303 and
296. Id. arts. 4.03(B)(1l)-(13).
297. See, e.g., E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
(1973) (the best single treatment); 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 163, §§ 13.18-31;
1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAw-FRAuD § 6.3 (1969); cf. Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada
Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973), discussed in Baade, Conflict of Laws,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 193-94, 227-28 (1974).
298. SEC Reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1-103 (1973). See generally E. ARANOW
& H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (2d ed. 1968); H. BLOOMEN-
THAL, supra note 163, §§ 13.01-.18; 2 L. Loss, supra note 66, at 857-1036; 5 id. 2829-
999 (Supp. 1969).
299. The SEC's proxy rules apply only to solicitation of proxies for securities regis-
tered pursuant to § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(a),
(g) (1970). These comprise in the main securities registered on a national securities
exchange, § 12(a), or those required to be registered under § 12(g) because their issuer
has total assets exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of equity securities (unless exempt)
held by 500 or more persons. There is no comparable scheme of proxy regulation for
general Texas business corporations; however, Texas insurance companies must solicit
proxies under similar regulations. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.48, § 5 (Supp. 1974).
Article 21.48 is the codification of the Insurance Company Insider Trading and Proxy
Regulation Act, ch. 222, §§ 1-14, [1965] Tex. Laws 435, enacted in response to the 1964
amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which exempted insurance com-
panies from the registration requirements of § 12(g) of that Act, provided the state of
domicile regulated proxy solicitation in substantially the same manner prescribed in §
14a of the 1934 Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g)(2)(G) (ii), 15 U.S.C.
§ 781 (1970). See 5 L. Loss, supra note 66, at 2741-60 (Supp. 1969), for a discussion
of the origin and application of the § 12(g) (2) (G) insurance securities exemption.
300. E.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. Ch. 1971); Penn-
Texas Corp. v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 34 N.J. Super. 373, 112 A.2d 302 (Super. Ct.
1955); Been v. Producers Ass'n of San Antonio, Inc., 352 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1961); cf. Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 515, 520, 348 S.W.2d 517, 520
(1961). See generally 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 1997-99.
301. E.g., In re Barreiro's Estate, 125 Cal. App. 752, 13 P.2d 1033 (1932); Phillips
v. Newland, 166 So. 2d 457 (La. App.), error ref., 246 La. 872, 167 So. 2d 679 (1964);
In re William Faehndrich, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 468, 141 N.E.2d 597, 161 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1957);
In re Election of Directors of FDR-Woodrow Wilson Democrats, Inc., 57 Misc. 2d 743,
293 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1968). See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra
note 298, at 62-67; 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 2006-11; Robinson,
The Stockholder's Common Law Right to Notice of Business To Be Transacted at Meet-
ings, 5 DUKE L.J. 1 (1955); Note, Notice and Quorum Requirements of Shareholders
Meetings, 24 U. CIN. L. REV. 578 (1955).
302. See generally 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2012; Kerr & Wolf,
Shareholders' Meetings Under the Texas Business Corporation Act, 43 TEXAS L. REV.
713, 721 (1965).
303. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.29(C) (Supp. 1974); Campbell v.
Loew's Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957); Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines
Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136 (1933); Wyatt v. Armstrong, 186 Misc. 216, 59
N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Fidelity Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Thompson, reversed in
part on other grounds, 45 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932); Shield v. Lone Star
Life Ins. Co., 202 S.W. 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1918), reversed on other grounds,
228 S.W. 196 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921). See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN,
supra note 298, at 410; 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 2053-63; 20 R.
HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 521-27; Comment, Irrevocable Proxies,
43 TEXAS L. REv. 733 (1965).
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the eligibility of various shareholders -to vote in the contest. 30 4 If litigation
ensues, as is likely -to be the case if the contested election is close, further
problems arise that concern -the propriety of the remedy being sought and
the standing of the complaining party. s0 5 In a recent decision by the Dallas
court of civil appeals, Salgo v. Matthews,30 some of these issues were con-
sidered in a scholarly and wide-ranging opinion by Justice Guittard.
The Salgo case involved a proxy contest for control of a Texas company
waged between two competing slates of candidates at a special meeting of
the shareholders. The president, a candidate for re-election to the board on
management's slate, appointed a Dallas attorney as election inspector to
count the votes. The meeting was recessed until the next day while the prox-
ies were tabulated. During that time the two principals in the insurgent
group presented several proxy documents executed in their behalf in the
name of a casualty company, the record owner, signed by the beneficial
owner (who was in bankruptcy) and another signed by the state receiver of
the casualty company, all pursuant to an order of a state district court that
the proxies be executed in their favor. The inspector refused to accept any
of these documents as proxies nor would he accept two telegraphic proxies
from other shareholders presented later the next day but before the results
were sought to be certified. Had all these proxies been counted, the non-
management slate would have won. The following day the two non-manage-
ment group principals obtained a temporary restraining order, later made into
a temporary injunction, ordering the president and the inspector not to accept
any more proxies, or -to refuse to count -the disputed proxies, or to certify
the final vote count until the validity of the disputed proxies had been re-
solved. After a hearing on the merits, the court ordered the president to re-
convene the meeting and announce the non-management slate as the victor
in the voting, because in its judgment the disputed proxies should have been
counted. On appeal the issues raised concerned the role of the inspector,
the voting of the shares by the receiver or beneficial owner, the timeliness
of the telegraphic proxies, and most importantly, the appropriateness of in-
junctive relief. The Dallas court's holdings on all these points warrant
discussion.
The Remedy: Injunction, Mandamus, or Quo Warranto? As the court
noted, quo warranto is generally regarded as the proper and traditional rem-
edy to test ,the validity of a corporate election and the title of those who claim
corporate office.3 0 7 Within the framework of its historical development308
304. E.g., Cooper v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 267 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1954), error ref. n.r.e.
305. E.g., Texlite, Inc. v. Wineburgh, 373 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1963), error ref. n.r.e. (non-shareholder cannot complain of inadequate notice), criti-
cally discussed in 19 R. HAMILTON, TExAs BUSINESS CORPORATIONS § 443, at 486, n.23.
306. 497 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), noted in 52 TExAs L. REv.
1433 (1974).
307. State ex rel. Yelkin v. Hand, 344 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961)
(dictum); State ex rel. Yelkin v. Hand, 331 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1959), error ref. n.r.e., 160 Tex. 415, 333 S.W.2d 109 (1960); Hyatt v. Mercury Life
& Health Co., 202 S.W.2d 320, 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1947), error ref.
n.r.e. See generally 6 Z. CAvrrCH, supra note 21, § 117.08; 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
CORPORATIONS §§ 2069, 2335; L. LowE, supra note 192, § 1203, at 94.
308. The writ of quo warranto is of an ancient origin and was one of the species
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and statutory authorization,30 9 this extraordinary legal proceeding empowers
a court to remove those who wrongfully hold or usurp public or corporate
offices and to replace them with the rightful occupants. Because of the ade-
quacy of the quo warranto remedy in most contested election cases, a corol-
lary general rule states that equity will not accept primary jurisdiction to de-
termine the legality of a corporate election or remove a director from his posi-
tion unless the issue is collaterally raised in a suit over which its jurisdiction
is unquestioned. 310  Finding no reason not to apply these general standards
where the only real issue was title to the office of director, the court reversed
,the trial court's decree.
The court justified its decision on the soundness it perceived in the policy
that bars the award of extraordinary mandatory relief, either by way of in-
junction or mandamus, if another effective and complete remedy can be
found, and rejected any notion that tradition or a mechanistic application of
precedent dictated the result. In its view, quo warranto was no more time-
consuming or expensive a proceeding than those asking for a mandatory in-
junction or mandamus and in a corporate election case gave more effective
relief. For example, the trial court's order did not really resolve the contro-
versy before it, since only the results of the election were announced. It did
not oust the management directors from office and install the plaintiffs' slate,
as in quo warranto; for that matter, the order could not have, since not all
the management directors were named as parties to the suit.
The appellate court conceded there might be times when mandatory
injunctive relief should be granted, such as when there has been a refusal
to hold an election or a failure to count votes cast and declare results, or
action taken that will frustrate or seriously delay the elective process. 311 In-
of writs of right. It was later replaced in England by the form of an information in
the nature of quo warranto and became part of the law in this country either by adoption
of the common law or by statute. At one time the remedy could not be used to question
the validity of a corporate official's appointment or election to office since it was
thought to apply only to public officials. However, because of the quasi-public nature
of corporations as creatures of the state, quo warranto became the principal mode of
testing one's right or title to corporate office. See generally F. FERRIS & F. FERRIS, THE
LAW OF EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES §§ 101-03, 154 (1926); 5 W. FLETCHER, CY-
CLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 2324-26, 2335; C. KINNANE, A FIRST BOOK ON ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAw 662 (2d ed. 1952).
309. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 6253 (authorizing attorney general or proper
district or county attorney to petition court to file information in nature of quo warranto
in name of state therein if, inter alia, "any person shall usurp, intrude into or unlaw-
fully hold or execute . . . any office in any corporation created by the authority of this
State .... "), 6257 (if person adjudged guilty as charged, he may be ousted from office,
fined, and suffer court costs) (1970).
310. State ex rel. Yelkin v. Hand, 331 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959),
error ref. n.r.e., 160 Tex. 109, 333 S.W.2d 109 (1960); Hyatt v. Mercury Life & Health
Co., 202 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1947), error ref. n.r.e.; State ex
rel. Bledsoe v. Grand Lodge of United Brothers of Friendship, 53 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1932); De Zavala v. Daughters of the Republic of Texas, 124 S.W.
160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1909), error ref. See generally 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra
note 21, § 117.09; 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2070.
311. The court cites Steinberg v. American Bantam Car Co., 76 F. Supp. 426 (W.D.
Pa. 1948), appeal dismissed as moot, 173 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1949); Meyberg v. Superior
Court, 19 Cal. 2d 336, 121 P.2d 685 (1942); Empire So. Gas Co. v. Gray, 29 Del. Ch.
95, 46 A.2d 741 (1946); Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 194 N.Y. 212, 87 N.E.
443 (1909); Tunis v. Hestonville, M. & F. Passenger R.R., 149 Pa. 70, 24 A. 88 (1892);
E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 298, at 481-88. See generally 6 Z. CAVITCH, su-
pra note 21, § 117.09, at 493; 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 2070-72.
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deed, equity's aid is frequently invoked to restrain fraud or misrepresentation
in the solication of proxies3 12 or prevent meetings from being held that contra-
vene notice, time, or subject matter requirements3 13 or ,to preclude interfer-
ence with the board's management during the course of the election
contest.3 14 But even in these cases, -the courts generally require some showing
of irreparable harm and inadequacy of other remedies.31 Moreover, in cases
such as the one before it, in which apparently for the first time in Texas jur-
isprudence judicial assistance was being sought to control a corporate election
before its results were announced,3 16 there is great need for letting matters
be decided internally before seeking judicial help. As Justice Guittard aptly
put it:
If, while the meeting is still in progress, opposing factions may take
their disputes to court and require judicial determination of the regu-
larity of the proceedings, eligibility of voters and validity of proxies,
the affairs of the corporation may be brought to a standstill by restrain-
ing orders, hearings and appeals, courts may be occupied by matters
of little or no ultimate consequence, land judicial processes may be
employed as tactics for the advantage of one faction or another in their
struggle for the support of other stockholders. Unless immediate judi-
cial intervention is shown to be essential to protect substantial rights,
opposing factions should be required to fight their battles to a conclu-
sion one way or another within the corporate arena before seeking the
aid of the courts.3 1 7
As to mandamus, the court first noted that that remedy is also governed
by general equitable principles; 318 thus its appropriateness, too, depends on
the inadequacy of other relief.319 Secondly, in response to an argument that
The court also acknowledged that mandatory relief might be available if corporate elec-
tion officials failed to perform their duties or if for some reason the attorney general
or district or county attorney refused to initiate quo warranto proceedings. 497 S.W.2d
at 632. But absent such a showing that the elective process "is being frustrated or un-
reasonably delayed," the court said, extraordinary mandatory relief would not be avail-
able until that process had been completed. Id.
312. See, e.g., Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966); Henwood
v. SEC, 298 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814 (1962); Cooke v. Tele-
prompter Corp., 334 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); McConnell v. Lucht, 320 F. Supp.
1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D.
Mich. 1966); Poirier v. Welch, 233 F. Supp. 436 (D.D.C. 1964); Pearson v. First Fed-
eral Say. & Loan Ass'n, 149 So. 2d 891 (Fla. App. 1963); Bowman Shoe Co. v. Bowman,
21 II. App. 2d 423, 158 N.E.2d 112 (1959); Segal v. Bresnick, 30 Misc. 2d 569, 222
N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Wyatt v. Armstrong, 186 Misc. 216, 59 N.Y.S.2d 502
(Sup. Ct. 1945); In re Scheuer, 59 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. 1942). See generally E.
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 298, at 503; H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 163, §
13.17[2][b]; 2 L. Loss, supra note 66, at 957 n.391, and at 2927.
313. See generally 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2071.
314. E.g., De Zavala v. Daughters of the Republic of Texas, 124 S.W. 160 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1909), error ref.; cf. State ex rel. Yelkin v. Hand, 344 S.W.2d 467
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961).
315. See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 298, at 470; 5 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS 341.
316. 497 S.W.2d at 626.
317. Id. at 625.
318. See authorities cited in note 196 supra.
319. See Wells v. Commissioners' Court, 195 S.W. 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1917), error re]., a case the Dallas court found quite persuasive, refusing to grant man-
damus to require election officials to canvass the returns of a particular precinct, because
quo warranto was the more appropriate remedy. Even if the election officials had given
a new certificate of election based on the mandamused recount, it would have only been
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the election inspector at least could be mandamused, the court declined to
follow -the suggestion of Aranow and Einhorn,3 20 that to alleviate the disrup-
tion and expense involved in post-election contest litigation, it would be desir-
able to 'have the courts mandamus election inspectors and thus provide quick
judicial review of their rulings before results are announced. Conceding the
mandamus remedy might be an expeditious and conclusive one in such
cases,3 21 the fact remained the plaintiffs initiated the whole time-consuming
procedure in equity of temporary orders, motions to dissolve, interlocutory
appeals, and trial and appeal on the merts-hardly a summary remedy to
quickly resolve a proxy contest when quo warranto would ultimately do the
job in no more time.3 22 It should also be noted that New York, where man-
damus has been used in such cases, has adopted a special procedure for con-
tested election cases that provides more summary relief3 23 and even Aranow
and Einhorn concede there is scant legal authority on the availability of man-
damus in such situations8 24
In view of the state of the law on judicial remedies in Texas, the court's
conclusion as to the appropriateness of quo warranto as ,the best form of relief
was undoubtedly sound. Yet had it not gone on to resolve the validity of
the disputed proxies,3 25 the parties might well have found themselves back
where they started after months trying to get a definitive ruling. True, the
court's holding in Salgo, if generally followed, will furnish a useful guide here-
after in other contested election cases. But in light of the uncertainties re-
maining so long as several overlapping remedies are possibly available, it
would seem much more desirable to recognize proxy contests as sui generis
and, as several states have done, '326 provide a specific summary proceeding
prima facie evidence of the right to office, an issue that would ultimately have to be
decided in quo warranto. The Dallas court felt the same reasoning applied to corporate
elections especially where extraordinary relief Nkas being sought before the election.
497 S.W.2d at 627.
320. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 298, at 492.
321. See, e.g., SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 67 F. Supp. 326 (D. Del. 1946), modified
& af'd on other grounds, 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847
(1948) (mandamus to compel compliance with proxy rules); Young v. Jebbett, 213 App.
Div. 774, 211 N.Y.S. 61 (1925). On possible uses of mandamus to review contested
corporate elections, see in general E. ARAxow & H. EINHORN, supra note 298, at 455,
492; 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 117.08, at 488; 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA COR-
PORATIONS § 2069.
322. As the court noted, an appeal in quo warranto must be perfected and the trans-
cript and statement of facts filed within 20 days after the trial court's final judgment or
order overruling a motion for new trial, unless a reasonable extension of time is granted,
TEX. R. Civ. P. 384; moreover, the appellate court must give preference to the appeal
and hear and determine it as early as practicable. TEX. R. Ctv. P. 781. See generally
L. LowE, supra note 192, §§ 1271, 1274.
On motion for rehearing, the Dallas court rejected an argument that the quo warranto
proceeding was unconstitutional because it made protection of voting rights dependent
on the exercise of discretion by prosecuting attorneys to bring the action, since no show-
ing was made that these officials would not perform their duty. 497 S.W.2d at 632.
323. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 619 (McKinney 1963), discussed in E. ARANOW & H.
EINHORN, supra note 298, at 497-518.
324. The authors cite only State v. Coogan, 98 So. 2d 757 (Fla. App. 1957); Young
v. Jebbett, 213 App. Div. 774, 211 N.Y.S. 61 (1925); McGoldrick v. Rotwein, 127
N.Y.L.J. 508 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 6, 1952). Cf. 6 Z. CAvrTCH, supra note 21, § 117.08, at
488.
325. See discussion in text accompanying notes 342-57 infra.
326. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §§ 2236-38 (West 1955); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
33-315 (Supp. 1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 225, 227 (1967); IDAHO CODE § 30-
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in which the court will have broad powers to enter whatever orders that may
be needed to resolve these disputes.8 27 These special statutory proceedings
afford a flexible and simplified procedure that avoids the pitfalls of traditional
judicial remedies classification and enables a court both to effectively deal
with all the legal sparring that marks the proxy contest and to rapidly deter-
mine the legitimacy of the combatants' competing claims to corporate office.
Role of Election Inspector. To further support the -trial court's order, the
plaintiffs argued relief was necessary because the election inspector had
abused his authority in not accepting the disputed proxies. His function, they
said, was purely ministerial and so long as the proxies appeared valid on their
face they should -not have been rejected. The court recognized there is some
case authority that so describes the inspector's duties,8 28 but specifically held,
nevertheless, that an election inspector has discretionary authority to prelim-
inarily determine the validity of proxies for purposes of -tabulation, counting
votes, and certifying results and that in the exercise of those duties he is not
subject to judicial control, although his decision is thereafter reviewable
through quo warranto proceedings.8 29 As a consequence, his exercise of dis-
cretion in performing this function cannot be controlled by mandamus or
mandatory injunction.
Since Salgo is the first Texas decision on the role of the election inspector,
there being nothing in the TBCA or in the corporation's bylaws on the
matter,8 0 the Dallas court's opinion obviously has made some new law, al-
though not necessarily inconsistent with holdings elsewhere.8 8 1 It believed
137 (1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6515 (Supp. 1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A,
§ 621 (1974); N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:5-27 (1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 619 (Mc-
Kinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-71 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-1.1-26
(Supp. 1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.19 (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-42
(1973).
327. Under the Maine statute, for example, the court can compel the production of
documentary evidence, issue interlocutory orders restraining directors and officers whose
positions are being contested from acting or dealing with other matters prior to final
determination if the court deems proper, and by way of final relief, declare the results
of the election, or order a new one including use of a master to conduct the election,
determine voting rights of shareholders or those claiming the right to vote, decide if
there have been breaches of voting agreements or trusts, and finally "direct such other
relief as may be just and proper." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 621 (1974).
As to use of a master to supervise a new election, see Tarver v. Mitchell, 265 S.W.
1106 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1924) (affirming trial court order setting aside
election but reversing that part of order appointing master to conduct new election
and report back to court).
328. Citing, e.g., Standard Power & Light Corp. v. Investment Associates, Inc., 29
Del. Ch. 593, 51 A.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Atterbury v. Consolidated Coppermines
Corp., 26 Del. Ch. 1, 20 A.2d 743 (Ch. 1941); Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines
Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136 (1933); State ex rel. Hawley v. Coogan, 98 So.
2d 757 (Fla. App. 1957); Bache v. Central Leather Co., 78 N.J. Eq. 484, 81 A. 571
(Ch. 1911); In re Lake Placid Co., 274 App. Div. 205, 81 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1948), appeal
denied, 298 N.Y. 932, 82 N.E.2d 44 (1949); In re Cecil, 36 How. Pr. 477 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1869). See also Kauffman v. Meyberg, 59 Cal. App. 2d 730, 140 P.2d 210 (1943);
Williams v. Sterling Oil of Oklahoma, Inc., 273 A.2d 264 (Del. 1971); Commonwealth
v. Woelper, 3 S. & R. (Pa.) 29 (1817); E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 298,
at 407; 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2018, at 108 n.6; Axe, Corporate
Proxies, 41 MicH. L. REV. 38, 64 (1942); Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 1443 (1972).
329. 497 S.W.2d at 627.
330. Id. at 628.
331. Several courts and authorities state that the inspector's duties are at least quasi-judicial, at least insofar as determining the eligibility to vote, or keeping the polls open
so that all shareholders can vote, are concerned. See, e.g., Clopton v. Chandler, 27 Cal.
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its ruling would best serve the interest of the shareholders in permitting proxy
contests to be promptly resolved by allowing the inspector to perform his
function of accurately determining and promptly announcing the result of the
voting without interruption by litigation brought by the opposing factions. 83 2
This of course is a policy decision, as the court's language quoted earlier
plainly reveals, 333 and certainly there is considerable merit in not having the
announcement of the poll delayed by constant resort to interlocutory proceed-
ings. The time in which the inspector performs his duties is so shor-t any-
way that no great harm can come ,to a contestant if he is allowed to play
his role, provided (and the proviso is quite important) his decision can be
expeditiously reviewed. While the court seemed confident the quo warranto
remedy suffices for that purpose, a summary procedure if enacted would safe-
guard the interests of all the contestants even more effectively because of the
wider range of options it can enable the court to promptly make.3 34 Other-
wise, any protracted delay simply means the persons apparently elected will
continue to serve at least as de facto directors until their election has been
set aside. 335
As the court observed, there is no Texas statute on the appointment of
election inspectors, although the practice is fairly common in meetings of
large publicly-held corporations.3 36  Certainly in light of the discretionary
authority Salgo vests in them, they should be chosen with care.3 37 Indeed,
if they are to fully play the protected role the Dallas court perceived for them,
it would again seem much more desirable to have the legislature prescribe
the right to and method of their appointment, and more importantly, the
scope of their duties and the standards by which they are to be exercised.
A number of states have such statutes 38 and they specify the needed details
that hardly can be expected from judicial legislation. The New York
statute,33 9 for example, provides that the inspectors, who may be appointed
by the board or the presiding officer unless otherwise provided in the
App. 595, 150 P. 1012 (1915); State ex rel. Dunbar v. Hohmann, 248 S.W.2d 49 (Mo.
App. 1952); Young v. Jebbett, 213 App. Div. 774, 211 N.Y.S. 61, 65 (1925); Comment,
Corporations-Elections-Judicial Actions of Inspectors of Elections, 48 MICH. L. REV.
483 (1950). See also E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 298, at 406; 6 Z. CAVITCH,
supra note 21, § 117.05[3]; 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2018; Axe,
supra note 328, at 64; Annot., supra note 328.
332. Salgo v. Matthews, 497 S.W.2d 620, 628 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), noted
in 52 TExAs L. REV. 1433 (1974).
333. See text accompanying note 317 supra.
334. See text accompanying notes 326-27 supra.
335. 1 HORNSTEIN 453.
336. See, e.g., L. DoRis & E. FRIEDMAN, CORPORATE MEETINGS, MINUTES, AND REs-
OLUTIONs 52 (3d ed. 1951); B. ROGERS, PROXY GuIE FOR MEETINGS OF STOCKHOLDERS§§ 7-24 (1969); Kerr & Wolf, supra note 302, at 725-26; Monaghan, Annual Stockhold-
ers' Meetings: Some Legal and Practical Problems, 16 BAYLOR L. REV. 129, 137 (1964).
337. 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 450, at 495.
338. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 2232, 2233 (West 1955); ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch.
32, § 157.26a (Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 609 (Supp. 1974); Mo.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 351.235, 351.240 (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:5-25 (Supp.
1974), -26 (1969); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw §§ 610 (McKinney Supp. 1974), 611 (Mc-
Kinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-70 (1965); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.50
(Page 1964); OIKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1.69 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1512
(1967); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.17 (Supp. 1973).
339. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 610 (McKinney Supp. 1974), 611 (McKinney 1963).
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bylaws,8 40 and who must be appointed if a shareholder demands, after taking
an oath to -fulfill their duties with strict impartiality and to the best of their
abilities, are to determine the number of voting shares outstanding and how
many are represented at the meeting, whether a quorum is present, and the
validity and effect of proxies; receive the votes; hear and determine all chal-
lenges and questions raised in voting and if requested make a report in writ-
ing thereon and execute a certificate as to any fact they find; count and tab-
ulate the votes; determine the results; and do everything proper to conduct
the election or vote "with fairness to all shareholders."'34' As useful as the
Salgo decision is in establishing new guidelines for election inspectors in
Texas, it would be even more helpful if a statute such as New York's or sim-
lar legislation elsewhere were made part of the TBCA.
Voting by Receiver. Under the TBCA a receiver may vote the shares
standing in his name or, even if they have not been transferred to him on
the corporation's books, any he holds or that are under his control when auth-
orized by order of the court appointing him.342  In the Salgo case, the most
pivotal of the proxies rejected by the election inspector were those for shares
owned by an insurance company in receivership. The inspector was present-
ed with four documents covering 29,934 shares owned by Pioneer Casualty
Company. Two were proxies signed by one Sheperd, the beneficial owner
to whom the shares had been transferred. A third was an order of a Travis
County district court directing Pioneer's receiver to give Sheperd a proxy to
vote these shares so that Sheperd could then give his proxy to the two plain-
tiff-insurgents (which the court regarded the same as if the receiver had
directly given the proxy to the plaintiffs) and the fourth was the receiver's
proxy so executed. Because Sheperd was bankrupt, the defendants contend-
ed beneficial ownership in the shares was in the trustee in bankruptcy, not
in Pioneer or Sheperd, and consequently neither Sheperd nor the receiver had
the right to vote the stock, just as 'the inspector had determined.
In deciding the receiver's proxy should have been counted, the court
acknowledged that under the bankruptcy law whatever beneficial interest
Sheperd had in stock vested in his bankruptcy trustee,3 43 but this did not
necessarily mean the trustee alone had power to vote the shares as beneficial
owner without their being transferred -to him on the corporation's books. For
until they were, the little authority there is on the point indicates a bankrupt
can continue to vote his stock at least until notice has been given the cor-
poration of the bankruptcy and vesting in the trustee.3 44 Moreover, under
the TBCA, the corporation's stock transfer records are prima facie evidence
340. The Maine statute makes the clerk or the secretary of the corporation the votinginspector, subject to other provisions in the bylaws or the discretion of the presiding of fi-
cer. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 609 (Supp. 1974).341. The Missouri and New Jersey statutes disqualify directors or candidates for the
board from serving as inspectors. Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 351.235 (1966); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:5-25 (1969).
342. Tux. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.29(G) (1956).
343. Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970).
344. Kresel v. Goldberg, 111 Conn. 475, 150 A. 693 (1930); State ex rel. White v.
Ferris, 42 Conn. 560 (1875). See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 298,
at 401; 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS 189.
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as to who are shareholders entitled to vote3 4 5 and insofar as the election in-
spector is concerned, these records are conclusive on the question of eligibility
to vote.8 4 6  If there is any conflict concerning disputed ownership, it must
be resolved later by the courts. This view seems somewhat in conflict with
the rather broad discretionary authority the court had just recognized the
election inspector as having, although certainly consistent with general law
elsewhere.3 47  Furthermore, the trustee here made no effort to have -the
shares transferred in his name or to have the receiver or the receivership
court issue a proxy to him or pursue any of the other remedies of the bene-
ficial owner who desires to vote.3 48
Since Pioneer was the record owner, the only matter to be resolved by the
inspector was to determine who -had the right to represent it. 349  Having no
officers and being in receivership, it seemed manifest under -the TBCA that
only the receiver acting pursuant to a court's order could vote for it. 350 How-
ever, the defendants argued that the shares in question were not "held by"
or "under the control" of the receiver, the operative language of article
2.29 (G), because apparently having been pledged to a Detroit bank either the
bank or the trustee as beneficial owner had "control" of them. In response,
the court said the statute did not mean the receiver had to have either actual
physical control of the stock certificates or beneficial owership; rather so long
as the shares are recorded in the name of the corporation in receivership on
.the books of the issuing corporation, its receiver "holds" the shares. The
court's interpretation is a sensible one, even though it leaves open the question
of a possible conflict in determining voting authority among two judicially
appointed officers or representatives, 3 51 something neither the Model Act352
nor its TBCA counterpart addresses itself to.
Timeliness of Proxies. The question of how long the polls should remain
open so that a shareholder may cast his vote or have his proxy received is
345. TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 2.27(A) (1956).
346. E.g., Williams v. Sterling Oil of Oklahoma, Inc., 273 A.2d 264 (Del. 1971);
In re Schirmer's Will, 231 App. Div. 625, 248 N.Y.S. 497 (1931); In re Argus Printing
Co., 1 N.D. 434, 48 N.W. 347 (1891). See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra
note 298, at 385; 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 2018, 2033; Axe, supra
note 328, at 63. In the Williams case, supra, the court held that if identical but con-
flicting proxies are presented which cannot be resolved from the face of the proxies
themselves or the corporate records, they must all be rejected.
347. See generally 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS 110; Annot., supra
note 328.
348. As the court noted, the beneficial owner can demand a proxy from the record
owner and seek relief by way of damages, an injunction, or mandamus if the latter re-
fuses. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 102 F.2d 397 (6th Cir.
1939); In re Giant Portland Cement Co., 26 Del. Ch. 32, 21 A.2d 697 (Ch. 1941);
In re Canal Constr. CO., 21 Del. Ch. 155, 182 A. 545 (Ch. 1936); see generally E.
APNow & H. EinmoRN, supra note 298, at 387; CARY 289; 5A Z. CAVITCH, supra note
21, § 109.02[2], at 996-97; cf. Maidman, Voting Rights of After-Record-Date Share-
holders: A Skeleton in a Wall Street Closet, 71 YALE L.J. 1205 (1962).
349. 497 S.W.2d at 630.
350. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.29(G) (1956).
351. Cf. Cooper v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 267 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1954), error ref. n.re.., discussed in 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
§ 478, at 509 (testamentary trustee prevailed over independent executor in dispute over
right to vote decedent's stock). See also In re Empire Fin. Corp., 1 F. Supp. 298 (N.D.
Cal. 1932) (trustee in bankruptcy and not previously appointed receiver authorized to
vote stock owned by bankrupt corporation).
352. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 33.
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one seldom dealt with by statute35 3 or even in the corporation's bylaws.3 54
If nothing is said, presumably they may be ordered closed by action of the
shareholders, the presiding officer, or the inspectors of the election, 35 5 but
even after that time they may be accepted or the vote changed so long as
the results of the voting have not been announced.3 6  The court applied
,these general principles in determining the two telegraphic proxies should
have been counted. Although presented the day following the meeting, the
meeting had only been recessed and not adjourned nor had the results been
announced. Absent a controlling bylaw, agreement or other binding provi-
sion concerning ,an earlier closing of the polls, the court said, the shareholder
retains his right to change his vote -up until the final announcement of
results.3 57
Management by Shareholders. Among the more far-reaching aspects of the
close corporation legislation adopted in 1973 and noted in the next part of
this survey are the sections that allow shareholders of a close corporation
either ito dispense with the board of directors and directly assume the pre-
rogatives of management358 or else to provide beforehand by agreement
many of the matters that normally fall within the discretion or powers of the
board of directors. 359 The choice for direct management by the shareholders
can be made in the original articles of incorporation360 or by an amendment
thereto;361 an agreement that impinges on the board's powers of manage-
ment must be one that all the shareholders of the close corporation have as-
sented to and meets other requisites.36 2  In either case, the shareholders
may then become subject to the various liabilities imposed by the Act or by
law for abuse or neglect of their managerial duties. 3 " These provisions are
treated in more detail in Part III but need to be mentioned here to demon-
strate the possibility of attaining the ultimate in shareholder action and
control.
353. New Jersey formerly required that the polls remain open from nine o'clock in
the morning until five o'clock in the afternoon with mandatory closing by nine in the
evening, but the requirement has been repealed. Ch. 185, § 34, [1896] N.J. Laws 289,
as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-24 (Supp. 1974); see Commissioners' Comment
to § 14A:5-24, 14 N.J. STAT. ANN. 238 (1969).
354. E. ARANOW & H. EiNaoRN, supra note 298, at 326.355. Id. See also 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 117.05[1], at 464; 5 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2017, at 101.
356. E.g, State ex rel. Dunbar v. Hohmann, 248 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. App. 1952); Young
v. Jebbett, 213 App. Div. 774, 211 N.Y.S. 61 (1925). See generally 5 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2017, at 101.
357. 497 S.W.2d at 631; see, e.g., Zierath Combination Drill Co. v. Croake, 21 Cal.
App. 222, 131 P. 335 (1913); Zachary v. Milin, 294 Mich. 622, 293 N.W. 770 (1940);
Washington State Labor Council v. Federated Am. Ins. Co., 78 Wash. 2d 263, 474 P.2d
98 (1970). See generally 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 117.05[1], at 465; 5 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2017, at 104; Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 234 (1972).
358. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-1(B) (Supp. 1974), discussed in text ac-
companying notes 535-37 infra.
359. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-2(A) (Supp. 1974), discussed in text ac-
companying notes 538-43 infra.
360. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 3.02(A)(9) (Supp. 1974), discussed in text ac-
companying note 24 supra.
361. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 4.01(B)(18) (Supp. 1974), discussed in text
accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
362. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-2 (Supp. 1974), discussed in text accom-
panying notes 538-43 infra.
363. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.30-1(B) (2), -2(E) (Supp. 1974).
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B. Action by Directors
Number of Directors. As part of -the trend -toward removing some of the
formalities of corporate government for what are essentially incorporated pro-
prietorships or two-man partnerships, a TBCA amendment reduces the num-
ber of directors a corporation must have to one or more.36 4 The almost uni-
versal minimum heretofore has been three directors3 65 which has led to the
practice in the case of the one-man close corporation of utilizing persons
such as family members, employees, or less frequently the company's attor-
ney, to serve for all practical purposes as dummy directors,3 66 content to do
the bidding of the owner when called upon to pass resolutions or sign docu-
ments, often their sole function, yet frequently unaware of their fiducial re-
sponsibilities or the risks of obeisance.3 67  Any show of independence by
these nominal or non-shareholder directors can easily be curtailed if foresight
has been used in providing for removal of directors without cause by the
shareholders.3 68 Despite the anomaly of a one-man board of directors,3 69 the
change squares the law with the reality of how these incorporated businesses
operate in fact and should reduce still further the possibilities of negation of
corporate transactions for want of formality.370
In one respect, however, the amendment (and its Model Act source)371
goes beyond legislation in some states which also countenance a board of less
than three members. Those states permit the reduction in number of direc-
tors to one or two only where there are less than three shareholders and add
the further proviso that the number of directors may not be less than the
number of shareholders.3 72 While on its face this appears to be a reasonable
364. Ch. 545, § 23, [1973] Tex. Laws 1500, amending TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN.
art. 2.32 (1956).
365. 6 Z. CAvITCH, supra note 21, § 124.01. Only a few states generally authorize
a board of less than three directors. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 1972);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.09(1) (Supp. 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.34 (Supp. 1974);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6301(b) (Supp. 1973); MicH. COMP. LAWS 450.1505 (1973);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.315 (1966); NEa. REv. STAT. § 21-2036 (Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 180.32 (Supp. 1974). However, many more permit one- or two-man boards if
there are fewer than three shareholders, the number generally corresponding with the
number of shareholders. See note 372 infra.
366. See Doty & Parker 1020.
367. See, e.g., Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473 (1961) (lawyer);
Allied Freightways v. Cholfin, 325 Mass. 630, 91 N.E.2d 765 (1950) (wife).
368. See F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 3.13, 3.59. See also discussion in text
accompanying notes 426-45 infra.
369. See ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2d, § 36, 2, concerning the English
experience with single directors.
370. See, e.g., Hurley v. Omsteen, 311 Mass. 477, 42 N.E.2d 273 (1942); Gerard v.
Empire Square Realty Co., 195 App. Div. 244, 187 N.Y.S. 306 (1921); Curtis v. Pipelife
Corp., 370 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963). However, the courts have
tended to overlook informalities in action by the directors when the corporation has
gained substantial benefit therefrom or when the board and the shareholders are the
same. See generally 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BuSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 559; 1 F.
O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 8.03.
371. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2d, § 36. Prior to the 1969 revision, the
Model Act required a minimum of three directors, but removed the minimum to recog-
nize the growing practice of one-man management in close corporations. Id. 2.
372. Approximately 20 states permit reduction of the number of directors below three
to correspond with the number of shareholders, if less than three. E.g., CALIF. CORP.
CODE ANN. § 301(d) (West Supp. 1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-314(a) (Supp.
1973); ILL. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 32, § 157.34 (Supp. 1974); IND. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-
2-11(b) (Code ed. 1972); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 47 (Supp. 1974); N.J.
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compromise in policy and there is no great likelihood a board of less than
three directors will be employed in corporations where there are a number
of active or substantial shareholders, these statutes remove an element of
flexibility in business planning the TBCA amendment affords. For example,
there may be eases where shares have been given to or purchased at nominal
cost by more than 'three family members or employees; yet the father or em-
ployer wants a one-man directorship in order to continue to operate without
interference what he still conceives to be his business.
Another aspect of the same amendment also gives more flexibility in deter-
mining 'how 'the number of directors will be fixed. 'Under the TBCA as first
enacted, -the bylaws stipulated how many directors there would be except for
the first board whose number was to be fixed in the articles of incorpora-
tion. 3 3 This meant that whenever an increase or decrease in number was
desired, the bylaws had ;to be amended.3 7 4  This might or might not be a
good deal of bother, depending largely on whether the shareholders retained
the power to amend the bylaws or had delegated that authority to the direc-
tors.87 5 -It also left open the rather intriguing possibility 'that even though
the shareholders provided in the articles for a specific number of directors,
,not only for the first board but during the life of the corporation, a contrary
bylaw adopted by 'the directors (assuming the amendatory power had been
delegated to them) would prevail.876
Employing the 1969 revision of the comparable Model Act section,3 77 the
1973 TBCA amendment deals with both of these problems by permitting the
number of directors to be determined either by, "or in the manner provided
in," the articles or bylaws.37 8  Similarly, their number can be increased or
decreased by amendments to, or in the manner provided by, either of -those
documents. 379  For example, the articles or bylaws can stipulate that the
,number of directors can be within a certain range with the precise number
to be fixed from time to time by the shareholders or the board, 8 0 presumably
by formal resolution, although informal acquiescence may well suffice, 38 1 or
STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-2 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 702(a) (McKinney Supp.
1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-25(a) (Supp. 1973); ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.185 (1969);
R.I. GEN. LAW ANN. § 7-1.1-34 (Supp. 1973); TmN. CODE ANN. § 48-802(a) (Supp.
1973).
373. Ch. 64, art. 2.32, [1955] Tex. Laws 239, as amended, TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 2.32 (Supp. 1974). If the bylaws were silent, the number remained the same
provided in the articles. There has been no change in this general rule.
374. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.32, 3A TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. 90
(Supp. 1974); Doty & Parker 1021.
375. See text accompanying notes 61-68 supra.
376. See Crow v. Consol. Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 A. 136 (1933),
upholding a bylaw instituted by successful insurgents increasing the number of directors
from nine to fifteen, although the charter provided for a nine-man board. The result
in Gow was overturned by later legislation. See note 384 infra.
377. ABA MODEL BUs. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 36.
378. Ch. 545, § 23, [1973] Tex. Laws 1500, amending TEx. Bus. CORP. ACr ANN.
art. 2.32 (1956).
379. Tnx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.32 (Supp. 1974).
380. See, e.g., Ellin v. Consol. Caribou Silver Mines, Inc., 31 Del. Ch. 149, 67 A.2d
416 (1949), upholding a similar bylaw.
381. See, e.g., Keating v. K-C-K Corp., 383 S.W.2d 69, 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1964) (where articles provided number of directors to be that fixed in bylaws, but no
less than three, action of shareholders in electing four directors for past four years
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as in one case, not provide a specific number but state that the number of
directors shall consist of those whose terms have not expired plus the num-
ber just elected by the shareholders. 3 -8 2 Or, in a close corporation, there may
well be a provision that there can be no increase or decrease in number with-
out -the unanimous consent of the shareholders. 383  Likewise, it should no
longer be possible for a bylaw relating to the number of directors to override
a contrary provision in the articles of incorporation.3 84
Quorum for Directors' Meeting. Article 2.35, dealing with the quorum
needed for a meeting of directors, has been amended in two respects. 38 5 One
change alters the quorum requirement to a majority of the number fixed by,
"or in the manner provided in," the articles or bylaws, to conform with the
amendment to article 2.32 on fixing the number of directors, just discussed.
The other purports to make clear that "the law" as well as the articles or
bylaws can require a quorum to consist of more than a majority of the direc-
tors or that action taken at a meeting at which a quorum is present must
be approved by more than a majority of the quorum. 386 The purpose of add-
ing the phrase "by law" is somewhat obscure, since it assumes there may be
statutes that impose such requirements for action by the directors, somewhat
similar to the approval by -the holders of specified percentages of shares
needed for certain corporate acts.3 8 7 However, the TBCA when referring
to voting by -the directors normally speaks only in terms of the board adopt-
ing a favorable resolution or taking other action without specifying a percent-
age required for such approval.388  The only article where the added phrase
would make a difference is in article 2.36, as amended, that requires ap-
proval by a majority of the "full board" of directors when designating an
deemed informal amendment of bylaws to authorize four-man board). See also Pelletier
& Marsh, Incorporation Planning in Texas, 23 Sw. L.J. 820, 849 (1969).
382. In re Quinlan, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30, 1964, at 18 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
383. 1 HORN'STEIN 489.
384. The Delaware statute is even more explicit on this point: It provides that
"[t]he number of directors shall be fixed by, or in manner provided in, the bylaws, un-
less the certificate of incorporation fixes the number of directors, in which case a change
in the number of directors shall be made only by amendment of the certificate." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 1971). The language is designed to specifically over-
come the result in the Gow case; see note 376 supra. E. FOLK, supra note 194, at 55.
385. Ch. 545, § 24, [1973] Tex. Laws 1501, amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.35 (1956).
386. "[U]nless a greater number is required by law or the articles of incorporation
or the bylaws. The act of a majority of the directors present at a meeting at which
a quorum is present shall be the act of the board of directors, unless the act of a greater
number is required by law or the articles of incorporation or the bylaws." TEX. Bus.
CoP,. ACT ANN. art. 2.35 (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added). The revised Model Act does
not contain the reference to any requirements made "by law." ABA MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT ANN. 2d, § 40. Cf. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 710.3 (1973) ("by . . .
this Act"); MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. § 450.1523 (1973) ("by this act").
387. E.g., the two-thirds requirement (unless the articles provide for a majority or
more) for amendments to the articles, merger or consolidation, sale of assets, or volun-
tary dissolution. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. arts. 4.02(A)(3), 5.03(B), 5.10(A)(3),
6.03(A)(3) (Supp. 1974).
388. E.g., repurchase of shares ("upon resolution of its board of directors"), TEX.
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.03(D) (Supp. 1974); declaration of dividends ("the board
of directors may . . . declare"), id. art. 2.38(A) (1956); amendment of articles ("the
board of directors shall adopt a resolution"), id. art. 4.02(A) (Supp. 1974); call of
shares of redemption ("by resolution of its board of directors"), id. art. 4.08(A) (1956).
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executive or other committees.3 9
Meeting by Conference Telephone. As discussed earlier,390 meetings of the
board of directors may be conducted by conference telephone or similar com-
munications techniques, or an individual director may participate in a
meeting in the same manner, provided all the participants can hear one an-
other.3 91  Notice requirements must still be adhered to and the articles or
bylaws can restrict the use of such devices or meetings conducted in this fash-
ion. Participation in a meeting held in this manner constitutes presence at
the meeting unless it is for the purpose of objecting to the legality of the
meeting's call or convention.3 92  If action is -taken that -the director wants
to disavow, he must ask that his dissent be entered in the minutes or else
send it by registered mail immediately after the meeting has adjourned to
the corporation's secretary; otherwise he will be presumed to have assented.393
Formality of Action by Directors. One basic characteristic of American cor-
poration law is the general authority ordinarily reposed in the board of direc-
tors to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.3 94 The authority
is said to be one that can only be jointly exercised by the directors as a board
and not as individuals.39 5  Moreover, the law contemplates -that whatever
decisions the board makes will occur during a deliberative meeting at which
varying points of view can be expressed and then only after conscientious
consideration 'has been given to the various alternatives available and judg-
ment exercised that the best interests of ;the corporation and the shareholders
will be served thereby.396  To that end, American corporation codes, and the
TBCA is no exception, have detailed provisions dealing with such matters
as the time and place of directors' meetings; notice, quorum and voting re-
quirements; and the manner in which the board is to be selected or re-
389. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.36 (Supp. 1974), discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 446-72 infra.
390. See text accompanying notes 199-205 supra.
391. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 9.10(C) (Supp. 1974).
392. Id.
393. Id. art. 2.41(B) (1956). For obvious reasons, the dissenter will normally not
be able to file his written dissent with the secretary of the meeting before adjournment,
the third alternative provided, unless for some reason the meeting has been recessed for
several days or possibly the meeting is one held by conference telephone or through
an intercommunications system in various offices in a large corporation headquarters.
394. See, e.g., id. art. 2.31(A).
395. E.g., Curtis v. Pipelife Corp., 370 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963);
Wichita Falls Elec. Co. v. Huey, 246 S.W. 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1923); Ni-
cholstone City Co. v. Smalley, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 210, 51 S.W. 527 (1899). See gen-
erally 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS § 559; 2 I. HILDEBRAND,
TEXAS CORPORATIONS § 638.
396. "The general rule seems to rest upon two reasons: First, that collective action
is necessary, in order that the act may be deliberately adopted, after an opportunity for
discussion and an interchange of views; and, second, that the directors are, for the pur-
pose of managing the affairs of the corporation, the agents of the stockholders, and are
given no power to act otherwise than as a board." Gerard v. Empire Square Realty Co.,
195 App. Div. 244, 248, 187 N.Y.S. 306, 310 (1921). See, e.g., Ames v. Goldfield Mer-
ger Mines Co., 227 F. 292, 301 (W.D. Wash. 1915); Star Corp. v. General Screw Prod.
Co., 501 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973), discussed in text
at notes 409-25 infra. See generally BALLANTINE § 124; 6 Z. CAvrrcH, supra note 21,




placed. 39 7 It is not surprising therefore that sometimes transactions that have
only been informally or individually approved without a meeting, even by
a majority of or sometimes by all, the directors, may be successfully avoided
by the corporation for want of authority of its directors to act other than as
a board. 398
A primary difficulty with this prescribed pattern of corporate management
is that it does not always fit the reality of how businessmen make decisions
for their corporate entities.3 99 This is especially true in the close corpora-
tion 400 where because of substantial identity between ownership and control
the varying roles corporate law expects a shareholder, director, or officer to
play tend to meld into those performed by a proprietor or partner, seen either
from the standpoint of those who operate the enterprise as their own or those
who deal with it. The entrepeneurs, as they regard themselves, do not re-
quire nor do they want to be bothered with the formalities of meetings and
minutes, which they regard as simply a nuisance and make-work for lawyers,
despite the possible risk of personal liability if the corporate entity is disre-
garded for such informality.401  At the same time, their business creditors
,have every reason to expect that the transactions these seeming owners have
undertaken will be carried out and not sought to be avoided by sudden insis-
tence ,that earlier failure to adhere to corporate niceties gives the corporation
the option of nonperformance. As a result, the courts, both in recognition
of the informal manner in which some corporations operate and to avoid
defeating the reasonable expectations of outsiders who are unfamiliar with
their internal structure and operation, have carved out various exceptions to
the rule requiring formal action by the directors as a board. 40 2 Chief among
these have been the doctrines of ratification and estoppel, especially where
the corporation has been shown to have benefited from the transaction, 403
397. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.32-.37 (Supp. 1974).
398. E.g., Hurley v. Ornsteen, 311 Mass. 477, 42 N.E.2d 273 (1942); Hill Dredging
Corp. v. Risley, 18 N.J. 501, 114 A.2d 697 (1955); Curtis v. Pipelife Corp., 370 S.W.2d
764 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963); Nicholstone City Co. v. Smalley, 21 Tex. Civ.
App. 210, 51 S.W. 527 (1899). See generally 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORA-
TIONS § 392.
399. E.g., Haff v. Long Island Fuel Corp., 233 App. Div. 117, 251 N.Y.S. 67, 71(1931); see BALLANTINE 125.
400. E.g., Gerard v. Empire Square Realty Co., 195 App. Div. 244, 249, 187 N.Y.S.
306, 310 (1921); Remillong v. Schneider, 185 N.W.2d 493, 498 (N.D. 1971); Freeman
v. King Pontiac Co., 236 S.C. 335, 114 S.E.2d 478, 485 (1960), discussed in 14 S.C.L.Q.
408 (1962); cf. Caldwell v. Kingsberry, 451 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1970), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Hamilton & Shields, Corporations, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 88, 104 (1971); Sutton v. Reagan & Gee, 405 S.W.2d 828,
836 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Pelletier, supra
note 133, at 144. See generally 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 125.01, at 125-10; 2
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 394.1; 1 HORNSTEIN 508; F. O'NEAL, CLOSE
CORPORATIONS H8 3.62, 8.02-.04; Note, Extent to Which Corporate Directors May Act
Without a Formal Meeting, 11 SYR. L. REV. 68 (1959).
401. See, e.g., 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 234, at 232; 2 F.
O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 8.04; Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEXAS L.
REV. 979, 989 (1971); Lebowitz, supra note 131, at 146 nn.311-12.
402. See, e.g., 6 Z. CAvrrCH, supra note 21, § 125.01, at 125-9; 2 W. FLETCHER, CY-
CLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 394-95, 397; 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS § 559, at 35; 1 HORNSTEIN 508.
403. E.g., Henger v. Sale, 365 S.W.2d 335, 340 (Tex. 1963), discussed in Lebowitz,
Recent Decisions on Fiduciary Duties to Corporations, 2 BULL. OP SECTION OF CORP.,
BANKING & BUS. L., May 1963, at 2; cf. Republic Nat'l Bank v. Whitten, 383 S.W.2d
207 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1964), a!f'd, 397 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1966).
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or the board or the shareholders have long acquiesced in an informal pattern
of management that has become the customary way of doing business, 404 or
else all the shareholders have given their tacit consent to an informally ap-
proved transaction. 40 5  In addition, corporation statutes are gradually being
revised 'to permit greater informality of operation, particularly in close cor-
porations either by special legislation for such bodies or in dispensing with
the need for formal meetings. For example, the TBCA now not only permits
a close corporation to replace the board entirely if the shareholders so opt 40 6
or agree to have the corporation operated as a partnership, 40 7 but since 1967
has permitted the board to take action without a meeting if all the members
sign a consent in writing. 408
The question of formality of action by the board of directors was recently
considered by the Houston (1st District) court of civil appeals in Star Corp.
v. General Screw Products Co. 40 9 The facts are difficult -to discern from the
rambling opinion but in essence concerned several transactions involving a
parent corporation, Star, and a wholly-owned subsidiary, G.S.P. Corpora-
tion410 (GSP) which Star formed to take over an incorporated business
owned by W. A. Kenyon. Star had two shareholders, E.W. Plodzik and E.G.
Ricketts, who each owned half its stock. Plodzik negotiated the acquisition
with Kenyon. Under the terms, Kenyon was to receive $675,000 for the
business 411 to be transferred to GSP when formed, payable $150,000 in cash
and the balance in secured notes. In addition, Kenyon was to be employed
as GSP's president for five years. Plodzik had earlier obtained an option
to buy the business. The option cost $50,000 which could be used to apply
on the purchase price and was paid by Star.
404. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Kingsberry, 451 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1970), error ref. n.r.e, discussed in Hamilton & Shields, supra note 400, at 104 (dictum);
Dallas Ice-Factory & Cold-Storage Co. v. Crawford, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 176, 44 S.W.
875 (1898). See generally 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 394; LATTIN
248; 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 8.03, at n.4.
405. See, e.g., Aransas Pass Harbor Co. v. Manning, 94 Tex. 558, 562, 63 S.W. 627,
629 (1901); Fort Worth Publishing Co. v. Hitson, 80 Tex. 216, 228, 14 S.W. 843, 846
(1890); Sutton v. Reagan & Gee, 405 S.W.2d 828, 836 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1966), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Pelletier, supra note 133, at 144. See generally
20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 559, at 35 n.29.
406. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-1(B) (Supp. 1974), discussed in text ac-
companying notes 535-36 infra.
407. Cf. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-2(A)(8) (Supp. 1974), discussed in
text accompanying note 538 infra.
408. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 9.10(B) (Supp. 1974).
409. 501 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
410. The name of the corporation was changed to General Screw Products Company,
the name of the corporation owned by Kenyon. According to the opinion this was done
at a special meeting of the board of directors, id. at 376, but whether this was an author-
ization to initiate an amendment to the articles to change the name, TEx. Bus. CORP.
ACT ANN. art. 4.01(B)(1) (1956), or to file an assumed name certificate, id. art. 2.05
(B) (1956) (but cf. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5927a (Supp. 1974) (assumed name
filing does not include corporations)), is not clear. However, since the opinion con-
stantly refers to the subsidiary as G.S.P. Corporation, the GSP reference to it in the
text seems appropriate.
411. Kenyon had two corporations, General Screw Products and Eleanor Realty Co.,
the latter being owned by Kenyon, his wife, and a trust for his daughter, and owned
the realty on which the General Screw Products plant was located. Apparently the
properties owned by these two corporations, rather than their stock, was the subject mat-
ter of the purchase agreement; otherwise there would have been no need to set up the
new subsidiary to take over the properties unless they were to become its subsidiaries.
501 S.W.2d at 375.
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When GSP was incorporated, Kenyon, Plodzik, and Ricketts were named
as the first board of directors. According to the minutes of the organizational
meeting, Star was to be issued 150,000 shares of GSP's one dollar par value
stock in consideration of $150,000 to be paid in by Star; 412 however, there
was some evidence -that Star had actually been issued a certificate for only
6,000 shares. 413  Star purportedly paid for the issue with a $100,000 check
and apparently that amount plus the $50,000 previously paid for the option
constituted the down payment to Kenyon for -the assets received by GSP.
Despite the recitation in the minutes, there appears to have been an oral
agreement among Plodzik, Ricketts, and a Mrs. Westbury, who was a Star
director, that the $150,000 was to be regarded as an advance to GSP and
would soon be repaid. This came about -after Ricketts and Mrs. West-
bury expressed concern that Star could not meet its obligations if that amount
were paid out and Plodzik reassured them the money would "come right out
of G.S.P. back to you."'414  Later Star made other payments on the notes
held by Kenyon and unquestionably did advance further funds to GSP.41 5
Ultimately, Plodzik and Ricketts seem to have divided up their investments
in Star with Plodzik receiving all the shares of GSP and two other subsidi-
aries and Ricketts retaining all the stock in Star. 416
The action was brought by Ricketts as Star's sole shareholder, after it had
become defunct, -to recover the various sums Star had paid to GSP or -to Ken-
yon for GSP's benefit. At the trial, the court submitted a single issue -to the
jury inquiring whether GSP had agreed to repay the $150,000 to Star. The
jury answered in the negative, and judgment was entered for GSP.
On appeal, the Houston court reversed and remanded on the $150,000
payment, deciding after a review of the evidence that the issue answered by
the jury had been improperly submitted, since if GSP was obligated to repay
412. The minutes also recited adoption of a resolution approving the purchase agree-
ment between Star and the Kenyons and authorizing the issuance of $525,000 in notes
as part of the agreed consideration for the purchase. There was also a consent filed
in the minutes executed by Ricketts for Star as the owner of all the stock in GSP, rati-
fying all the actions taken by the GSP board at the organizational meeting. Id. at 376.
413. A stock certificate purporting to be Stock Certificate No. 1 for 6,000 shares was
introduced in evidence; however, the stub showed that Certificate No. 1 was for 150,000
shares. Both the certificate and the stub apparently had been altered as to amount or
date. Id. at 378.
414. Id. at 376.
415. When Kenyon demanded payment on the purchase money notes after default,
Star executed three checks for $52,500 to him. Later Star issued another $30,000 check
directly to GSP, apparently for its internal use. All the checks were drawn on an ac-
count jointly owned by Star, GSP, and several other corporations. The court ruled the
trial judge should have rejected evidence that these checks were in fact charged to an-
other company in the joint account and therefore not paid out by Star on grounds of
hearsay. The defendant not having plead payment, accord and satisfaction, or any other
affirmative defense, there was a sufficient basis for Star to recover these sums as a mat-
ter of law. The appellate court rendered judgment for Star for the $82,500, after sever-
ing the claim for the $150,000 advancement. Id. at 381-83.
416. Among the stipulated items of evidence was a letter agreement signed by Plodzik
and addressed to Ricketts and Star, which Ricketts accepted for himself and Star, which
recited that all of the shares Star owned in GSP and two other corporations had been
transferred to Plodzik and that both Star and Ricketts were releasing any claims they
might have had in such stocks; however, the agreement would not affect any claim either
might have against Plodzik or the three corporations arising out of prior transactions
or advancements between them. Id. at 377. The court had earlier stated that the action
had been brought by Ricketts as the sole shareholder of Star. Id. at 375.
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the advance, it was immaterial whether it had agreed to repay or not.417
Furthermore, it determined the jury's finding was against the great weight
of -the evidence, because there was credible evidence showing that an agree-
ment for repayment of the $150,000 had been informally made by Ricketts
and Plodzik in order to mitigate the impact of the payout on Star's financial
condition. The court conceded -that normally such an agreement would not
be binding upon GSP since only two of the three directors acquiesced, reciting
the general rule that the authority of the directors is conferred upon them
only as a board and not as individuals. 418 However, because Plodzik was
GSP's promoter and he and Ricketts Were the majority of its directors, as
well as officers of both corporations, any knowledge they had of the agree-
ment would be imputed to GSP.419  GSP's subsequent acceptance of the
$100,000 paid directly to it and of the benefit received from the $50,000
paid Kenyon for the option constituted a ratification or adoption of what was
essentially a promoters' agreement.420 In other words, when GSP accepted
the benefits of these payments, any infirmity due to the lack of formal action
by the full board was cured by ratification.
Although the Houston court's statement of the general rule requiring action
by the directors as a board and the ratification exception thereto cannot be
faulted, its application of these norms to the facts recited is somewhat puz-
zling. It was uncontroverted that a decision had been made to have a spec-
ially-formed subsidiary acquire Kenyon's business for cash and deferred pay-
ments, rather than using Star's 421 or the new subsidiary's securities, and it
was evident, therefore, that Star as the parent would have to provide its sub-
sidiary with sufficient financing to make the purchase. Star's action in pay-
ing out the $150,000 was as consistent with an intent -to make a long-term
417. The court reasoned the evidence showing that GSP had received $150,000 from
Star would create a quasi-contractual obligation to repay that sum unless it could be
shown the money was a gift or an inference drawn that it was paid to GSP as considera-
tion for the issuance of shares. The court relied on the supreme court's holding in
Ramo, Inc. v. English, 500 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. 1973), that in deciding whether advances
are loans or dividends, the recipient's intent not to repay is not controlling, for if the
transaction in question is a bona fide loan and there is a legal obligation to repay, the
fact there was an intent not to repay would not alter its legal effect. Id. at 467.
418. The court added: "A majority of [the directors] cannot act for the board itself
and bind the corporation. In order to exercise their powers they must meet so that they
can hear each other's views, deliberate and then decide. They must act as an official
body .... ." 501 S.W.2d at 380.
419. The court cites United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. San Diego State Bank, 155
S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941), error ref.; Vogel v. Zipp, 90 S.W.2d
668, 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936), error dismissed. See, e.g., In re Westec Corp.,
434 F.2d 195, 200 (5th Cir. 1970); City of Fort Worth v. Pippen, 439 S.W.2d 660, 665
(Tex. 1969); Weathersby v. Texas & Ohio Lumber Co., 107 Tex. 474, 180 S.W. 735,
738 (1915). See generally 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 789; 20 R.
HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 589; 1 HORNSTEIN § 516.
420. The court cites Dealers' Granite Corp. v. Faubion, 18 S.W.2d 737, 739 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1929); Phil H. Pierce Co. v. Rude, 291 S.W. 974 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1927), error dismissed w.o. See, e.g., Wetherford, M.W. & N.W. Ry. v.
Granger, 86 Tex. 350, 24 S.W. 795 (1894); Joy v. Quality Shirt Mfg. Co., 73 S.W.2d
905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1934), error dismissed; Weeks v. San Angelo Nat'l
Bank, 65 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1933); Hart-Toole Furniture Co. v. Sha-
han, 220 S.W. 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1920). See generally 19 R. HAMILTON,
TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 326; 2 I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORIPORATIONS 240.
421. If Star's stock had been used, a triangular merger might have been possible.
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 5.01(B)(4), 5.02(B)(4) (Supp. 1974), discussed in
Lebowitz, supra note 131, at 99-111.
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investment in its subsidiary in exchange for ,the stock that would give it
ownership as it was with an inferred agreement that these sums were to be
repaid as advances, especially since there was no evidence to show any other
consideration had been paid for the issuance of GSP's stock. 422 The notion
of setting up a subsidiary by furnishing it with funds through payment for
its shares to acquire some assets and then immediately withdrawing those
funds and leaving the subsidiary in an undercapitalized position is reminis-
cent of a practice sometimes followed under -the old corporation law. Under
this practice money would be borrowed from a bank on a short-term loan
to pay for the amount of stock required to be paid in for stock subscriptions
before corporate existence could begin, 423 and as soon as the charter was filed
the funds would be withdrawn to repay the bank. 424
In essence, Star received equivalency for the money it paid to and for GSP
through the enhanced value of the GSP stock it owned as represented by the
net worth of the business and assets the subsidiary was taking over, even
,though admittedly the payout could well have adversely affected Star's work-
ing capital position. Surely someone was expected to pay Kenyon for his
business; and since Star owned all of GSP's stock, it got what it paid for when
GSP received the assets with the money Star invested in it. To say, as the
court did, -that by using the proceeds to acquire the very business for which
it had been created, and without any showing there had been any other pay-
ment for its shares, GSP ratified an oral understanding by two of its directors
that the sums would be repaid, seems not only to be using bootstrap logic
but overlooks the evidence, including the corporate minutes, 4 25 that sup-
ported the contrary inference drawn by the jury in its finding. At a mini-
422. Based on the facts given, it is difficult to understand why there was not enough
probative evidence to support the jury's finding or at least to hold it was not against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be wrong and unjust, as the
court ruled. The minutes recited that the shares were to be issued for $150,000; the
stub in the stock book showed a certificate for that amount had been issued. Kenyon
testified that he saw such a certificate and that all the papers that were signed at the
meeting, which had been prepared in advance by lawyers, had been read aloud at the
meeting, and no one had protested. On the other hand, there was no direct evidence
of an agreement to repay other than the concern expressed by Ricketts and Mrs. West-
bury and Plodzik's reassurance to them; as the court itself suggested, Kenyon would prob-
ably not have agreed to repayment out of the funds of the business being acquired by
GSP. Almost inexplicably, the court states there was no evidence that the stock had
a par value and that the announcement concerning the stock subscription did not specify
the consideration paid. 501 S.W.2d at 380. Yet the resolution contained in the minutes
recited both the par value of the stock and the total consideration for which such shares
were to be issued. Id. at 376. Moreover, the stock certificate for 6,000 shares intro-
duced in evidence must have shown whether the stock had a par value or not. Certainly
the minutes were at least prima facie evidence of the action taken by GSP at the orga-
nizational meeting, and surely testimony of a more conclusive nature should have been
offered to overcome the effect of their recitation here. See, e.g., Mcllhenny v. Binz,
80 Tex. 1, 9, 13 S.W. 655, 658 (1890), error dismissed sub nom. Houston, E. & W.T.
Ry. v. Binz, 145 U.S. 641 (1892), and sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Binz, 145 U.S.
657 (1892).
423. Under the pre-TBCA statutory law, a Texas corporation having par value stock
was required to have all of the stock subscribed for and 50% paid in cash or its equiva-
lent in other property or labor done before the charter could be filed by the secretary
of state. Ch. 166, § 1, [1907] Tex. Laws 309 (codified as TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 1308 (1926)), repealed by ch. 229, § 1, [1961] Tex. Laws 458; see 1 1. HILDEBRAND,
TEXAS CORPORATIONs 64.
424. See, e.g., Dunagan v. Bushey, 152 Tex. 630, 263 S.W.2d 148 (1953).
425. See note 422 supra.
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mum the repayment decision was one that should have been made by the
full board. But perhaps the court felt the need of using the ratification ex-
ception to the general rules as a means of adjusting the equities between
Ricketts and Plodzik upon the division of their companies among themselves,
since apparently Plodzik ended up with the operating subsidiaries and Ric-
ketts was ultimately left with the defunct parent. If so, it would not be the
first time doctrine has been loosely employed to reach a right result.
Removal of Directors. Prior to adoption of the TBCA, the Texas law was
silent on the power of the shareholders to remove a director from office un-
til his term had expired, 426 although case law elsewhere held the shareholders
had an inherent power to remove for cause.427  But they had no power to
remove without cause unless granted by statute or reserved in the articles or
bylaws. 428 Article 2.32 of the TBCA as originally enacted stated that a
director once elected held office for the term for which he was elected and
until his successor had been elected and qualified "[u]nless removed in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the bylaws. '429  Whether the bylaws could
provide for removal with or without cause was not indicated; however, the
Bar Committee comment suggested they could. 430  Moreover, in Texlite, Inc.
v. Wineburgh,431 the only Texas decision to have directly considered the re-
moval power since the TBCA was adopted, the court held that there was
at least power to remove a director who was not a shareholder at the time,
with or without cause, if all 'the shareholders approved. On the other hand,
even though the removed director would not 'have standing to complain,432
a minority shareholder or possibly creditors would have such standing if -the
426. 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 555, at 31; 3 1. HILDE-
BRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS § 738; Belsheim, The Need for Revising the Texas Corpo-
ration Statutes, 27 TEXAS L. REv. 659, 690 (1949).
427. See, e.g., Toledo Traction Light & Power Co. v. Smith, 205 F. 643 (N.D. Ohio
1913); Campbell v. Loew's Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957); Auer v. Dressel,
306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954); Markovitz v. Markovitz, 336 Pa. 145, 8 A.2d
46 (1939). See generally 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 124.05[1]; 2 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 351; HENN 412; 1 HORNSTEIN § 389; Travers, Removal
of the Corporate Director During His Term of Office, 53 IOWA L. REv. 389 (1967);
7 BAYLOR L. REV. 313 (1955).
428. See, e.g., Toledo Traction Light & Power Co. v. Smith, 205 F. 643 (N.D. Ohio
1913); Walsh v. State ex rel. Cook, 199 Ala. 486, 74 So. 45 (1917); People ex rel.
Manice v. Powell, 201 N.Y. 194, 94 N.E. 634 (1911); Abberger v. Kulp, 156 Misc. 210,
281 N.Y.S. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1935). See generally 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORA-
TIONS § 352; Travers, supra note 427, at 389.
429. Ch. 64, art. 2.32, [1956] Tex. Laws 239.
430. The comment suggested that "[tihe bylaws may, for example, provide for such
removal without cause." Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.32, 3A TEX. Rav. Civ.
STAT. ANN. 128 (1956).
431. 373 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963), error ref. n.r.e.
432. Both Professors Hamilton and Travers are critical of this aspect of the holding.
Professor Hamilton thinks that since it was not certain whether there were bylaws au-
thorizing removal without cause, the director may have had an independent interest in
his position if for no other purpose than representing possible future creditors. 19 R.
HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 495, at 525. He is also critical of the
opinion because it seems to disenfranchise the record owner of shares, despite TBCA
art. 2.27(A), by allowing the beneficial owners to call a shareholders' meeting without
notice and oust the record owner from office as a director. Id. § 443, at 486 n.23. Pro-
fessor Travers notes that the Texlite decision seems contrary to the bulk of decisions
that assume the director has standing to sue and that he has a vested right in his posi-




majority removed a director without cause, presumably absent a bylaw auth-
orizing the same.
Part of the 1973 amendment to article 2.32 finally makes clear that re-
moval can be without cause as well as for cause if so provided in the articles
of incorporation or the bylaws. 4 3  The specification of the articles as a
source for the conferral of the power is new, although a removal provision
undoubtedly could have been made part of the articles before. 434  Removal
of a director must be approved by ;the vote of the holders of a majority of
shares entitled to vote for directors at a meeting expressly called for that pur-
pose, subject to any further restriction on removal "contained in -the by-
laws."' 43 5 Failure ,to mention the articles as another source for additional re-
strictions was probably inadvertent; as just indicated, such restrictions can be
included in the articles anyway. In fact, if one of the restrictions is a require-
ment for greater than a majority vote, it may be necessary to put such re-
quirement in the articles to comply with article 9.08.436 Finally, as previously
discussed, 43 7 the removal power is limited if cumulative voting is available
in that a director elected by cumulative voting cannot be removed if the votes
cast against his removal would have elected him through such voting at an
election for the entire board or of the class of directors of which he is a part,
unless the entire board of directors is being removed.
Even though ,the amendment further illuminates the Texas law on removal,
there remain some aspects that will need future resolution. What constitutes
cause for removal, for example, is a matter that will have to be developed
on a case-by-case basis. 438  The law elsewhere is that a director sought -to
be removed for cause has a right to notice of the charges against him and
must be afforded an opportunity to defend himself, either in proxy solicita-
433. Cb. 545, § 23, [1973] Tex. Laws 1500, amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.32 (1956).
434. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 3.02(A)(10) (Supp. 1974) permitting arti-
cles to include any provision required or permitted to be set forth in the bylaws by the
Act.
435. Id. art. 2.32.
436. Under this article, if the articles of incorporation require the vote of the holders
of a greater or lesser number (but no less than a majority) of shares "than required
by this Act with respect to such action," the provisions of the articles will govern. Id.
art. 9.08. Since article 2.32 as amended specifically calls for a majority vote for re-
moval, it would seem safer to put a provision for a greater vote for removal in the arti-
cles, although arguably such a provision in the bylaws could be sustained since it would
undoubtedly be the type of "further restriction" which article 2.32 explicitly says can
be contained in the bylaws. Id. art. 2.32.
437. See text accompanying notes 254-60 supra.
438. Among causes that have been held sufficient are (1) diverting business to a
competing corporation, Fells v. Katz, 256 N.Y. 67, 175 N.E. 516 (1931); (2) harassment
of corporate officers and employees, Campbell v. Loew's Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d
852 (1957); Markovitz v. Markovitz, 336 Pa. 145, 8 A.2d 46 (1939); (3) sale by direc-
tor of all his shares, Selley v. American Lubricator Co., 119 Iowa 591, 93 N.W. 590
(1903). Cf. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1351 (1962) stating in essence that if a
corporation has created any watered indebtedness or engaged in ultra vires activities be-
cause of the act of any agent, attorney, director or officer, it shall be considered the
act of the corporation unless within a year from the wrongful act it has entered an order
on its records in the state repudiating the wrong "and permanently dismissing from its
service all persons directly or indirectly connected with such violations." This presum-
ably would be grounds for removal of a director if he were responsible. See generally
6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 124.05[l]; 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS
§ 351; 1 HORNSTEIN 500; Travers, supra note 427, at 408; Note, Removal of Corporate
Directors For Cause, 27 CiNc. L. REv. 92 (1958).
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tions to the shareholders or otherwise; 4 9 the amendment is silent on this.
Neither does it indicate whether a court has power to remove a director for
cause, 440 which a few states permit by statute,44' although once removal has
occurred there clearly is a power of judicial review, 442 provided ,the plaintiff
has standing to complain. 443  Finally, it is not certain whether adoption of
an amendment to the articles or bylaws empowering removal for cause or
not allows the shareholders to remove directors in office at the time the
amendment was adopted. There is some authority suggesting they may
not, 444 but given the explicit language in amended article 2.32, the right to
remain in office as a director should be regarded as conditioned on possible
adoption of such a provision.
439. See, e.g., Campbell v. Loew's Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (1957); Alli-
ance Co-op Ins. Co. v. Gasche, 93 Kan. 147, 142 P. 882 (1914); Auer v. Dressel, 306
N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954); cf. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5751 (1958),
dealing with removal of officers and directors of marketing associations. Under that
statute 10% of the membership must petition for removal; the director or officer against
whom charges are brought must be informed of them in writing; he must have an oppor-
tunity to be heard in person or by counsel and to present witnesses at the meeting called
for removal. See Been v. Producers Ass'n of San Antonio, Inc., 352 S.W.2d 292 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1961), striking down a bylaw purporting to allow removal of
a director or officer without cause, charges, notice, or hearing as being in conflict with
the statute. See generally CARY 155; 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 354,
at 159; 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 555, at 32; 1 HORNSTEIN
501; Travers, supra note 427, at 415.
440. The traditional view is that a court of equity has no power to remove a director,
even for cause. See, e.g., Feldman v. Pennroad Corp., 60 F. Supp. 716 (D. Del. 1945),
afi'd, 155 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 808 (1947); Tri-City Elec.
Serv. Co. v. Jarvis, 206 Ind. 5, 185 N.E. 136 (1933); Markovitz v. Markovitz, 336 Pa.
145, 8 A.2d 46 (1939); cf. Application of Burkin, I N.Y.2d 570, 136 N.E.2d 862, 154
N.Y.S.2d 898 (1956). But see Brown v. North Ventura Road Dev. Co., 216 Cal. App.
2d 227, 30 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1963) (since director is in position of trust, judicial power
to remove exists independent of statute). See generally 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21,
§ 124.05[t], at 917; 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 358. In Texas,
if directors have been guilty of illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct, they may in
effect be removed from management by appointment of a receiver to rehabilitate the cor-
poration. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.05(A)(1)(c) (1956). See also Comment
of Bar Committee to Art. 2.32, 3A T-X. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 128 (1956), referring
to the power of removal as "cumulative of such action by a court order."
441. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 811 (West 1955) (holders of 10% or more of
shares may petition court for removal); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 707.6 (1964)
(two-thirds of directors then in office may petition); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 706(d)
(McKinney 1963) (holders of 10% of shares or attorney general); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-27(g) (1965) (holders of 5% of shares); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1405C (1967)
(holders of 10% of shares); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-1.1-36.1(d) (1969) (holders of
10% of shares); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.7(d) (Supp. 1973) (holders of 5% of shares).
Most of the statutes state as cause for removal, fraud, dishonesty, or gross abuse of
authority or discretion. See generally 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 124.05[3]; 2 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 358, at 172-73; 1 HORNSTEIN § 391.
442. See, e.g., 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 360; 1 HORNSTEIN 501;
Travers, supra note 427, at 417.
443. See 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 359. See also note 432 su-
pra.
444. See, e.g., Toledo Traction Light & Power Co. v. Smith, 205 F. 643 (N.D. Ohio
1913); Frank v. Anthony, 107 So. 2d 136 (Fla. App. 1958); People ex rel. Manice v.
Powell, 201 N.Y. 194, 94 N.E. 634 (1911); Abberger v. Kulp, 156 Misc. 210, 281
N.Y.S. 373 (Sup. Ct. 1935); ci. Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prods.,
Inc., 159 A.2d 288 (Del. Ch. 1960); Cuppy v. Stollwerck Bros., 216 N.Y. 591, 111 N.E.
249 (1916). See generally 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 124.05[2], at 919; 2 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 354, at 157. Professor Hamilton raises another
issue as to whether shareholders may amend the bylaws to allow removal of a director
and then remove one or more directors at the same meeting. He notes that article 2.32
requires a meeting "expressly" called for the purpose and seems to assume a bylaw al-
ready exists that authorizes such call. 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS § 495, at 33 n.34 (Supp. 1974).
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Despite these unanswered questions, the more detailed exposition of the
shareholders' power of removal made by -the amendment should prove help-
ful if serious thought is given to its potential exercise in corporate planning.
A broad removal provision will aid majority shareholders desiring to oust a
recalcitrant director whose business policies they want to change, or whose
conduct is suspect but difficult to prove, or, in cases of a takeover, when old
management resists -to the very end. On the other hand, participants in a
close corporation who desire to protect their individual status as directors may
well want to exclude the power entirely or subject its exercise to a veto
through 'high voting requirements. 445
Delegation of Authority to Executive or Other Committees. Publicly-
held corporations very often have several or, sometimes, a majority of so-
called "outside" directors sitting on their boards. Generally these direc-
tors are not actively involved in day-to-day management, but are expected
instead to attend regular or special meetings of the 'board, when called, to
decide on basic corporate policies. Because it may not always be conven-
ient to convene such a board when a matter arises -that necessitates action by
all the directors, it has become fairly common to establish an executive
committee composed of a few members who can act for the board in the in-
terim between meetings, and to whom some or most of the board's powers
can be delegated. In addition, large boards of directors can frequently
work more effectively if divided into special committees to supervise or to
advise on such matters as finance, executive compensation plans, share-
holder relations, or operations of particular divisions or groupings of affil-
iated or subsidiary companies.
The common law has long recognized the need for such delegation to or
division of power among board committees, although at one time there
was a fine line drawn between ministerial acts which were deemed delega-
ble, and discretionary acts which were not, assuming there had been no ab-
dication of power completely to one or more directors or outsiders, 446 and
today virtually every corporation code specifically sanctions the creation of
at least an executive committee.447  Implicit in such recognition, however,
and often explicitly stated in the statutes, is the rule that despite such dele-
gation the board as a whole or the directors individually must continue to
bear the responsibilities imposed on them by law. 448
445. See, e.g., 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 3.59; Steadman, Maintaining
Control of Close Corporations, 14 Bus. LAw. 1077, 1080-82 (1959); Note, Removal of
Directors in Closely Held Corporations, 12 FLA. L. REV. 232 (1959).
446. See, e.g., 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 494-504, 552.1-.6; 1
HORNSTEIN § 420; LATTIN 250; Aurell, The Corporate Executive Committee: A Di-
lemma for the Nonmember Director, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 525 (1965); Comment, Cor-
porate Management by an Executive Committee: Proposed New York Business Corpora-
tion Act, 25 ALBANY L. REV. 93 (1961); Comment, Corporation Executive Committees,
16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 167 (1967); Comment, The Executive Committee in Corpora-
tion Organization--Scope of Powers, 42 MICH. L. REV. 133 (1943); Note, Delegation
of Duties by Corporate Directors, 47 VA. L. REV. 278 (1961); Executive Committees-
Creation, Procedures, and Authority, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 42.
447. Arizona is the only state with no statute on corporate committees. ABA MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT 2d, § 42, % 3.04. See generally FOLK, supra note 12, at 899.
448. The Model Act language is typical: "The designation of any such committee
and the delegation thereto of authority shall not operate to relieve the board of directors,
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In Texas, the development of the law relating to the board's power to
delegate authority to an executive or other committees has followed some-
what the same pattern. While a few cases cast some doubt on the degree
to which total authority could be delegated, 449 a Texas Supreme Court
case 4 0 reaffirmed the board's power to delegate either to subordinate of-
ficers or agents or to a committee of their own number authority to per-
form any act, "'although the performance of the act may involve the exer-
cise of the highest judgment and discretion.' ,451 The TBCA, on the other
hand, did not go quite that far when first enacted. Under article 2.36, if
the articles or bylaws so provided, the board could designate two or more
directors to serve as an executive committee that could, to the extent al-
lowed by the resolution creating it or -the articles or bylaws, exercise all the
managerial authority of the board "except where action of the board of di-
rectors is specified by this Act or other applicable law," but such designa-
tion or delegation would not relieve the directors as a whole or individ-
ually of their legal responsibilities. 452  The provision did not mention dele-
gation to other committees, although the original Bar Committee comment
suggested any power that could be delegated to an officer "may of course"
be delegated to the executive committee "or to any other Committee of the
Board." 453
The 1973 amendment to article 2.36 has expanded the original statu-
tory authorization, but not to the extent permitted by pre-TBCA case law. 454
If authorized by the articles or bylaws, a majority of the full 455 board of di-
rectors can by resolution designate from among its members not only
an executive committee but "one or more other committees" to perform its
or any member thereof, of any responsibility imposed by law." ABA MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT ANN. 2d, § 42.
449. See Tempel v. Dodge, 89 Tex. 68, 32 S.W. 514, 33 S.W. 222 (1895), criticized
in 2 I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS 568; cf. Hamblen v. Horwitz-Texan Theatres
Co., 162 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1942) (agreement giving minor-
ity shareholder in parent control over subsidiary to exclusion of latter's board invalid);
Brand v. Fernandez, 91 S.W.2d 932, 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1935), error
dismissed by agreement (surrender of partial control over investments to joint venture
improper).
450. San Antonio Joint Stock Land Bank v. Taylor, 129 Tex. 335, 105 S.W.2d 650(1937); cf. Miller v. Angelina & N.R.R.R., 476 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1972), error ref. n.re., discussed in Lebowitz, Corporations, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 85, 95 (1973) (board may delegate authority to president to
employ general manager; general rule also stated in terms of delegation to committees).
See generally 2 I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS § 634.
451. 129 Tex. at 342, 105 S.W.2d at 654.
452. Ch. 64, art. 2.36, [1955] Tex. Laws 239, as amended, TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 2.36 (Supp. 1974). See generally 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANI-
ZATIONS § 569.
453. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.36, 3A TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 135
(1956).
454. Ch. 545, § 25, [1973] Tex. Laws 1501, amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.36 (1956). The revision is derived from ABA MODEL Bus. Coup. ACT ANN. 2d,§ 42 and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (Supp. 1971). Doty & Parker 1021 n.71.
455. The reference to a majority of "the full board of directors" considerably short-
ens the language in the former provision that spoke of action 'by a majority of the num-
ber of directors fixed by the bylaws, or in the absence of a bylaw fixing the number
of directors, a majority of the number stated in the articles of incorporation. Ch. 64,




functions, within limits set by the resolution or the articles or bylaws, ex-
cept as to certain specified matters for which authority cannot be dele-
gated. Those actions which will continue to require consideration and ap-
proval by all the directors are those relating to: (1) amendments of the
articles; (2) merger, consolidation, or sale of all or substantially all the as-
sets not in the regular course of business; (3) voluntary dissolution; (4)
alteration, repeal or adoption of bylaws; (5) filling vacancies in or "re-
moving members of the board of directors ' '456 or any such committee; (6)
fixing compensation for such committee members; or (7) alteration or repeal
of any board resolution stating it is not to be amended or repealed. In ad-
dition, unless the resolution, articles, or bylaws expressly so provide, a
committee cannot declare dividends or authorize the issuance of shares.
Obviously, this listing is less encompassing than the former, more general
language that precluded delegation as to any matter where the TBCA or
other law specified action by the board. 457  This means that if authority
has been properly delegated the executive or some other committee may
authorize the repurchase of shares to the extent of unrestricted earned sur-
plus, 458 call for payment of stock subscriptions, 459 make distributions in
partial liquidation 60 or to discharge cumulative dividend rights,46' elect or
remove officers, 462 call shares for redemption, 463 reduce stated capital after
the redemption or repurchase of redeemable shares, 464 cancel treasury
shares,465 recommend reduction of stated capital represented by no par
shares,466 apply capital or reduction surplus to reduce or eliminate defi-
cits in the earned surplus account,467 create or abolish reserves out of earned
456. This suggests the board has power to remove one or more of its own members
and to fill all vacancies on the board. However, article 2.32 as amended makes quite
evident the shareholders alone have the removal power. See discussion in text accom-
panying notes 426-45 supra. See generally ABA MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 39,
4.02; W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA COR'ORATIONS § 357. Although vacancies on the
board can be filled by the vote of the remaining directors, any new directorships caused
by enlarging the number of directors must be filled by action of the shareholders at the
general meeting or at a special meeting called for that purpose. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 2.34 (1956). Perhaps the draftsmen intended to refer to removal of officers,
a power which is vested in the board. Id. art. 2.43 (1956). Neither the Model Act
nor the Delaware statute, the two sources for the amendment, see note 454 supra, speci-
fies removal of directors (or for that matter, of officers) as matters reserved for action
by the full board.
457. Ch. 64, art. 2.36, [1955] Tex. Laws 239, as amended, TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 2.36 (Supp. 1974). In a sense, the general language used was almost self-
defeating, since among the provisions of the Act "where action of the board of directors
is specified" is article 2.31, stating that the business and affairs of the corporation "shall
be managed by a board of directors." This would suggest it would be improper to dele-
gate any managerial authority to the executive committee which of course is contrary
to what article 2.36 states. See Lebowitz, Duties and Liabilities of Directors, in TEXAS
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT PROCEEDINGS 74 (1955), reprinted in 3A TEx. REv. COy.
STAT. ANN. 506 (1956).
458. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.03(C) (1956).
459. Id. art. 2.14(D).
460. Id. art. 2.40(A).
461. Id. art. 2.40(B).
462. Id. arts. 2.42, 2.43.
463. Id. art. 4.08(A).
464. Id. art. 4.10(A).
465. Id. art. 4.11(A).
466. Id. art. 4.12(A)(1).
467. Id. art. 4.13(B).
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surplus, 468 or authorize conveyances of corporate property.469  In view of
the broad range of these delegable actions, serious consideration should be
given when drafting articles, bylaws, or resolutions setting up any of these
committees as to whether some of the matters just specified ought not to
be reserved for approval by the full board.
While the amendment does not specifically say so, a committee can pre-
sumably be composed of a single director. 470  Also, as noted before,471
another amendment allows members of such committees to hold or partici-
pate in meetings by means of conference telephone or similar communica-
tions equipment. 472
C. Action by Officers
While none of the 1973 TBCA amendments deal directly with the func-
tion of officers or other supervisory employees in the conduct of corporate
affairs, the new Penal Code contains several relevant provisions. For ex-
ample, as discussed earlier, the extent and degree of corporate criminal re-
sponsibility imposed by the Code will depend on whether the conduct con-
stituting the offense was committed 'by a director, officer, employee, or
other agent acting in behalf of the corporation and within the scope of
his office or employment, or else was sanctioned by a majority of the
board or by an officer or other high managerial agent acting in the corpo-
ration's behalf and within the scope of office. 47 3  There were also a few
cases that considered various actions undertaken 'by officers or other mem-
bers of management while purportedly representing their corporations, but
none were of great significance.
The most noteworthy case of the group 474 concerned the power of the
vice-president to act in the place of the president in taking a vote of the
board of directors on, and later executing, a conveyance of some of the
corporation's property, even though the president was present at the meet-
ing. The corporation was essentially an incorporated recreation club that
had been formed for the benefit of property owners of a lakeshore subdi-
vision. A minority group of member-stockholders objected to a lease of
the club property that had been made by the president without board ap-
proval to one of the members. Under the lease's terms, the lessee could op-
468. Id. art. 4.13(C).
469. Id. art. 5.08.
470. Before its amendment, article 2.36 stated that the board could designate "two
or more directors" to constitute the executive committee (emphasis added). As
amended, it provides the board may designate an executive and one or more committees
"from among its members." The Bar Committee comment that states "[aidditionally,
the required number of a committee of the board of directors has been reduced from
three to one" is obviously in error. See Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.36, 3A
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 91 (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added). A few state statutes
say specifically committees may be composed of one or more members. See, e.g., NEV.
REV. STAT. § 78.125 (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-9 (Supp. 1973).
471. See discussion in text accompanying notes 199-205 supra.
472. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 9.10(C) (Supp. 1974).
473. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 7.21-.24 (Supp. 1974); see discussion in text accom-
panying notes 147-84 supra.
474. Austin Lake Estates Recreation Club, Inc. v. Gilliam, 493 S.W.2d 343 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
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erate the facilities as a private club to which the property owners would
have to pay new dues. He was also given the right under the lease to erect
a fence around the premises that would enclose part of the lot through
which the property owners had access to the lake by virtue of an ease-
ment of ingress and egress granted by the subdivision's developers. A
special meeting of the board was called at which more directors repre-
senting the minority faction were present than the majority's. A minority
director proposed giving a quitclaim deed to that part of the lot providing
access to the lake to certain named trustees for the benefit of all present
and future lot owners in the subdivision. When the president refused to
call a vote on the motion, saying he wanted to obtain the advice of coun-
sel, the vice president took over and the resolution was passed by a three-
to-two vote.475  The vice president then executed the quitclaim deed to the
trustees who had it recorded the next day. Less than two months later,
the board met again, voted to rescind the quitclaim deed and declare it
void ab initio,476 and brought an action for a declaratory judgment and to
quiet title. The trial court, however, gave judgment to the trustees, based
on favorable jury findings.
The Austin court of civil appeals affirmed on several grounds. 477  On the
issue of whether the vice president was authorized to act, the court simply
noted that the corporation's bylaws provided that the vice president could
perform the duties of the president either in his absence or in the event of
his inability "or refusal to act; ' 478 hence when the president would not call
the vote, whatever his motive, the vice president properly assumed the chair
for the vote, and his execution of -the deed bound the club.
Under the TBCA, a vice president may execute a number of corporate
documents in lieu of -the president, 479 including conveyances of -the corpo-
ration's property.4 0  But while there is a presumption of authority when
the vice president acts in place of the president,48' the determination of
475. At the time the minority faction had control of the board by a 4-3 margin. One
board member was absent, 493 S.W.2d at 346; presumably he was a majority shareholder
representative and the vice president must not have voted as presiding officer. See note
476 inf ra.
476. The special meeting was held seven days before the annual stockholders' meeting
at which the majority shareholders regained control of the board and a resolution was
passed authorizing the directors to take whatever steps were necessary to prevent the
quitclaim deed from clouding the corporation's title to its property. These facts do not
appear in the opinion, but are taken from undated letters from the majority and minor-
ity shareholders soliciting proxies for the annual meeting of June 24, 1972, which are
in the author's files. At an earlier period, the author was asked to redraft the corpora-
tion's bylaws when it was discovered that although organized as a stock corporation un-
der the TBCA, it had been operating under bylaws for a non-profit recreational club.
Somehow in the process the author ended up with a share of the corporation's stock and
thus has become a bemused observer of the shifting struggles for control each year.
477. The court ruled the quitclaim deed created an irrevocable trust, had been given
for valid consideration and was properly delivered, and that the trial court had not erred
in amending the property description in its judgment (so as to exclude the clubhouse
site). Based on the defendants' counterclaim, the court also affirmed the cancellation
of shares that had been issued to some of the majority shareholders.
478. 493 S.W.2d at 348.
479. See, e.g., TEx. Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. arts. 4.04(A) (articles of amendment),
4.11(B) (statement of cancellation of treasury shares), 5.04(A) (articles of merger or
consolidation of domestic corporations), 6.06(A) (articles of dissolution) (1956).
480. Id. art. 5.08 (1956).
481. E.g., Ballard v. Carmichael, 83 Tex. 355, 367, 18 S.W. 734, 739 (1892); Huf-
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whether there is actual authority for his action must depend upon its source,
since there is no presumption of authority by virtue of his office alone. 4s2
Here the vice president had been authorized by a majority of the board, al-
beit a temporary one, to execute the quitclaim deed. Furthermore, even
though a vice president normally is not expected to perform the president's
function except when the latter is absent, disabled or has vacated his of-
fice, 4 88 or some of the president's duties have been properly delegated to
him, the fact remained that the corporation's bylaw did specifically state he
could take the president's place if that official refused to act.4s4 Actually,
the bylaw in question is a fairly standard one;4s5 perhaps in light of the
decision some additional thought should be given to the desirability of in-
cluding the refusal to act contingency if factional disputes among board
members or officers can be anticipated.
Two cases of interest were brief opinions by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applying Texas law. In one,486 the appel-
late court affirmed the trial court's judgment that a corporation was not re-
sponsible to a discharged employee for an allegedly slanderous statement
made by the corporation's warehouse superintendent to a union steward
that the plaintiff had been discharged for theft. The plaintiff had the
burden of showing the slander was uttered by the superintendent in the dis-
charge of a corporate duty48 7 and since the jury found the superintendent
had no such duty, his statement was not legally attributable to -the corpora-
tion. The other case 488 was a per curiam opinion sustaining the award
of a judgment in a breach of contract action against the plaintiff notwith-
standing a verdict in his favor, the court holding an individual director had
no authority to bind his corporation to a contract to purchase the plain-
tiff's business. 48 9  Moreover, being an oral contract, it was unenforceable
under the Uniform Commercial Code.
One other case by the Amarillo court of civil appeals, Maxey v. Citi-
zens National Bank,490 ruled that a bank could not be held liable for con-
stedler v. Sides, 165 S.W.2d 1006, 1009 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1942), error ref.; Texas
Auto Co. v. Arbetter, 1 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1927), error
dismissed; Peyton v. Sturgis, 202 S.W. 205, 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1918) (dic-
tum).
482. E.g., Leon Farms Corp. v. Beeman, 240 S.W.2d 433, 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1951), error ref. n.r.e.; Texas Auto Co. v. Arbetter, I S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1927), error dismissed; Indiahoma Ref. Co. v. Wood, 255 S.W. 212,
214 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1923); Hurlbut v. Gainor, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 588, 103
S.W. 409 (1907). See generally 5 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 103.02[5]; 2 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 627-35; 2 I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORA-
TIONS § 641.
483. See HENN 440.
484. See Smith v. Smith, 62 Ill. 493 (1872) (vice president can act upon president's
refusal when authorized by board to execute conveyance).
485. See, e.g., 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 280, at 322; 5 R.
STAYTON, TEXAS FORMS § 2480, at 63. But cf. H. KENDRICK & J. KENDRICK, TEXAS
TRANSACTION GUIDE § 3.161[2], at 3-219 (1972).
486. Wells v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 474 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1973).
487. See Texam Oil Corp. v. Poynor, 436 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Tex. 1968).
488. Paul v. Shur-Gro Irrigation Co., Inc., 476 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1973).
489. See text accompanying note 395 supra.




version by fraud and conspiracy of a customer-borrower's property result-
ing from his dealings with the bank, when in earlier judgments, 49 1 all of
the bank's representatives had been exculpated for their actions in behalf
of the bank in -the transactions complained of. The court acknowledged
that a bank can be held liable for conversion along with its officials and
representatives as joint tortfeasors; however, its liability in such cases is
not primary, but rather is derived from the acts of those who represent it.
However, during the writing of this survey article, the Amarillo court's de-
cision was reversed.4 92  The 1975 survey will discuss the supreme court's
holding in more detail, but in short the high court ruled that it was error to
have granted summary judgment in the bank's favor on the basis of the
earlier judgments for its representatives. As a party to security agreements
with the plaintiff customer-borrower, the bank assumed primary duties to
exercise good faith and fairness in the sale of collateral, apart from any du-
ties owed the plaintiff by its officials or representatives, and thus plaintiff's
claim against the bank was not barred by res judicata or estoppel by
judgment.
D. Corporate Records
A Texas corporation is required to keep books of account, minutes of
shareholders' and directors' meetings, and a record of its shareholders,
addresses, and their holdings. 498  In addition, the officer and agent in charge
of the stock transfer books must prepare a list of shareholders eligible to
vote at least ten days before a shareholders' meeting.494 Other -than the re-
quirement that the 'books and records of account be correct and complete,
not much is said in the statute as to the form in which such records should
appear. For example, if the directors or shareholders take action without
a meeting by executing a written consent, 495 presumably such consents
when filed somewhere in the corporate records will be deemed equivalent
,to minutes. 490  But whatever the format, the law has assumed it would
be in writing, if for no other reason than to become available for inspec-
tion by shareholders making proper demand therefor. 497
In recent years rapid developments in communications and computer
technology have led to the practice, particularly in larger corporations, of
keeping books and records in other than written form, generally utilizing
various information storage and retrieval systems. Tape recorders, for ex-
ample, are frequently used to more accurately preserve proceedings at
stockholders', directors', or committee meetings for later transcription if
the need should arise.498  To accommodate employment of -these new
491. See Maxey v. Irish, 457 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1970); Maxey v.
Goad, 451 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970), error ref. n.r.e.; Maxey
v. Rodman, 444 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969), error ref. n.r.e.
492. Maxey v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 507 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1974).
493. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.44(A) (Supp. 1974).
494. Id. art. 2.27 (1956).
495. Id. art. 9.10(A), (B) (Supp. 1974).
496. See 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAs BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 453, at 500 n.65.
497. 20 id. § 804, at 335.
498. This assumes good equipment has been used, no gaps appear in the transcription,
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techniques for storing financial and other data, the TBCA has been amended
to allow books, records, and minutes either to be in written form or in any
other form capable of being converted into writing within a reasonable
time.499 'In keeping with its Model Act source,5 °00 the amendment does not
attempt to specify or anticipate the variety of forms, "from microfilm to
electronic tapes to memory banks," 0' 1 that may be used. The important
criterion is that the information be reducible or convertible into written
form; otherwise the shareholder's right of inspection can easily be frus-
trated. 502
Another amendment to the same article,503 also taken from the Model
Act, is designed to provide a shareholder with at least some basic financial
data about his corporation without having to resort to formal inspection
or litigation to get it.504 Upon written request, a shareholder of record
(which includes the holder of a beneficial interest in a voting trust)5 °0 can
have the corporation mail to him within a reasonable time its last annual
fiscal statements if reasonably detailed and a report of its operations, along
with the most recent interim statements, if any, that have been publicly
filed or otherwise published. 506  This is in addition to the obligation im-
posed on the board of directors to provide similar information upon request
by the holders of at least one-third of the outstanding shares. 507  It may
seem surprising at this late date to have an amendment requiring informa-
tion be furnished a stockholder on his request since the receipt of annual
reports and proxy statements has become commonplace for most investors.
Yet such reporting has come about largely as .the result of federal law,508
and no privilege is claimed with respect to some of the deliberations recorded. Cf.
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
499. Ch. 545, § 26, [1973] Tex. Laws 1502, amending TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.44(A) (1956).
500. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 52.
501. Id. 2.
502. Id.
503. Ch. 545, § 26, [1973] Tex. Laws 1502, adding §§ (E), (F) to TEX. Bus. CORP.
ACT ANN. art. 2.44 (1956).
504. The shareholder's right of inspection of corporate records is dealt with in other
sections of article 2.44 that were also amended. See discussion in text accompanying
notes 619-36 infra.
505. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.44(F) (Supp. 1974).
506. Professor Hamilton notes that grammatically it is not clear whether the annual
statements and report, as well as the interim reports, must have been filed in a public
record or otherwise published. 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS CoRP'oRATIoNs § 802
(Supp. 1974). As he correctly surmises, the intent was to include interim reports that
were readily available such as those taken from forms 10-Q, filed under § 13 or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1970) pursuant to rules 13a-
13 or 15d-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13, 240.15d-13, 249.308a (1973), or found in vari-
ous securities manuals, and not to limit the annual reports to be sent on request to those
previously filed or published. The Model Act does not contain the interim report re-
quirement. Apparently New York is the only other state that does. ABA MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 52, Last Para., 3.01-.03. However, New York limits the infor-
mation furnished the shareholder on request to the last annual balance sheet and profit
and loss statement plus any interim statements that have been distributed to the share-
holders or otherwise made available to the public; moreover, the requesting shareholder
must have been a holder of record for six months or own 5% of the outstanding shares
of the corporation. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 624(e) (McKinney 1963).
507. Tax. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.38(C) (1956).
508. Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, issuers whose securities are listed
on a national securities exchange, or which have total assets exceeding $1,000,000 and
500 holders or more of a class of equity securities (not otherwise exempt), or which
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not state corporation statutes. 09 Despite the very fundamental nature of
the shareholder's right to know about his corporation's affairs, it is only
comparatively recently that some states have begun implementing -that
right beyond permitting physical examination of the records. And even
now, as the Texas and Model Act provisions indicate, the shareholder
must still take the initiative if his corporation is not one required to
communicate with him under the federal law.5 10  Thus far only a handful
of states command their corporations to furnish stockholders with even rudi-
mentary reports on a periodic basis. 511 Granted that some corporations
do send reports to their shareholders annually without compulsion, perhaps
to foster good shareholder relations or because of a perceived moral im-
perative -that it is only right that shareholders be informed, there still seems
little reason why any corporation having public or inactive shareholders
should not be required to fulfill this responsibility.
III. THE CLOSE CORPORATION
A. Legistative Developments
Perhaps the most extensive changes the 1973 amendments made in Texas
corporate law were those affecting the close corporation. For the first
time, these entities have been singled out for special statutory treatment
and are granted privileges of corporate government and arrangement of re-
lations among their shareholders not afforded other corporations or share-
holders. Because they depart so far from the usual corporate norms in
many respects, -the new close corporation statutes deserve more extended
consideration than can be given in a survey article such as this512 and as a
have filed a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933 (unless having fewer
than 300 shareholders) must file such annual and quarterly reports as prescribed by the
SEC. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (1970). Moreover, before any proxy with reference
to a security registered under § 12 of the Exchange Act can be solicited in behalf of
management for use at an annual meeting for the election of directors, it must be ac-
companied or preceded by an annual report that includes financial statements for the
last two fiscal years that adequately reflect the issuer's financial position. 17 C.F.R.§ 240.14a-3(b) (1973). Even if a company that has securities registered under § 12
opts not to solicit proxies for the annual meeting, it must still send its shareholders infor-
mation substantially equivalent to that required for soliciting issuers. 15 U.S.C. §
78n(c) (1970). See generally 1 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 163, §§ 3.11, 13.05; E.
GADSBY & J. O'BRIEN, ThE FEDERAL SECuIuTIES EXCHANGE Acr OF 1934, §8 4.02, 7.03;
2 L. Loss, supra note 66, at 809-23, 886-87 (1961); 5 id. at 2774-90 (Supp. 1969); Som-
mers, The Annual Report: A Prime Disclosure Document, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1093.
509. See, e.g., CARY 1029; 2 L. Loss, supra note 66, at 1149; Knauss, A Reappraisal
of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 625 (1964); Sommers, supra note 508,
at 1094.
510. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 301.35 (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-37(a)(4)
(1965); Omo. REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.38(C) (Page Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-716(e) (Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. § 180.43(1) (Supp. 1974).
511. CAL. CORP. CODE § 3006 (West 1955); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 33-334(a)
(Supp. 1973); Micu. CoMp. LAWS § 450.1901 (1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.72
(1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1318 (1967).
512. Several useful summaries of the new close corporation statutes have already ap-
peared. The most detailed is a helpful comparative study by William P. Bivins, Jr.; see
Comment, The New Texas Close Corporation Legislation: A Comparison with Florida
and Delaware, 27 Sw. L.J. 340 (1973). Professor Hamilton has written a succinct yet
critical analysis as part of the 1974 pocket part supplementation to his excellent treatise;
see 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 661, 670, 673, 674, 676, 696-
702 (Supp. 1974). Further insight into the purposes of the legislation can be found in
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consequence this author is preparing a separate article that will deal with
these new provisions in much more detail. All that will be undertaken
here is a brief synopsis of their content plus mention o several other
amendments affecting all corporations that can also be used in close corpo-
ration situations.
Basic Pattern of Legislative Changes. The 1973 amendments affecting
the close corporation fall into two categories. The first consists of an inte-
grated set of new statutes and amendments that pertain only to those cor-
porations that meet the following definition of a close corporation: a do-
mestic corporation composed of no more than fifteen shareholders of rec-
ord whose shares were privately issued and are subject to some, restriction
on transferability. 513 Such corporations are referred to hereafter as defined
closed corporations. The second group encompasses the changes made in
other laws that apply overtly to all corporations but nevertheless have par-
ticular utility for close corporations, whether of the defined category or not.
The most significant in this group is the amendment virtually rewriting arti-
cle 2.22, dealing with stock transfer restrictions.514  In addition, -there re-
the Comments of the Bar Committee in the current supplement to 3A TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. (based on those prepared for the committee's use by this author as the prin-
cipal draftsman of the new legislation) and in Doty & Parker 1016, 1018-20. See also
Comment, Close Corporations and the New Texas Business Corporation Act, 5 TEx.
TECH L. REv. 703 (1974).
513. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-1(A) (Supp. 1974). As indicated, there
are three elements to the definition. First the corporation must be one "which, at any
given time, has no more than 15 shareholders of record of all classes of shares, whether
or not entitled to vote." Fifteen was set as the maximum number in the belief that any
number in excess of that figure would make management by the shareholders cumber-
some; also 15 is one of the benchmarks of a private offering in the Texas Securities
Act, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5, subsec. I(c) (1964). Comment of Bar Com-
mittee to Art. 2.30-1, 3A TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. 76, 77 (Supp. 1974). In addition,
in counting to 15, shares held by husband and wife either as community property or
as joint tenants or tenants by the entirety, or by a decedent's or incompetent's estate,
or by an express trust, partnership, or corporation (if none of those entities were formed
for the primary purpose of holding shares in the close corporation) are treated as if held
by a single shareholder. The specification is derived from the State Securities Board's
interpretation of section 5.1 as to how security holders are to be counted for purposes
of that exemption. Texas Securities Board Policies & Interpretations No. 7, at I-A(10)(Sept. 18, 1970), 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 46,650 (1972). See generally Bromberg,
Texas Exemptions for Small Offerings of Corporate Securities, 18 Sw. L.J. 537, 539(1964); Lebowitz, supra note 131, at 138.
Secondly, the corporation's "issued shares of all classes shall be subject to one or more
of the restrictions on transfer permitted by Article 2.22 of this Act." See discussion
in text accompanying notes 557-70 infra.
Lastly, the shares "shall have been issued to its shareholders without any public offer-
ing, solicitation, or advertisement." This language is designed to encompass both federal
and state standards as to the nature of the private offering concept. Comment of Bar
Committee to Art. 2.30-1, 3A TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 76, 77 (Supp. 1974). The
phrase "without any public . . . solicitation or advertisement" is taken again from sec-
tion 5.1 of the Texas Securities Act and here, too, the Board's interpretation referred
to above, should prove helpful. See also Bromberg, Texas Exemptions for Small Offer-
ings of Corporate Securities-The Prohibition on Advertisements, 20 Sw. L.J. 239(1966); Lebowitz, supra note 131, at 131. Many of the federal concepts of the private
offering exemption can be found in the SEC's recently promulgated rule 146 which be-
came effective June 10, 1974. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5487 (April 23, 1974),
17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1974). The literature on the federal private offering exemption
is voluminous. See generally 2 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 163, § 4.05; S. GOLDBERG,
PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND RESTICTED SECURrIES (1973); 1 L. Loss, supra note 66, at653-96 (1961); H. SowARDs, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.02
(1971).
514. See discussion in text accompanying notes 557-70 infra.
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main a number of other TBCA articles, not all of which were altered in
1973, that clearly were drafted with the close corporation in mind and will
continue to be of benefit to both defined and other close corporations.
Among such provisions are those permitting high quorum and voting re-
quirements for action by the shareholders or directors (the "veto" power),51
classification of shares, 510 voting trusts, 5 7 certain voting agreements,118 or
appointment of a receiver to break a deadlock among directors or share-
holders.51 9 Moreover, some of the 1973 amendments previously discussed
will offer more flexibility in planning for control in close corporations. Spe-
cifically, the new provisions authorizing disproportionate voting, 520 allow-
ing a one- or two-man board of directors,5 21 protecting directors elected
through cumulative voting from removal by the majority,522 and giving new
rights to holders of beneficial interests in voting trusts, 523 should all prove
helpful. Any of these statutes, whether new or old, can be employed, since
nothing in the TBCA definition of a close corporation is intended to af-
fect the right of any other corporation to provide for corporate manage-
ment or restrict transferability or to exercise any other power or right other-
wise provided by the Act.524
There is no doubt that of all these changes in the Texas law of close corpo-
rations, the integrated close corporation statutes will have the greatest im-
pact since they automatically apply to any corporation -that falls within the
statutory definition without need for any action to elect close corporation
status.5 25 But two observations are in order on this point. First, these stat-
utes are far from constituting a separate code for close corporations com-
parable to those found in Texas law for banks 526 or insurance compan-
ies;52 7 rather the defined close corporation will continue to be governed by
515. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. arts. 2.28, 2.35, 9.08 (Supp. 1974).
516. Id. art. 2.12(A) (1956).
517. Id. art. 2.30(A).
518. Id. art. 2.30(B) (Supp. 1974).
519. Id. arts. 7.05(A)(1)(b) (1956), (e) (Supp. 1974).
520. Id. art. 2.29(A) (Supp. 1974); see discussion in text accompanying notes 206-
26 supra.
521. Id. art. 2.32; see discussion in text accompanying notes 364-72 supra.
522. Id. (last sentence); see discussion in text accompanying notes 251-60 supra.
523. Such beneficial holders are given the same rights to inspect corporate records
and receive information as to the corporation's financial conditions as are accorded rec-
ord holders. TEx. Bus. CORP. AT ANN. art. 2.44 (Supp. 1974); see discussion in text
accompanying notes 503-11 supra and notes 619-36 infra. They are also permitted to
initiate derivative actions if otherwise qualified. Id. art. 5.14(B)(1); see discussion in
text accompanying notes 678-704 infra.
524. TEX. Bus. CORP. AT ANN. art. 2.30-1(A) (Supp. 1974).
525. In this regard Texas has followed the pattern of close corporation legislation in
Florida and Maine in making the law uniformly applicable to all close corporations as
defined therein in contrast to that used in Delaware, Kansas, Maryland, Pennsylvania,
and Rhode Island which require close corporations desiring to take the benefit of such
special legislation to elect that status. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.70(1) (Supp.
1974) and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 102 (Supp. 1973) with DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 344 (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7201 to -7204 (Supp. 1973); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 23, § 100(a) (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1371-74 (Supp. 1974);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-51(a) (1970). However, the Bar Committee as part of its 1975
legislative program plans to recommend that Texas also require an election of close cor-
poration status to come under the new statutes.
526. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 342-301 to -911.1 (1973).
527. E.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 2.01-.21, 3.01-.69 (1963).
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the TBCA "to the extent not inconsistent with" the new legislation.121 Sec-
ondly, they are largely optional in nature and are really no more than en-
abling legislation to allow shareholders in certain close corporations essen-
tially the same freedom of contract in structuring their corporation's affairs
as if they were partners, but only if they so choose.5 29  In short, despite
their sweep, these provisions are permissive, not mandatory.
The Defined Close Corporation Statutes. The bulk of the 1973 legisla-
tion for the defined close corporation consists of five new articles that have
been added to the TBCA, articles 2.30-1 to 2.30-5. 530 'In iaddition, several
other articles were amended to permit inclusion or removal of optional pro-
visions in the close corporation's articles of incorporation authorizing
shareholder management or granting one or more shareholders the option
of dissolving the corporation, as permitted by the new law. 5 3 1 In a sense,
article 2.30-1 (A), which contains the definition of a close corporation, is the
very core of these statutes since utilization of the privileges they afford de-
pends almost entirely on the corporation maintaining its status as a close cor-
poration as defined. Thus a corporation managed by its shareholders will
be obligated to reinstate management by a board of directors if it no longer
meets the definition.5 3 2 Similarly, an agreement among all the shareholders
which regulates the corporation's affairs beyond that normally permitted in
a shareholders' agreement is valid only so long as its close corporation status
is maintained. 5 3 For this reason, a special proceeding has been authorized
to prevent loss of, or to restore close corporation status when wrongfully
or inadvertently endangered.5 34
Control Arrangements. A small closely-held enterprise composed of a
handful of shareholders all active in the business has very little need for
adherence to the normal structure of corporate government which contem-
528. TEx. Bus. Cosy. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-1 (A) (last sentence) (Supp. 1974).
529. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.30-1, 3A TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. 76
(Supp. 1974).
530. Ch. 545, §§ 18-22, [1973] Tex. Laws 1495-1500, adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. arts. 2.30-1 to -5 (Supp. 1974).
531. Tax. Bus. CoRp. ACT ANN. arts. 3.02(A)(9), 4.01(B)(18)-(20), 4.03(B)(1l)-(13) (Supp. 1974); see discussion in text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
532. Tax. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-1(C) (Supp. 1974). The president must
call a special meeting of the shareholders to elect the board; if he fails to do so within
four months after the corporation no longer qualifies as a close corporation, any share-
holder may call the meeting. The number of directors is to be that specified in the arti-
cles or bylaws, but if neither document says, then three directors are to be elected.
533. Id. art. 2.30-2(D). As drafted, this section seems to negate all the terms of
such an agreement, even those that would otherwise be lawful in the absence of the
broad authorization of subject matter set out in section A, such as restrictions on transfer
or pooling of shareholders' votes. As a consequence, special precautions should be taken
to preserve the close corporation's status or else place the matters that may normally
be provided for or agreeed upon in any type of corporation in some other document such
as the articles, bylaws, or an agreement to which the corporation is a party.
534. Id. art. 2.30-3. The proceeding may be brought by the close corporation or one
of its shareholders or by one who is party to or is bound by an agreement among all
the shareholders by filing a petition in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county
where the corporation's principal place of business is located. The court may grant re-
lief by way of injunction, specific performance, receivership, or any other appropriate
remedy. If necessary, it may enjoin or set aside any transfer of shares or public offering
that threatens the close corporation's status or is contrary to any restriction on transfer-
ability permitted by article 2.22 or prohibited by agreement.
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plates shareholders' meetings to elect representatives known as directors
who then convene periodically as a board to determine corporate policy
and select the executives who will conduct day-to-day operations. Once
ownership and management meld, the whole concept of shareholder repre-
sentation through a board of directors loses its reason for being. Hence,
under article 2.30-1(B), a defined close corporation can elect to dispense
with a board of directors and by an appropriate provision in its articles of
incorporation conspicuously noted on its share certificates allow its business
and affairs -to be managed by its shareholders. In taking action for the
corporation as managers, the shareholders may act. formally or in any
manner that evidences their consent -to the transaction in question,5 35 and
of course must bear the responsibilities imposed by law on the directors.5 :' 6
A decision to dispense with the board of directors may not of itself affect
control, however, since presumably the shareholders will vote according to
their shareholdings and not per capita.537  However, if the shareholders
of a defined close corporation choose, they can by a unanimous agree-
ment among themselves impinge as they see fit on the managerial pre-
rogatives of the board, if not abolished, or permit one or more of their
number or outsiders to run the corporation or in essence treat the business
and affairs of the corporation as if it were a partnership. 53  ,Moreover,
they can decide how voting requirements or power will .be exercised, the
terms and conditions of employment of all corporate offices and employees
including who the directors and officers will be and the manner dividends
will be declared and profits divided. 539  In addition, they may impose re-
strictions on transfer seemingly in excess of those otherwise permitted by
law140 and in general work out the relationship among themselves and the
corporation as 'if they were partners. 54' Because of the far-reaching na-
ture of such an agreement, it must not only be unanimously agreed to but
must be set out in full or incorporated by reference in the articles or by
laws542 and its existence conspicuously noted on the share certificates.5 43
535. Id. art. 2.30-l(B)(3).
536. Id. art. 2.30-1(B)(2).
537. The statute does not say so specifically but this interpretation is consistent with
the policy of permitting the board to be dispensed with entirely as a useless appendage
and letting the shareholders run the corporation in accordance with their ownership in-
terests. But as Professor Hamilton suggests, the language is ambiguous and could lead to
the contrary inference that voting is to be per capita as directors vote, although he agrees
the voting should be by share holdings. 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS § 697, at 20 n.98 (Supp. 1974). Interestingly, only the Maryland statute of all
the close corporation legislation is explicit on this point. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § §
105 (a) (5), (6) (1973) (action by voting of shares of stock).
538. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.30-2(A)(1), (8) (Supp. 1974).
539. Id. arts. 2.30-2(A)(3) to (6).
540. Id. art. 2.30-2(A)(2). Though the statute speaks only of "restrictions on the
transfer of shares," the general permission granted that allows the agreement to regulate
the relations of the shareholders in a manner that would otherwise be appropriate only
among partners suggests that any restraint partnership law permits to preserve the de-
lectus personae concept should be valid, even if beyond those stated in article 2.22.
541. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.30-2(A)(8) (Supp. 1974).
542. Id. art. 2.30-2(B). This requirement is critical, because the validity of the entire
agreement is made dependent upon its inclusion in the articles or bylaws. It has been
imposed in the belief that since the shareholders' agreement will form the basic compact
among the shareholders, it should be included in either of those documents. Comment
of Bar Committee to Art. 2.30-2, 3A Tax. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. 79 (Supp. 1974). By
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Deadlock, Dissension, and Dissolution. Because of the intimacy of as-
sociation among shareholders in most close corporations, it is not surprising
that disagreements and discord sometimes result. ,If the dissension per-
sists or becomes of such intensity that some of the associates would like to
terminate the relationship, they may find themselves frozen in.144  A more
likely consequence is that either through spiteful exercise of a veto power
or because of equality of voting strength, corporate affairs will become
deadlocked.5 45 -Heretofore, the only remedy in the absence of an agree-
ment has been a receivership to rehabilitate the corporation 46 that -might
ultimately lead to dissolution,547 but receivership is a remedy not easily
obtained.5 48  Now, three of the 1973 close corporation articles provide addi-
tional solutions for ,the defined close corporation.
Under article 2.30-4, the corporation, or shareholder, or one who is party
to or bound by an agreement among the shareholders can seek judicial ap-
pointment of a provisional director whenever the directors '(or shareholders,
if they have power of management) become so deadlocked that the corpo-
ration's affairs can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the share-
holders generally. 549  The provisional director, who cannot be a shareholder
or creditor and who does not have the powers of a receiver, is given a di-
rector's (or shareholder's) right to vote which ordinarily will permit him to
break -the deadlock, and he serves until removed by the court or a vote of the
directors or shareholders, 550 if the latter later decide they would rather re-
solve their own differences than have an outsider meddle in their affairs.
As -an alternative to judicial intervention, 55' the shareholders may want
contrast, failure to note the agreement's existence conspicuously on the share certificates
simply makes its terms unenforceable against certain transferees without actual notice.
543. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-2(C) (Supp. 1974). In general, the agree-
ment must be set out in full or summary form on the front or back of the certificate
or, if set out in or incorporated by reference in the articles or bylaws, a statement can
be made of its availability at the corporation's registered office and principal place of
business or in the office of the secretary of state, if filed there. If the statement is set
forth on the back of the certificate, conspicuous reference to it is required on the face
of the certificate.
544. Typically the corporation's articles will have provided for perpetual duration and
if the shareholders do not have sufficient votes to force voluntary dissolution, they have
no basis to seek receivership or ultimate involuntary dissolution unless they can show
insolvency, wasting of corporate assets, oppression by the majority, or a deadlock situa-
tion. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 7.05, 7.06 (Supp. 1974). True, they may try
to sell their shares but this assumes a purchaser can be found who wants to buy into
a business wracked with dissension, or if shares cannot be transferred without giving the
other shareholders or corporation a first option, that the option will be exercised.
545. See generally 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 689; 2 F.
O'NEAL, CLOSE CoRPoRATioNs § 9.02; W. PANThP., CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS 257;
C. ROHRLICH, supra note 88, § 4.28.
546. TEx. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. arts. 7.05(A)(1)(b) (1956), (e) (Supp. 1974).
547. Id. art. 7.06(A) (3) (Supp. 1974).
548. In order for a receiver to be appointed to rehabilitate the corporation in the
event of deadlock, it is necessary to show that all other remedies either in law or in
equity are inadequate. Even if such a receiver is appointed, the court will not proceed
to liquidate the corporation's assets unless no plan for remedying the situation has been
presented within twelve months after his appointment. In general, attempts by minority
shareholders to obtain receivership have not been successful. 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 692.
549. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.30-4(A) (Supp. 1974).
550. Id. art. 2.30-4(B).
551. But such intervention cannot be completely avoided, since a court has power to
appoint a provisional director "notwithstanding any contrary provision in the articles of
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to work out their own methods for settling internal disputes. If they all
join in an agreement sanctioned by article 2.30-2, they can include any provi-
sion they desire providing for arbitration of issues when deadlock ensues5 52
and, given the broad freedom of contract that statute affords, undoubtedly
may provide for a first option or mandatory buy-out by one or the other of
the disagreeing parties. 553 Article 2.30-5 permits an even more drastic solu-
tion: if the articles of incorporation so provide and again the share certifi-
cates so conspicuously indicate, one or more shareholders can be given an
option to dissolve the corporation at will or on the happening of ,any event
or contingency, 55 4 and there is no reason why a deadlock situation or refusal
to abide by an arbitrator's award cannot be such a contingency. The power,
if conferred, is equivalent to that given a partner under partnership law, '555'
and as in partnerships, the danger of its exercise should be hedged against
by allowing the remaining shareholders to continue the corporation's busi-
ness, if they wish, by buying out the dissident's shares. 556
Restrictions on Transferability. Although technically not part of the close
corporation statutes, the amendment of article 2.22 relating to restrictions
on -the transfer of shares5 57 is of great importance since one of the essential
requirements for a defined close corporation is that ,its issued shares of all
classes be subject to one or more of the restrictions set out in article 222. 55s
That statute has been almost completely revised, not only to clarify some
of the ambiguities in -the former language that may have led to the unfortu-
nate decision by the Waco court of civil appeals in Ling & Co. v. Trinity
Savings & Loan Ass'n5 9 and to give statutory recognition to restrictions cur-
rently being imposed to assure compliance with federal and state securities
laws, 560 but also to allow the corporation's status as an electing small busi-
ness corporation under subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code 561 or as a
defined close corporation to be preserved.
incorporation, or bylaws, or agreement among shareholders of a close corporation."
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-4(A) (Supp. 1974).
552. Id. art. 2.30-2(A)(7).
553. See 20 R. HAMILTON, TExAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 691 for a form for
a first-option arrangement in the event of deadlock. But even with such an agreement,
problems can arise as to the manner in which the option is exercised or offer made to
purchase the other's shares. See, e.g., Roy Herider Feed Co. v. Modem Feeds of Nacog-
doches, Inc., 468 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971), error ref. n.r.e., discussed
in Lebowitz, supra note 131, at 154. See generally 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS
§ 9.05.
554. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-5 (Supp. 1974).
555. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 31(1)(b) (1962) (partner may dis-
solve partnership at will without violation of the partnership agreement if no definite
term or undertaking has been specified). But unlike the shareholder in a close corpo-
ration, a partner has power to dissolve the partnership even in contravention of the part-
nership agreement at any time, id. § 31(2), but is liable to his co-partners for the dam-
ages thus caused. Id. § 38(2)(a)(II).
556. See generally A. BROMBERO, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 476
(1968); 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.06.
557. Ch. 545, § 12, [1973] Tex. Laws 1493, amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 2.22 (1956).
558. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-1 (A) (Supp. 1974).
559. 470 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971), rev'd, 482 S.W.2d 841 (Tex.
1972), noted in 50 TExAS L. REv. 528 (1972), discussed in Lebowitz, supra note 166,
at 96; Rogers, Stock Transfer Restrictions, 10 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON CORP., BANKING
& Bus. L., June 1972, at 1.
560. Doty & Parker 1016.
561. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1371-79 (Supp. 1974).
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As drafted, article 2.22 focuses primarily on the manner of imposing, and
the permissible scope of restrictions on the transfer of shares or other corpo-
rate securities, but begins nevertheless with a statement that such securities
are personal property for all purposes and are transferable in accordance
with the Texas equivalent of article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 562
except as otherwise provided by the TBCA.5 63 Section B specifies the
sources for the imposition of such restrictions as being the articles, bylaws,
agreements -among any number of shareholders, and agreements among the
shareholders and corporation provided the latter keeps a counterpart at its
principal place of business and registered office where it may be inspected.
The section also seemingly codifies the holding in Sandor Petroleum Corp.
v. Williams5 64 that previously unrestricted shares cannot be restricted with-
out -the consent of 'the holder either by voting for the restriction or becom-
ing a party to an agreement imposing it.565
To 'be enforceable, a restriction must be reasonable and must be noted con-
spicuously on the share certificates, and if -imposed by the corporation, in
the manner prescribed by article 2.19(G) .5 66 "Conspicuously" is basically
defined in terms of use of type of sufficient size, color, and character 'that
would cause a reasonable person against whom the legend will operate to
notice it.567  Absent the conspicuous notation, the restriction is enforceable
only against a person who actually knows about it.56s  The reasonableness
requirement is not defined and ultimately can only be determined as to
any specific restriction by the courts. Some guidance is provided, however,
in section D which sets out several varieties of permissible restraints, 'again
provided they are reasonable. The list is not exhaustive but covers most
of the common type of restrictions such as options to purchase, first refusals,
buy-sell agreements, and limited consent restraints to keep out undesirable
persons or classes of persons (if 'the designation is not "manifestly" unreason-
able) 569 or to prevent violations of securities laws or -loss of status as a sub-
chapter S or defined close corporation. 70
B. Case Law Developments
During the survey period the Texas courts decided three cases that con-
562. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.101-.406 (1968).
563. Tax. Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. art. 2.22(A) (Supp. 1974).
564. 321 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1959), error ref. n.r.e., noted in 14
Sw. L.J. 106 (1960); 38 TEXAS L. REV. 499 (1960), holding a restriction imposed by
an amendment to the bylaws cannot be enforced against a holder of previously unre-
stricted shares without his consent. The statute goes beyond the Sandor case in that
it would also apply to an amendment to the articles seeking to restrict the transfer of
shares issued without such restriction.
565. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.22(B) (last sentence) (Supp. 1974).
566. Id. arts. 2.19(G), 2.22(B). Section G of article 2.19 prescribes the manner in
which restrictions on transfer imposed by the corporation must appear on the share cer-
tificates. In general, the restriction must either appear in full or summary form on the
front or back of the certificate or else a statement made that the restriction exists pur-
suant to a specified document, a copy of which will be furnished upon request made at
the corporation's principal place of business or registered office.
567. Id. art. 2.19(H).
568. Id. art. 2.22(C).
569. Id. art. 2.22(D)(4).
570. Id. art. 2.22(D)(5).
720 [Vol. 28
TEXAS CORPORATION LAW
cerned close corporations and all involved stock transfer restrictions imposed
in conjunction with buy-sell or first option arrangements. In each the out-
come depended largely on construction of the language used in imposing
the restrictions or on the validity of efforts made to implement them.
The first case, Rainwater v. Milfeld,5 71 dealt largely with rights of succes-
sive optionees given as first refusals572 and the application of bylaw provi-
sions granting the options. According to the facts, the plaintiff and his father
had purchased fifty percent of the stock in a motel corporation, the other
fifty percent being owned by two others, the Milfelds, who had formed the
corporation with plaintiff's sellers. The plaintiff took five percent of the
block and his father forty-five percent. Under the corporation's bylaws,
the corporation and its shareholders were given successive options to buy
the stock of a shareholder desiring -to sell at the price or value a bona fide
prospective purchaser was willing to give. The offer to sell had to be made
first to the corporation and if it refused, -then to the remaining shareholders,
each of whom had the right to buy his proportionate share plus a proportion-
ate part of any stock not taken by other shareholders.
The Milfelds received 'an offer from an outsider to buy their fifty per-
cent block, the latter specifying he would not be interested in acquiring
less than a fifty percent position. The Rainwaters were duly notified as
the bylaws required. Their attorneys responded, rejecting the offer in be-
half of the corporation and plaintiff's father, but stating that plaintiff was ex-
ercising his option to purchase five percent of the Milfeld stock, his pro-
portionate share. When -the Milfelds refused ,to transfer the shares 'to him,
plaintiff sued for specific performance. The trial court found for the de-
fendants and the Corpus Christi court of civil appeals affirmed.
As -the appellate court interpreted the contract, once a selling shareholder
offers his stock and 'the corporation declines to buy it, all of the stock then
alternatively offered must be purchased by the remaining shareholders in
the proportions specified by the bylaws in order for the restriction to stand.
If not, it would be unreasonable to allow an individual shareholder to pur-
chase his proportionate share of the total unless either he or his other
shareholders take the balance. Because the ownership was evenly divided
between the two groups and there had been some discord between them, it
was evident that neither group nor an outside purchaser of their shares
would want to be placed in the minority position which would result from
571. 485 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972).
572. Although the term "first option" is often generically used to describe any obliga-
tion giving the corporation or the other shareholders the initial opportunity to acquire
restricted securities (and is employed in that sense in amended article 2.22(D)(1)),
there appears to be a difference between a true "first option" and a "first refusal." In
the former, the opportunity given the other contracting parties is to purchase at a fixed
price or according to an agreed formula; in the latter, the selling shareholder can in a
sense fix the price at whatever amount he is willing to sell to an outsider who agrees
to pay that much, as in the instant case. See 1 HORNSTEIN 251 n.43. Article 2.22 prior
to its amendment referred both to rights of the corporation or other persons "granted
as an option or options or refusal or refusals on any shares." Ch. 64, art. 2.22(B)(3),
[1955] Tex. Laws 239, as amended, TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.22(B) (Supp.
1974). The court, however, referred only to another provision of the former article con-
cerning preemptive or prior rights of the corporation or its shareholders to purchase
shares offered for transfer. Id. art. 2.22(D)(1).
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being forced to give up part of their shares. There being no right to buy
anything less than all the stock being offered, plaintiff's response was
simply a counteroffer that was not accepted.
The court's interpretation undoubtedly accorded with -the intent of the
parties although the bylaw was not as free of ambiguity as the court seemed
to think,573 absent an explicit statement that -the successive options to the
corporation and shareholders would fail if all the shares were not taken.
On the other hand, the bylaw did not contain the provision often found in
such arrangements -that any portion of the stock not purchased by either
the corporation or the shareholders on a proportionate basis can then be
sold -to others.574  In any event, the case emphasizes the -need for careful
draftsmanship in formulating successive options and for being certain the
parties decide beforehand what action should be taken if not all the shares
offered are purchased. 575
The second opinion, Gulf States Abrasive Manufacturing, Inc. v. Oertel,576
focused mainly on the validity of the issuance of shares.5 77 Part of the case,
however, conerned -the value of the shares in question. The dispute cen-
tered on a determination by a master appointed by agreement that the
shares were worth two dollars each when a bylaw of the corporation stipu-
lated that the price to be paid a shareholder for his shares upon death, in-
capacity, or separation from his duties with the corporation was to be "a
minimum of ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) per share. '5 78 The court upheld the
master's valuation of the stock as not in conflict with the bylaw, since as it
sensibly concluded, the bylaw established a minimum price but made no
provision for determining how much more than that amount could be pa-id. 579
573. 485 S.W.2d at 835-36. The court set out what it considered the unambiguous
meaning of the bylaw provision to be, quoting the Texas Supreme Court's synopsis of
the general rules regarding construction of unambiguous written instruments in City of
Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Co., 432 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. 1968).
574. See, e.g., Coleman v. Kettering, 289 S.W.2d 953, 957-58 (Tex. Civ. App.--Gal-
veston 1956) (text of agreement granting successive options set out in full); 20 R. HAM-
ILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 683, at 173-74.
575. 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 7.22; cf. W. PAINTER, CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATIONS 93; C. ROHRLICH, supra note 88, § 4.25. For a somewhat comparable
case see Helmly v. Schulz, 219 Ga. 201, 131 S.E.2d 924 (1963) (offer to sell to stock-
holders pursuant to first option restriction in bylaws; court holds all shareholders must
buy their proportionate share and hence offer not accepted by single shareholder saying
he would buy his share and all stock not taken by others). Cf. Alkire v. Dugan Drug
Stores, Inc., 468 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971), error ref.
n.r.e., discussed in Lebowitz, supra note 131, at 155.
576. 489 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
577. Plaintiff sued the corporation for conversion of 25,000 shares he claimed had
been wrongfully cancelled. The corporation asserted the shares had been improperly is-
sued because their consideration had been a promissory note executed by the plaintiff
in the corporation's favor in violation of TEx. CONST. art. XII, § 6 and TEX. Bus. CORP.
ACT ANN. art. 2.16(B) (1956). 489 S.W.2d at 185. The jury, however, found that
the shares had been issued for the plaintiff's work in organizing the corporation and get-
ting its product on the market and plaintiff was awarded judgment on that basis. The
corporation tried to invoke judicial estoppel to overturn the judgment because the plain-
tiff had alleged under oath in a federal tax court proceeding that he had not received
the shares in the taxable year in question or that if he had they were not compensation
or income. But the corporation had failed to plead judicial estoppel, an affirmative de-
fense, and though the plaintiff had not objected to the admission of a certified copy of
his sworn petition in the tax proceeding, the appellate court determined this did not indi-
cate the issue was tried with his consent. Id. at 186-87.
578. 489 S.W.2d at 187.
579. The problem of determining the value of stock in a close corporation is a diffi-
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The third case, Hall v. Weller, Hall & Jeffery, Inc.,5 0 is likewise dis-
cussed more extensively elsewhere as an important holding on the extent of
a corporation's power to repurchase shares pursuant to a buy-sell agree-
ment.58' The agreement provided that to the extent the corporation
might be prevented by law from purchasing all or any portion of the stock
obligated to be sold to it, the remaining shareholders would then have
to purchase the portion not bought by the corporation. Although the ap-
pellate court ruled the trial court erred in ordering the corporation to buy the
plaintiff's shares under the agreement in view of its financial position, it
required that this aspect of the agreement be carried out by the remaining
shareholders after the amount they were obligated to buy -was determined
upon remand.582
IV. SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS
American law vests shareholders with a number of rights,583 but not all
are absolute. If the articles of incorporation so provide rights, for example,
to elect directors,584 participate equitably in the distribution of dividends, 58 5
or purchase a pro rata part of any new offering of shares for cash,""" may
be limited. Others, such as rights to inspect corporate records if for a proper
purpose,587 resort to the appraisal remedy if dissenting to mergers or simi-
law combinations,5 s or vote on fundamental changes in the corporation's
structure8 9 or continuation of its existence,590 generally cannot be abridged
except as provided by law.
The degree to which shareholders' rights should be curtailed has been
the subject of continuing debate, depending largely on whether viewed from
the vantage point of management or outside investors, and often couched
in terms of corporate democracy versus managerial autonomy in fulfilling the
cult one at best since there is no public market for such shares. Some method of valua-
tion should therefore be decided upon by the close corporation participants beforehand,
preferably by a more certain method than used in this case. See generally 7 Z. CAVITCH,
supra note 21, § 148.04; 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 678; 1
HORNSTEIN § 196; 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 7.24-.24g; W. PAINTER,
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS 93-96; see, e.g., Blackstone, Robinson, Harvey & Shiach,
How To Put a Price on a Close Corporation, DIGEST OF TAX ARTICLES, Oct. 1971, at
43; Butala, Valuation of Securities of Closely Held Corporations, 14 W. RES. L. REV.
193 (1963); Page, Setting the Price in a Close Corporation Buy-Sell Agreement, 57
MICH. L. REV. 655 (1959).
580. 497 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
581. In brief, the trial court had ordered the corporation to repurchase the plaintiff's
shares under the agreement although the amount it adjudged he was entitled to be paid
therefor in the form of a promissory note far exceeded the total of the corporation's
stated capital and surplus. The court of civil appeals reversed because the repurchase
contravened the permissible limits on the corporation's right to reacquire its own shares
delineated in the TBCA. Id. at 376-77. This aspect of the case will be developed more
fully in the second half of this survey when published.
582. Id. at 377.
583. See 5 Z. CAvITCH, supra note 21, § 108.04, and 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
CORPORATIONS § 5717 for lists of shareholder's rights.
584. See, e.g., TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.12(A) (1956), 2.29(A)(1)(a)
(Supp. 1974).
585. See, e.g., id. arts. 2.12(B) (2), (3) (Supp. 1974), 2.38(A) (1956).
586. See, e.g., id. art. 2.22-1(A) (Supp. 1974).
587. See, e.g., id. art. 2.44(B).
588. See, e.g., id. arts. 5.11-.13.
589. See, e.g., id. arts. 5.03(B), 5.10(A)(3).
590. See, e.g., id. art. 6.03(A)(3).
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corporation's role in a modern capitalistic society. 591 The TIBCA tradi-
tionally has attempted to strike a balance between the interests of the two
groups 592 (where they do not coalesce as in the close corporation), and
the 1973 amendments which concern shareholders continue -that pattern.
Some, particularly the amendments dealing with inspection of corporate
records, 593 cumulative voting,59 4 and management in defined close corpora-
tions, 595 are designed to strengthen their rights. Others that, for example,
permit a reduction in the percentage needed for shareholder approval of
certain matters from two-thirds to a majority or greater vote, 96 or that
grant the board the primary power to amend !the bylaws697 or enlarge its
powers to enter into corporate guaranties 598  or repurchase shares,5 99
clearly give management greater freedom of action. Still others, particularly
the amendments redefining preemptive rights600 and relating to shareholders'
derivative suits601 both enlarge and contract the rights shareholders previ-
ously had.
Many of the 1973 amendments that affect shareholders' rights have al-
ready been commented upon, including those dealing with voting,60 2 re-
591. The literature on the corporation's role in modem society and the parts that
should be played by management and shareholders in ordering its affairs is extensive
and continues to grow in both serious and popular form. See, e.g., A. BERLE & G.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1968) (the seminal
work in this area); A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUr PROPERTY (1959); CARY 229; F. EMER-
SON & F. LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY (1954); M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM (1962); J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); A. JAY, MANAGE-
MENT AND MACHIAVELLI (1967); J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER (1958);
H. MANNE & H. WALLICH, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1972); THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY (E. Mason ed. 1959); M. MINTZ & J.
COHEN, AMERICA, INC. (1971); D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW 1 (1973); Dodd,
For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Garrett,
Attitudes on Corporate Democracy-A Critical Analysis, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 310
(1956); Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 399 (1962). See HENN 4 n.9 for a more detailed bibliography.
592. As noted earlier, see note 11 supra, the TBCA as originally enacted was based
on the 1950 version of the Model Business Corporation Act which, according to its
draftsmen, was "designed on the premise that a corporation statute, properly drawn,
could and should serve equally the requirements of large and small corporations and the
fair treatment of the shareholders of each." I ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. §
1, 4.02 (1960). See also Campbell, The Model Business Corporation Act, 11 Bus.
LAW. 98, 100 (1956). Over the years, the Model Act has become more permissive in
granting greater managerial discretion and flexibility. See HENN 22 n.40; cf. Eisenberg,
The Model Business Corporation Act and the Model Business Corporation Act Anno-
tated, 29 Bus. LAW. 1407 (1974) (trenchant criticism of methodology used in drafting
the Model Act). Some of the 1973 TBCA amendments reflect this trend, but in general
the TBCA still remains more protective of shareholders' rights than the current Model
Act and considerably more so than the ultra-permissive Delaware law.
593. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.44(B)-(D), (F) (Supp. 1974).
594. Id. arts. 2.29(D), 2.32.
595. Id. arts. 2.30-1 (B), 2.30-2(A)(1), (8).
596. Id. art. 9.08.
597. Id. art. 2.23.
598. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06(B) (Supp. 1974).
599. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.03(D) (Supp. 1974). Before its amendment,
section (D) provided that any repurchase of shares to the extent of unrestricted capital
or reduction surplus available therefor had to be approved by the vote of two-thirds of
the holders of each class of shares. As amended, that power now can be conferred on
the directors if the articles permit, but otherwise the same shareholders' vote is required.
600. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.22-1 (Supp. 1974).
601. Id. art. 5.14.
602. See discussion in text accompanying notes 206-96 supra.
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moval of directors, 0 3 amendment of bylaws,60 4 and reporting of financial
data. 605 In particular, the new close corporation statutes give shareholders
of a defined close corporation sweeping yet optional powers of manage-
ment 6 6 and almost complete freedom of contract to operate the corpora-
tion as if it were a partnership.60 7 In addition, the same statutes, along
with other amendments previously noted, have broadened the actions share-
holders can bring to enforce or protect their individual or collective rights.
Thus shareholders in a defined close corporation may institute litigation to
preserve the close corporation's status6 8 or gain appointment of a provi-
sional director to resolve a deadlock situation.60 9 Similarly, any shareholder
may sue to prevent the making of a guaranty not reasonably expected to
benefit the corporation, or if made, to hold the directors accountable there-
for,6 10 or, in another context, to apply for summary relief if the annual
meeting has not been held within thirteen months.61 There remain, how-
ever, four amendments that have made significant changes in the law relat-
ing to shareholders' preemptive rights and rights to inspect corporate rec-
ords, dissent, or institute derivative actions.
Right of Inspection. One of the most fundamental rights a shareholder has
as an ultimate owner of his corporation's property and assets is to be able
to inspect its books and records at reasonable times to determine its
financial condition, check on its general state of affairs and management,
or ascertain who the other shareholders are in order to protect his own or
the corporation's overall interests. 612 The right is one almost universAlly
recognized in American common law613 and has been confirmed in the
statutory law of virtually all the states.61 4  Even prior to the adoption
of the TBCA, Texas recognized the right by statute, seemingly in absolute
terms. 615 Nevertheless, 'because of the discretionary nature of manda-
603. See discussion in text accompanying notes 426-45 supra.
604. See discussion in text accompanying notes 61-68 supra.
605. See discuss'on in text accompanying notes 503-11 supra.
606. See text accompanying notes 535-37 supra.
607. See text accompanying notes 538-41 supra.
608. See text accompanying note 534 supra.
609. See text accompanying notes 544-50 supra.
610. See discussion in text accompanying notes 90-146 supra.
611. See discussion in text accompanying notes 190-98 supra.
612. See, e.g., HENN 395; 2 HORNSTEIN §§ 611-20; LATTIN 344; Newman, Inspection
of Stock Ledgers and Voting Lists, 16 Sw. L.J. 439 (1962); Starr & Schmidt, Inspection
Rights of Corporate Stockholders: Toward a More Effective Statutory Model, 26 U.
FLA. L.J. 173 (1974); Comment, Shareholders' Right to Inspection of Corporate Stock
Ledger, 4 CONN. L. REV. 707 (1972); Comment, "Proper Purpose" for Inspection of
Corporate Stock Ledger, 1970 DuKE L.J. 393.
613. 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 2213-14. At English common
law, the right did not arise unless there was a dispute between the shareholder and cor-
poration. LATTIN 344.
614. See ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 52, 3.01-.04; 6 Z. CAVITCH,
supra note 21, § 116.04; 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 2215-15.1 for
various summaries of and references to applicable state statutes.
615. Ch. 97, § 21, [1874] Tex. Laws 120 (last codified as TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 1328 (1945)), repealed, ch. 229, § 1, [1961] Tex. Laws 458. "[The directors]
shall cause a record to be kept of all stock subscribed and transferred, and of all business
transactions. Their books and records shall at all reasonable times be open to the in-
spection of any stockholder." The statutory right has been said to be absolute. Moore
v. Rock Creek Oil Corp., 59 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933), judgment
adopted; see 2 I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS 513. But cf. Guaranty Old Time Life
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mus, regarded as the only remedy available for the enforcement of this
right,6 16 its availability depended in the final analysis on whether a court
could be convinced that the shareholder making the demand was not acting
in good faith or for a proper purpose.61 7 The burden of proof to show im-
proper purpose rested, however, with the corporation (or other defend-
ants); to make a prima facie case the shareholder merely had to allege his
interest as a shareholder and the corporation's refusal to allow inspection
after a proper demand.618
The TBCA as adopted in 1955 also recognized the shareholder's right of
inspection in article 2.44,610 a much more detailed provision taken mainly
from the Model Act. 20  Yet despite some apparently more restrictive
language due to greater specificity as to the books and records subject to ex-
amination,6 21 no real change was effected in the law except in one very
Co. v. McCallum, 97 S.W.2d 966, 967 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1936); Dreyfuss & Son
v. Benson, 239 S.W. 347, 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1922), error ref.; Roberts v.
Munroe, 193 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1917), error dismissed.
616. Moore v. Rock Creek Oil Corp., 59 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933),judgment adopted; Dreyfuss & Son v. Benson, 239 S.W. 347, 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dal-
las 1922), error ref.; see R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 809; 2 I.
HILDEBRAND, TEXAS COaPoRATIONs 515; Comment, Shareholder Inspection Rights, 12
Sw. L.J. 61, 80 (1958).
617. Moore v. Rock Creek Oil Corp., 59 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933),judgment adopted. The propriety of the purpose for which a shareholder seeks to assert
his inspection right is one that courts sometimes disagree upon since there must be some
balancing between the shareholder's interest in seeking information and the corporation's
interest in keeping from being harassed or even injured by unwarranted demands. See
20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 804, at 337 n.34. In general, the
Texas courts have taken a fairly liberal view of the proper purpose requirement. For
example, inspection has been upheld even where the purpose has been to determine if
there have been bad management practices, Grayburg Oil Co. v. Jarratt, 16 S.W.2d 319,
320 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1929), or to find something that might alarm the other
shareholders as to the corporation's financial condition, Moore v. Rock Creek Oil Corp.,
supra. Nor does it matter, as the Moore case states, that the shareholder seeking in-
spection is on unfriendly terms with the company. Id. On the other hand, if the in-
spection is for purposes of aiding a competitor, see Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co. v. Lough-
ridge, 425 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. 1968), discussed in Amsler, supra note 124, at 106, or to
defraud the corporation, see Roberts v. Munroe, 193 S.W. 734, 736-37 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1917), error dismissed, or to obtain a list of shareholders for resale for commer-
cial purposes, cf. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.44(C) (Supp. 1974), relief by way
of mandamus will undoubtedly be denied. For a general discussion and listing of proper
and improper purposes, see CARY 1020; 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 116.02; 5 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 2222-2226.4.
618. Moore v. Rock Creek Oil Corp., 59 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933),judgment adopted; Dreyfus & Son v. Benson, 293 S.W. 347, 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1922); see 2 I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS § 565, at 513; Comment, supra note
616, at 76.
619. Ch. 64, art. 2.44, [1955] Tex. Laws 239, as amended, TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 2.44 (Supp. 1974).
620. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 46 (1953) (now ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. 2d, § 52). When considered by the original draftsmen of the TBCA, the Model
Act provision contained five paragraphs that, respectively, established the general re-
quirement that books and records be kept, gave a shareholder who met certain require-
ments the right to inspect upon reasonable demand, imposed a penalty for refusal, saved
rights of other shareholders to enforce inspection right upon proof of proper purpose,
and required that financial data be sent out upon request. The TBCA draftsmen used
only the first, second, and fourth paragraphs as sections (A), (B), and (C) respectively,
of article 2.44. The 1973 amendment in essence has picked up the two missing para-
graphs but with some modifications. See notes 499, 503 supra, and notes 626-35, 647.
49 inf ra.
621. Whereas the former law permitted access to all "books and records," the TBCA,
again using Model Act language, refers to "books and records of account, minutes,
and record of shareholders." TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.44(B) (1956). Al-
though this listing has been further modified by the requirement that all such records
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important respect. A shareholder who had not owned his shares for at
least six months prior to making his demand or who did not own at least
five percent of the outstanding shares would not be required to prove a
proper purpose for his demand if he sought judicial aid to compel inspec-
tion.62 2  Indeed, even a shareholder who satisfied the six-months or five-
percent requirement had to state the purpose for seeking inspection in a
written demand therefor and his right, too, was conditioned on the propriety
of the demand, but there was no specification that he had to prove the
same. 623  The net effect, therefore, was to shift the burden of pleading and
proving proper purpose to the shareholder if he had very recently acquired
a small percentage of shares, and at least the burden of allegation with re-
spect to any other shareholder. 624
Article 2.44 was amended in several respects in 1973,625 but none of the
changes affected the allocation of pleading and proof just described. Even
so, one of the three new sections that have been added to the article 626 may
well make the whole matter academic in many situations. The section is
designed to discourage a refusal based on the usual reason for which an in-
spection demand is improperly turned down, i.e., management's decision
that the shareholder making the demand, however proper his purpose oth-
erwise, is either hostile (to themselves) or simply pestiferous and therefore
justifies resort to the delaying tactic of putting him to the time and expense
of litigation to enforce his right.6 27 Thus, to make it unlikely that a reason-
be "relevant" to the purposes of the demand, id. art. 2.44(B) (Supp. 1974), it is doubtful
either limiting phraseology would more seriously curtail the scope of inspection once or-
dered by the court than under the former law. See, e.g., Johnson Ranch Royalty Co.
v. Hickey, 31 S.W.2d 150, 151-52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1930), error ref., permit-
ting inspection of "record books, books of account, receipts, vouchers, bills, papers, and
all other documents in any way evidencing the financial condition of the corporation."
See generally 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 804, at 335; Com-
ment, supra note 616, at 62.
622. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.44(C) (1956) (now art. 2.44(D)). Such
shareholder presumably could only examine the records himself, thus not including ex-
amination by attorney or agent or the making of extracts therefrom as permitted other
shareholders in art. 2.44(B), but again it is doubtful a Texas court would so limit his
inspection.
623. Ch. 64, art. 2.44(B), [1955) Tex. Laws 239, TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
2.44(B) (1956).
624. Professor Hamilton believes, and quite correctly, that the absence of the phrase
"upon proof by a shareholder" in section B can only mean that at most the shareholder
whose ownership meets the requirement of that section must allege a proper purpose and
therefore the corporation must continue to prove the absence of such purpose. 20 R.
HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 804, at 334; see Texas Infra-Red Radiant
Co. v. Erwin, 397 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965), error ref. n.r.e.,
discussed in Pelletier, supra note 133, at 152, noted in 19 Sw. L.J. 851 (1965); cf. Sierk,
Shareholders' Rights Under Texas Business Corporation Act, 26 TEx. B.J. 25 (1963).
This view is also consistent with that expressed in Moore v. Rock Creek Oil Corp., 59
S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933), judgment adopted, that when the inspection
right is conferred by statute, the effect is to change the common law rule requiring the
shareholder to establish that he is asking for inspection in good faith and for an honest
purpose to one requiring the corporation to show he is actuated by corrupt or unlawful
motives. See also Comment, supra note 616, at 76.
625. Ch. 545, § 26, [1973] Tex. Laws, amending TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art.
2.44 (1956) (codified at TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.44 (Supp. 1974)).
626. TEx. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.44(C) (Supp. 1974). The section is new and
supplants former section C wh;ch has been redesignated as section D. Comment
of Bar Committee to Art. 2.44, 3A TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 104 (Supp. 1974).
627. See, e.g., R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 809; N. LAT-IN, COR-
PORATIONS 347; Starr & Schmidt, supra note 612, at 176.
1974]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
able request of inspection will be refused, 628 a corporation that refuses to al-
low an examination of or the taking of an extract from its books and records
for a proper purpose by a shareholder of record for at least six months
prior to his demand or who owns at least five percent of the outstanding
shares will be liable for all costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees, in-
curred in enforcing his inspection right, in addition to any other damages
or remedy he can recover. 629 This deterrent is in lieu of the monetary pen-
alties suggested in the Model Act6 30 or provided for in other statutes,631 but
has been employed in a few states.6 3 2 It is also consistent with the similar
sanction that can be imposed on a shareholder who brings a derivative ac-
tion without reasonable cause, 633 presumably on the premise that what is
sauce for the goose should be sauce for the gander. The corporation 634
can assert as a defense, however, that the shareholder has sold or offered
for sale a list of shareholders of the corporation or any other corporation
within the last two years or has aided or abetted others in procuring such
lists, or has improperly used information obtained as the result of any prior
inspection, or, somewhat redundantly, was not acting in good faith or for a
628. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.44, 3A TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. 104
(Supp. 1974).
629. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.44(C) (Supp. 1974).
630. The Model Act makes an officer, agent, or the corporation which refuses to let
the shareholder examine or make extracts from its records, for any proper purpose, liable
to the shareholder or the holder of a voting trust certificate for a penalty of 10% of
the value of the holder's shares or beneficial interest. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. 2d, § 52. See Starr & Schmidt, supra note 612, at 178, for a discussion of the
Model Act 10% penalty provision.
631. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 31, § 5-17 (1963) (10% of value); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 608.39(2) (1956) ($50 for each day of neglect or refusal); IDAHO CODE§ 30-144.14 (1967) (10% of value); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.45 (Supp. 1974)(10% of value); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.47 (Supp. 1974) (10% of value but no more
than $500); Ky. REv. STAT. § 271A.260(3) (Supp. 1972) ($500 penalty); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 351.215.2 (1966) ($250 penalty); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2050 (Supp. 1972)(10% of value); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.71d (1953) ($50 penalty); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 7-1.1-46 (1970) (10% of value); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-717(3) (Supp. 1973)($50 penalty); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1896(c) (1973) (10% of value). Fifteen
states have adopted the Model Act penal provision. Starr & Schmidt, supra note 612,
at 175 n.17. For a recent case interpreting the Colorado version of the Model Act
ten-percent penalty, see Wood, Walker & Co..v. Evans, 461 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1972).
632. See GA. CODE ANN. § 22-613(d) (1970); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:172D(1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 626.5C (1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.§ 15-2246 (repl. vol. 1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-717(3) (Supp. 1974). Maine also
allows the recovery of punitive damages equal to 10% of the value of shares if the court
finds the refusal to permit inspection was in bad faith. See Starr & Schmidt, supra
note 612, at 187, for a discussion of such statutes.
633. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT aNN. arts. 5.14(A) (2), (F) (Supp. 1974).
634. It will be noted that only the corporation is liable for the payment of all costs
and expenses to the shareholder, and not also the officer or agent responsible for the
wrongful refusal. Most state statutes and the Model Act also subject these officials to
the penalties they prescribe. See note 631 supra. While presumably the responsible of-
ficer or agent would be named as a defendant to the mandamus action to compel inspec-
tion, see 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 809-11; L. LOWE, supra
note 192, § 303, at 308 n.62, § 352, the net effect of the provision is to require the
corporation to also be made a party if recovery of costs and expenses are being sought
against it. Compare TBCA art. 2.27(C) making the officer or agent in charge of pre-
paring the list of shareholders eligible to vote at a meeting who fails to prepare the list
or keep it open for inspection liable to a shareholder for the damages caused thereby.
But if his failure was due to lack of timely notification of the meeting's date, then only
the corporation becomes liable to the shareholder. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.27(C) (1956).
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proper purpose in making his demand. 633 Although the statute does not
say so expressly, this listing of reasons for denying recovery of costs could
also be grounds for denying the award of mandamus to compel inspection
in the first place.
63 6
Several other changes should also be noted. One makes it clear that the
shareholder may utilize an accountant as well as an attorney or other agent to
assist him in making his examination, 637 as had been held in an earlier
case. 638  Another limits the books and records that can be inspected to those
that are "relevant, '6 3 9 with the obvious purpose of curtailing mere fishing ex-
peditions and thus may narrow the rather expansive view of propriety of
purpose stated in Moore v. Rock Creek Oil Corp.,640 the leading pre-TBCA
opinion on inspection rights, where the commission of appeals found no
reason to deny examination of the corporation's records simply because
shareholders "hope to find something alarming in the affairs of the com-
pany, which they intend to communicate to other stockholders."' 641  On the
other hand, given enough imagination in formulating the purpose for mak-
ing the demand, relevancy is not likely to become a serious obstacle.
The third group of changes relates to beneficial owners of shares. Prior to
the 1973 amendments, it was not at all certain such owners had any right
of inspection, 64 2 because article 2.44 spoke only in terms of inspection
rights of "record" holders of shares. Nevertheless, a 1965 civil appeals de-
cision6 43 held that a divorced wife' who had received a ten percent benefi-
cial interest in a corporation's shares as part of the divorce had a common
law right to inspect its books upon proof of proper purpose. Despite its
questionable construction of then article 2.44(C) ,644 the court's ruling has
635. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.44(C) (Supp. 1974). The defenses are listed
as defenses "to any action for penalties under this section." Technically, the award of
costs and expenses to the successful plaintiff is not a penalty; the language is taken from
the Model Act section which does impose a 10% penalty, see note 630 supra, and should
be changed to reflect the nature of the cause of action given the shareholder under the
Texas section. See 20 R. HAMLTON, TEXAS BusINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 809, n.63.10
(Supp. 1974). See also Starr & Schmidt, supra note 612, at 184.
636. See, e.g., State ex rel. Theile v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. 514, 115 A. 773 (1922)
(inspection denied where shareholder who owned only one share of stock was in business
of selling shareholders lists); accord Chas. A. Day & Co. v. Booth, 123 Me. 443, 123
A. 557 (1924).
637. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.44(B), (C) (Supp. 1974).
638. See Johnson Ranch Royalty Co. v. Hickey, 31 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Amarillo 1930), error ref. (shareholder may use any duly authorized agent, including
attorney, accountant, or stenographer); see Comment, supra note 616, at 66. See gen-
erally 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2233.
639. See note 621 supra.
640. 59 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933), judgment adopted.
641. Id. at 818. The court added: "If in truth and in fact no alarming condition
exists, presumably it will not be found through any examination . . . . If there be ex-
istent anything in the financial affairs of the company which would be reasonably cal-
culated to alarm the stockholders in general, we see no reason why plaintiffs in error
could not properly communicate such fact to the other stockholders. The stockholders
of a corporation are the beneficial owners of the corporate property, and are therefore
vitally interested in knowing the true condition of its affairs." Id. at 818-19.
642. See Comment, supra note 616, at 72. The law elsewhere is also uncertain with
some courts or statutes allowing beneficial owners the inspection right and others not.
See generally 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2230, at 862; LATrIN 350.
643. Texas Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Erwin, 397 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1965), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Pelletier, supra note 133, at 152, noted in 19
Sw. L.J. 851 (1965).
644. Despite the precise language of then section C of article 2.44 (now section
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now been codified so that a beneficial owner, as well as the shareholder
who does not meet the time or percentage of ownership requirement, may
seek judicial enforcement of his inspection right if he sustains the burden
of alleging and proving the propriety of his purpose in demanding inspec-
tion. 645  He cannot, however, recover costs and expenses for a wrongful re-
fusal, because recovery of that penalty is limited to record holders who
satisfy the test.6 40 On the other hand, a holder of a beneficial interest in a
voting trust that complies with the TBCA6 47 is considered a holder of rec-
ord of the shares underlying his beneficial interest for all purposes of arti-
cle 2.44648 (including the right to receive financial data if requested).6 49 As
a consequence, whether he can enforce the inspection right without proof
of proper purpose or recover the costs and expenses of a lawsuit if his
proper demand has been refused will also depend, as in the case of a record
holder, on the currency and size of his beneficial interest in relation to the
shares represented thereby. 50 Why the two types of beneficial ownership
are treated differently is not at all clear, especially since beneficial own-
ership, particularly when shares are held in a street name, 651 is much more
common than participation in a voting trust. The obvious purpose of dif-
ferentiating between recent and longer or more substantial stockholdings in-
sofar as allocating the burden of proof of proper purpose or imposing sanc-
D) which allowed a shareholder who could prove a proper purpose to compel the pro-
duction of corporate records for examination regardless of the period of time during
which he had been "a shareholder of record, and irrespective of the number of shares
held by him" (emphasis added), Tax. Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. art. 2.44(C) (1956) the
court construed the languge to read that although the plaintiff was not a shareholder
"of record," she could be granted the right of inspection simply on proof of proper pur-
pose, since the purpose of section C was to save the common law right of inspection
available upon such proof. Texas Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Ervin, 397 S.W.2d 491, 493
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965), error ref. n.r.e. This, of course, is contrary not only
to what the section said, but also assumed that the common law accorded the right to
beneficial owners, another questionable proposition, see note 642 supra. See generally
20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 804, at 334 n.19 (Supp. 1974);
Pelletier, supra note 133, at 152.
645. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.44(D) (Supp. 1974). The amendment still
leaves uncertain whether such beneficial owners or holders of record who do not meet
the time or percentage of holdings requirement may be assisted by an attorney, account-
ant, or agent or make extracts from the records, as shareholders who meet the require-
ment are permitted to do. See note 622 supra.
646. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.44(C) (Supp. 1974); see 20 R. HAMILTON,
TEXAS BUSINEsS ORGANIZATIONS § 804, at 33 n.19 (Supp. 1974).
647. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30(A) (1956). The voting trust can last no
longer than 10 years and a counterpart must be deposited with the corporation at its
registered office where it is subject to examination either by shareholders or holders of
a beneficial interest in the voting trust.
648. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.44(F) (Supp. 1974). The equation of the
voting trust certificate holder with a record holder is taken from the Model Act which,
however, does not have the separate provision but refers to both types of holders in tan-
dem throughout section 52. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 52.
649. See Tax. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.44(E) (Supp. 1974), discussed in text
at notes 503-11 supra.
650. But cf. 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 804 (Supp. 1974),
indicating voting trust certificate holders are to be treated as other beneficial owners in-
sofar as inspection rights are concerned. But this is not completely accurate, as a fair
reading of section F and its Model Act source will show.
651. Technically, there may not be the division of ownership between legal and equit-
able title as in a trust when a customer's shares are held by a broker in his street name,
but rather either an agency or pledge relationship, depending on whether the shares are
being thus carried as a matter of convenience or have been hypothecated in a margin
account. See HENN 361.
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tions for an improper refusal is to discourage a potential strike suiter from
buying a share or two of stock in order to start fishing immediately for a
potential basis for litigation; therefore, a classification designed to accom-
plish that objective rather than one based on the form of beneficial owner-
ship would make far more sense.
Finally, note should be taken that article 2.44 is not the only statutory
source for the shareholder's inspection right. For example, other provisions
of the TBCA give the shareholder the right to inspect the list of shareholders
entitled to vote at a forthcoming meeting652 or to examine the counter-
part of any voting trust agreement 653 or voting agreement 654 required to be
deposited with the corporation. And, under the 1973 amendments, there
are other documents he may inspect such as a written agreement among any
member of shareholders and the corporation imposing restrictions on the
transfer or registration of transfer of securities655 or an agreement among all
the shareholders of a defined close corporation sanctioned by article 2.30-2
that has been set out or incorporated by reference in the bylaws, as well as
the applicable bylaw. 65 6 Moreover, if the legend on the share certificate so
states, the shareholder may upon written request to the corporation at its
registered office or principal place of business be furnished with a copy of
(1) any provision of the articles of incorporation (a) setting out the designa-
tions, preferences, limitations and relative rights of each class of shares or var-
iations in the relative rights and preferences of each series of shares if there
are any; 65 7 (b) limiting or denying preemptive rights; 656 or (c) in the case
of a defined close corporation, giving shareholders an option to dissolve
the corporation; 659 (2) any document imposing restrictions on the transfer
of securities; 660 or (3) any agreement among all the shareholders of a de-
fined close corporation or a bylaw of which it has been made a part. 661
652. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.27(A) (1956).
653. Id. art. 2.30(A).
654. Id. art. 2.30(B). Interestingly, the counterpart of a voting trust agreement must
be filed in the registered office whereas the voting agreement counterpart is to be filed
at the corporation's principal office. By contrast, the 1973 amendments, referred to in
notes 655-61 infra, require the deposit of counterparts of documents at, or requests for
copies of such or other documents to be made to, the corporation's registered office and
principal place of business. Contrast also TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. arts. 5.12(B) and
5.16(E) (4) (Supp. 1974), laying venue for a dissenter's appraisal action in the county
where the principal office is located, with id. arts. 2.30-3(A) and 2.30-4(A) (Supp.
1974), placing venue for actions to preserve a defined close corporation's status or to
seek appointment of a provisional director of such a corporation in the county where
the principal place of business is located. Presumably in all these statutes, principal of-
fice and principal place of business should mean the same. The former term is undoubt-
edly derived from Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subd. 23 (1964) (permitting
venue to be maintained against domestic corporations, inter alia, "in the county in which
its principal office is situated," a location sometimes described as the corporation's
"domicile," see Vines v. Harry Newton, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 260, 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1969), error dismissed, whereas the latter is derived from TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 2.09(A)(1) (1956) stating that the registered office can but need not be the
same as its place of business.
655. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.19(B) (Supp. 1974).
656. Id. art. 2.30-2(B).
657. Id. art. 2.19(B)(1).
658. Id. art. 2.19(B)(2).
659. Id. art. 2.30-5(B).
660. Id. art. 2.19(G)(3).
661. Id. art. 2.30-2(C).
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Outside the TBCA, the general tax statutes likewise permit a shareholder to
examine his corporation's annual franchise tax returns filed with the comp-
troller of public accounts .62
Shareholders' Derivative and Other Actions. The principal weapon a
minority shareholder can wield to be certain that management adheres to its
fiducial duties and responsibilities has long been the derivative action in
which the shareholder sues to enforce a corporate claim the directors will
not prosecute, often because it lies against themselves.66 3 While the deriva-
tive suit is recognized in Texas, 6 4 much of the law relating to the action has
remained uncertain. There are at least two reasons for this unsettled state
of affairs.
First, and somewhat surprisingly considering the large growth in corpo-
rate enterprises over the past few decades, there has been very little deriva-
tive litigation in this state. 665 As a consequence, the Texas courts have
had few opportunities to formulate or decide upon the characteristics of, or
requirements for, the action here.
Secondly, the statutory law has not been very helpful. Unlike its present
federal counterpart, 66 6 the Texas rule speaks only of certain class actions
that are "joint, or common or secondary in the sense that the owner of the
primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby
becomes entitled to enforce it.'' 667 The primary effect of this categoriza-
662. TEX. TAX.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.10 (1969). Any bona fide shareholder owning
one or more shares can examine the reports upon presentation of evidence of ownership
to the Comptroller, but apparently the information gained cannot be disclosed or used
except in the course of a judicial proceeding to which a bona fide shareholder is a party.
Improper disclosure can constitute a misdemeanor punishable by a fine up to $1,000 or
confinement in jail not in excess of one year or both. Id. art. 12.10A (Supp. 1974).
663. The literature on shareholders' derivative suits is quite large. See generally, e.g.,
6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, §§ 119.01-.08; 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORA-
TIONS §§ 5937-6045; HENN §§ 358-80; 2 HORNSTEIN §§ 711-34; LATTIN §§ 103-16;Block, Current Critical Points in Stockholder Litigation, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 181 (1967);Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74 (1967); Hornstein,
Shareholder's Derivative Suit in the United States, 1967 Bus. LAw. 282; Hornstein, TheFuture of Corporate Control, 63 HARv. L. REV. 476 (1950); Hornstein, New Aspects
of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1947). See 2 ABA MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, at 71 for a comprehensive bibliography.
664. See, e.g., Pratt-Hewit Oil Corp. v. Hewit, 122 Tex. 38, 43-44, 52 S.W.2d 64, 65(1932); Evans v. Brandon, 53 Tex. 56, 60 (1880) (dictum); Barthold v. Thomas, 210S.W. 506, 507 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919), holding approved; Providential Inv. Corp. v.Dibrell, 320 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959). See generally 20 R.
HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 831-44; 3 I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPO-
RATIONS §§ 761-75; Comment, Shareholder's Derivative Suits in Texas: Possible Restric-
tions on Their Abuse, 36 TEXAS L. REV. 641 (1958).
665. 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 832, at 352; Comment,
supra note 664, at 641 n.2.
666. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. Derivative suits were formerly dealt with in rule 23, be-fore its amendment in 1966, as a secondary class action, but were thought to deserve
separate treatment because their distinctive aspects required special provisions. Note of
Advisory Committee on Rule 23.1 (1966) in 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE23.1.01[61 (1974). See generally id. 23.1.1-23.1.15; 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1821 (1972).
667. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(1). The Texas rule is derived from federal rule 23, be-fore its amendment; however, a section dealing with secondary actions by shareholders
contained in the original federal rule as rule 23(b), see J. MOORE, supra note 666,23.01[1], although made part of the Texas rule when first adopted, was deleted by
amendment in 1941, "because it was thought to apply to a jurisdictional mischief appli-
cable to the Federal courts and inapplicable to the Texas courts." Stayton, The New
Rules: Analysis of Changes, 4 TEX. B.J. 667 (1941). There appears to have been no
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tion of the derivative suit as a class action 668 is to require the court's ap-
proval before one is dismissed or compromised. 669
The TBCA up until 1973 furnished very little more guidance. A share-
holder was authorized to bring a representative suit, as it was termed, against
incumbent or former officers and directors for having engaged in acts that
were ultra vires or contravened limits placed on their authority in the arti-
cles of incorporation. 670  In 1965 a security for expenses statute was
added to the Act671 that in essence required a plaintiff in a derivative suit to
secure the corporate defendant for reasonable expenses, including attorneys'
fees, of its own or of other defendants that were indemnifiable, unless he
owned shares of a required percentage or value. 672 Its purpose ostensibly
was to curtail so-called "strike" suits,6 73 although given the paucity of such
litigation in Texas that had hardly seemed a problem before, and was justly
criticized for not discriminating between such suits and legitimate share-
holders' actions. 674 But beyond these -two provisions nothing more was said.
The net result was that Texas law remained in doubt as to such aspects
of derivative litigation as the need for making a demand on the share-
holders if the directors would not sue;675 whether the shareholder was re-
discussion of the rule by the Texas courts in conjunction with shareholders' derivative
suits. See TEx. R. ANN., rule 42 (1967); 1 R. MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE §
3.34.1, at 344 (rev. vol. 1965).
668. In a sense, a derivative action is a type of class suit in that the plaintiff usually
also represents all other shareholders similarly situated who are indirectly affected by
the corporation's failure to prosecute its cause of action. At the same time, the share-
holder may bring a class action to enforce an individual right that also belongs to other
members of his class, such as a suit to compel the declaration of dividends on preferred
shares or rescind an improper issuance of shares to insiders. In such cases, both are
also representative suits, a term used in the TBCA art. 2.04(B)(2). The distinction
between derivative suits which are always representative and those direct actions to en-
force individual rights which may not be is not always easy to draw and is often confus-
ing, yet is exceedingly important in view of the varying procedural consequences in-
volved. See generally 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 831-33;
HENN 755; 2 HORNSTEIN § 601.
669. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
670. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.04(B)(2) (1956).
671. Ch. 332, § 1, [1965] Tex. Laws 698, adding TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
5.14. Former art. 5.14, a savings clause, was renumbered as art. 5.15. Id. § 2. The
provision seemed to be derived from an earlier version of the Model Act, ABA MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 43A (1960). It was not drafted or sponsored by the Bar Com-
mittee, although the Commitee did prepare a commentary on it. Comment of Bar Com-
mittee to Art. 5.14, 3A Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1972).
672. To avoid posting security for expenses, the complaining shareholder or share-
holders had to own, if the corporation's stated capital were $250,000 or less, either 2%
or more of the outstanding shares or shares having a market value of at least $25,000;
if the stated capital exceeded $250,000, the necessary percentage and market value rose
to 5% or $50,000, respectively. See 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
§ 838.
673. See Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 5.14, 3A TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
(Supp. 1972), defining a "strike suit" as one brought not for the purpose of redressing
an injury to the corporation but to secure a settlement profitable to the plaintiff. See
generally CARY 930; HENN 781; 2 HORNSTEIN § 722; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 666, § 1835: Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders' Derivative Suits: How Far Is
California's New "Security For Expenses" Act Sound Regulation?, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
399 (1949); Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1947); Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New
York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1944).
674. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 5.14, 3A TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. (Supp.
1972); 20 R. HAMILTON. TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 838, at 360.
675. A few earlier Texas cases indicated by way of dictum that a demand on the
shareholders is needed as well, but did not distinguish between the demand on directors
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quired to have owned his shares at the time the wrong complained of oc-
curred, the so-called "contemporaneous ownership" rule;676 or the types of
defenses that could be asserted in such actions. 677
With the adoption of a 1973 amendment on derivative suits -that com-
pletely supplants the former article on security for expenses, 678 the law re-
lating to these actions has been greatly clarified. While partly derived
from the Model Act,679 the Texas amendment is a superior version both
from the standpoint of balance and drafting and might well serve as a guide to
other states in its treatment of the security for expenses problem. 680
The amendment begins by defining a derivative suit simply as one
"brought in the right of a domestic or foreign corporation."' 681 Expenses
are defined as those that are reasonably incurred in the defense of a deriv-
and that on shareholders. See, e.g., Stinnett v. Paramount-Famous Lasky Corp., 37
S.W.2d 145, 150 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931), holding approved; Barthold v. Thomas, 210
S.W. 506, 507 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919), holding approved; see 20 R. HAMILTON,
TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 836; Comment, supra note 664, at 643.
676. The Texas case law was not at all clear on this point with some cases seemingly
in conflict, but by way of dictum. Compare Pacific Am. Gasoline Co. v. Miller, 76
S.W.2d 833, 841-42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1934), error ref. (inferring transferee
of shares who had not approved wrongful action could sue), with Southwestern Portland
Cement Co. v. Latta & Happer, 193 S.W. 1115, 1123 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso, 1917),
error ref., and Farwell v. Babock, 65 S.W. 509, 514-15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) (indicat-
ing subsequent transferee cannot sue). The commentators also disagree as to what the
Texas rule was or should have been, although agreeing as to its uncertainty. The author
of the student comment previously referred to, supra note 664, contended that because
of the amendment of Texas rule 42 in 1941 to delete a requirement of contemporaneous
ownership that had been taken from the federal rule, an intent had been manifested to
dispense with that requirement and that it was therefore probable Texas would follow
the rule that a transferee of "non-guilty" shares could maintain the derivative action.
Comment, supra note 664, at 645. Dean Hildebrand also intimated as much and con-
sidered the rule permitting the transferee to sue as the preferable one. 3 1. HILDEBRAND,
TEXAS CORPORATIONS § 770, at 211-12. On the other hand, Professor Hamilton is du-
bious of the conclusion, 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 837, and
the late Roy McDonald termed the speculation in the student comment as to what was
intended by the 1941 amendment of rule 42 an erroneous non sequitur, saying the sec-
tion was withdrawn from the rule because of an apprehension it dealt with substantive
rather than procedural law and that whatever the rule on contemporaneous ownership
was later determined to be, it had not been prejudged by the 1941 procedural amend-
ment. I R. McDONALD, supra note 667, § 3.34.1, at 345 n.99. Whether the contempo-
raneous ownership rule is one of substance or procedure has been a difficult matter for
decision under present federal rule 23.1 and its predecessor, rule 23(b), especially in di-
versity actions when the applicable state law does not require such ownership. Compare
J. MOORE, supra note 666, 23.1.15[2] (concluding federal requirement should yield
to contra state law), with C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 666, § 1829 (suggest-
ing that under Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), rule 23.1(1) should continue
to be applied in diversity cases). In light of Texas' adoption of the contemporaneous
ownership rule in the 1973 amendment to article 5.14, see note 683 infra, the matter
has become academic insofar as diversity litigation arising in this state is concerned, ex-
cept possibly as to the amendment's retroactivity.
On the contemporaneous ownership rule in general and some criticisms of its strict-
ness, see 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 119.04[2][b]; 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
CORPORATIONS § 5981; HENN 764; 2 HORNSTEIN § 712; LATrIN 421.
677. See 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 839.
678. Ch. 545, § 37, [1973] Tex. Laws 1508, amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 5.14 (Supp. 1974).
679. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 49. Professor Alan Bromberg was
the principal draftsman of the amended articles and deserves credit both for the innova-
tive treatment of the security for expenses requirement and the article's refreshing clar-
ity.
680. 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 838 (Supp. 1974).
681. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14(A)(1) (Supp. 1974). The Model Act de-
scribes a derivative suit in the same terms; so did art. 5.14 before its amendment.
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ative suit, including fees of attorneys, and for which a corporate defendant
might be required to indemnify another defendant.6 12
Next the prerequisites the plaintiff must satisfy to bring the suit are
set out. First, and perhaps most importantly, he must have been a holder of
shares at the time of the transaction of which he complains unless his shares
devolved upon him by operation of law from a person who was an owner at
that time.68 3  Thus whatever doubts there have been concerning this requi-
site have been resolved 684 by adding Texas to the growing list of juris-
dictions that require contemporaneous ownership.685 Moreover, the right
to bring the action is not limited to a holder of record, but can also be exer-
cised by an owner of a beneficial interest in a voting trust or, in a departure
from the Model Act686 but in accord with the majority rule, 68 7 by any other
beneficial owner at the time.688 Secondly, the plaintiff's petition must state
both the nature of his ownership and describe with particularity the efforts he
has made to get the board of directors to bring the suit or else the reasons
why such efforts were not made. 689 Since in most cases the derivative ac-
tion is brought against the board or principal officers, this requirement re-
mains a largely formal one, but may be a significant barrier to the enforce-
ment of corporate actions against third persons if the directors in the exer-
cise of their disinterested, independent judgment have decided the corpora-
tion ought not to sue.690 These are the only two prerequisites listed and
because of their specificity would appear to eliminate any need for show-
ing a demand on the shareholders as well before bringing suit. 09 1
As to security for expenses, the most important change made by the
amendment 692 is that it is no longer mandatory in those cases where the com-
plaining shareholder had held an insufficient number of shares; rather,
whether it must be given the corporation or defendants69 3 at all falls within
682. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14(A)(2) (Supp. 1974).
683. Id. art. 5.14(B)(1).
684. See text accompanying note 676 supra.
685. Comment of the Bar Committee to Art. 5.14, 3A TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. 140(Supp. 1974). See 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 119.04[2][b], at 119-42 n.31 for
a list of 27 states that by judicial decision, statute, or rule of court require share owner-
ship at the time of the transaction complained of.
686. The Model Act permits holders of a beneficial interest in a voting trust to bring
a derivative action, but not other beneficial owners. ABA MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN.
2d, § 49.
687. See, e.g., 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 119.04[2], at 119-39 n.26; 13 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5976; HENN 762; 2 HORNSTEIN 193; LATTIN
421; Note, Rights of Equitable Owners of Corporate Shares, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 999(1951).
688. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14(B)(1) (Supp. 1974).
689. Id. art. 5.14(B) (2).
690. See, e.g., Ash v. International Business Machines, Inc., 353 F.2d 491, 492 (3d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 858(7th Cir. 1957); Findley v. Garrett, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421, 427 (1952).
See generally 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 21, § 119.04, at 119-32; HENN 772; 2 HORNSTEIN
at 207.
691. 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 836 (Supp. 1974).
692. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14(C) (Supp. 1974).
693. The amendment permits the court to require security not only for the corpora-
tion's defenses but for any expenses "incurred or expected to be incurred by one or more
of the defendants." This, however, makes no substantive change since under the former
version, the security the corporation could require to be posted could also cover attor-
neys' fees of other parties to the action which the corporation would be obligated to in-
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the discretion of the court having jurisdiction of the suit.69 4 The court re-
tains the power, as before, to increase or decrease the amount of security
if a showing is made that it is inadequate or excessive;6 95 the court may also
excuse a plaintiff unable to give security because of poverty if an affidavit
is filed in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 96 stating that
he is too poor to pay costs and give security for expenses.6 97 If the plain-
tiff fails to give security within a reasonable time set by the court, the suit
may be dismissed without prejudice.6 98 Finally, and in what may be the
most significant barrier of all to baseless actions or strike suits (and rightly
so), the court may, upon final judgment for one or more of the defendants and
a finding that the suit has been brought without reasonable cause, award ex-
penses to such defendants, whether security for expenses has been required
or not.699 As a corollary, this means that if the action is settled by dis-
missal700 or without a judgment for the defendants, or if the court decides
not to require the plaintiff to pay expenses, such expenses cannot be re-
covered by the defendants since the statute no longer speaks in terms of the
corporation having a right of reimbursement from any security formerly re-
quired to be given.70' Nothing is said of the winning plaintiff's right to re-
cover attorneys' fees and expenses on the theory that the corporation has
been benefited because of his initiative and efforts;70 2 in the view of the Bar
Committee, this right is so well-established under common law and equitable
demnify. The present statute covers such indemnifiable expenses in the definition of
expenses in section (A)(2)(b), see note 682 supra; however, in the sense that such in-
demnifiable expenses may go beyond counsel fees, the difference in language may result
in greater security having to be posted under the amended article than formerly.
694. The amendment does not state what factors should influence the court in mak-
ing its decision on whether security for expenses should be given or not. Professor
Hamilton believes the court would likely consider the probability that the plaintiff will
be ordered to pay the expenses of one or more of the defendants under section F if
it suspects the action has been brought without reasonable cause, and depending on
whether the plaintiff has sufficient assets that creditors can reach to satisfy the order.
20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 838, at 36 n.39 (Supp. 1974). The
Bar Committee suggests that in exercising its discretion the court may consider the
pleadings, affidavits, or other data, or hold a preliminary hearing if it desires more infor-
mation. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 5.14, 3A TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 140
(Supp. 1974).
695. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14(C) (Supp. 1974).
696. TEX. R. Civ. P. 145.
697. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14(D) (Supp. 1974).
698. Id. art. 5.14(E).
699. Id. art. 5.14(F). The provision is taken from the Model Act. ABA MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 49 (second paragraph). See Comment, supra note 664,
at 649, where the author contended as early as 1958 that this provision rather than se-
curity for expense legislation or the contemporaneous ownership requirement would
serve as the more effective deterrent of strike suits.
700. See generally Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders' Actions,
22 Sw. L.J. 767 (1968), 23 Sw. L.J. 765 (1969).
701. The operative words of the former statute stated: "[Tlhe corporation in whose
right such action is brought shall be entitled . . . to require the complainant . . . to give
security for the reasonable expenses . . . which may be incurred by it in connection with
such action . . . to which the corporation shall have recourse in such amount as the
court . . . shall determine upon the termination of such action." Ch. 332, § 1, [1965]
TEX. LAWS 698-99. See 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 838, at 358.
702. National Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Rosson, 400 S.W.2d 366, 369 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1966), error ref. n.r.e.; Adler v. Brooks, 375 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Tyler 1964), error ref. n.r.e.; Modern Optics, Inc. v. Buck, 336 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1960), error ref. n.r.e. See generally HENN 794; 2 HORNSTEIN 250.
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principles that it did not require codification. 703 Of course, the same thing
can be said concerning the requirement for a demand on the directors and
perhaps in the interests of even more balance, the statute should have ad-
dressed itself to this side of the coin. On the other hand, since the award
and size of counsel fees are so dependent on the circumstances of each
case,7 0 4 any parameters set by statute may not prove useful.
Because the requisites have now been mandated by statute for derivative
suits, the need for differentiating such actions from individual or other class
actions, not encumbered by such requirements, 'becomes all the more im-
portant.70 5 Another 1973 amendment, for example, permits a shareholder
to bring a direct action to enjoin the making of a guaranty on the ground it
could not reasonably be expected to benefit his guarantor corporation,
either directly or indirectly; 70 6 however, once the guaranty has been
made, his recourse then must be a representative (read: derivative) suit
against the directors who voted for or assented to the making of the guar-
anty. 70 7 The distinction between the various actions a shareholder can
bring was also emphasized in a federal diversity case arising in Texas dur-
ing the survey period.708  Under the facts, a Texas insurance company
loaned $350,000 to a North Dakota corporation, secured by 50,000 shares
in National Insurance Company, which later came under the Texas com-
pany's control. When the note was not paid, the Texas company sold
the collateral to itself for $150,0000, a value considerably less than its
alleged worth at the time it was given for security, and sued the North Da-
kota company for the deficiency. The defendant attacked the validity of the
foreclosure sale 70 9 and counterclaimed on the basis that the Texas plaintiff
had used its control over National to so dissipate its assets as to violate its
duty as pledgee not to intentionally deplete the value of the collateral which
it held. The trial court dismissed the counterclaim, apparently on the
ground that it was essentially a shareholder's suit for mismanagement which
should have been brought derivatively. The Fifth Circuit ruled this was
error, reasoning that where the action complained of creates not only a cause
of action in favor of the corporation but also one for the shareholder
arising out of a duty owed to him as an individual (in this case the duty
owed by the pledgee to the pledgor to preserve the value of the collateral
703. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 5.14, 3A TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 140
(Supp. 1974).
704. See, e.g., 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 844; 2 HORNSTEIN§ 732; Cole, Counsel Fees in Stockholders' Derivative and Class Actions-Hornstein
Revisited, 6 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 259 (1972); Hornstein, The "Salvage" Factor in
Counsel Fee Awards, 69 H!v. L. REv. 658 (1956); Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in
Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1939).
705. See note 668 supra.
706. TEx. REV. Ci . STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06(B) (Supp. 1974).
707. Id.
708. Empire Life Ins. Co. v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1972).
709. The trial court's decision on this point was reversed and remanded because it
had erroneously applied the standards of the Uniform Commercial Code in deciding
whether a deficiency judgment should be granted in that the loan transaction had been
consummated prior to the effective date of the Code in either Texas or North Dakota,
the two states concerned. Id. at 334.
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pledged), 710 he may sue in his individual capacity. 711 The case perhaps il-
lustrates the scarcity of Texas law on the subject since only one Texas de-
cision was cited out of many71 2 and it is obvious it was decided on the basis
of general common law in point, Erie notwithstanding.
Preemptive Rights. The preemptive right is generally regarded as an-
other of the fundamental rights shareholders enjoy, 713 yet in reality it is
more often denied than not in most publicly held corporations.71 4  A
creature of the American courts,715 the right may be defined as the oppor-
tunity given a shareholder to acquire a proportional share of any new issue
of stock being sold to raise additional capital so that his relative status in
the corporation in regard to voting power, payment of dividends, or distribu-
tion of assets on liquidation can be preserved, if he wishes. 716 Its premise
is that as owners of the corporate enterprise, shareholders should have the
privilege of maintaining their proportionate ownership in the corporation on
equal terms with each other and in preference to strangers. 717  The right,
however, is not absolute. Over the years, the courts have carved out vari-
ous exceptions in the process of accommodating the differing objectives for
which shares are issued. Thus while the right is almost always recognized
when newly authorized shares are being sold for cash, 718 it does not ex-
tend to the issuance of shares to acquire property, 719 effect a merger or
710. Id. at 335.
711. The court treated this as an exception to the general rule that a shareholder can-
not sue in his own right for the general diminution in the value of his shares caused
by mismanagement. Id. at 335. The rule it stated is well established. See, e.g., 20
R. HAMILTON, TExAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 833; 2B HORNSTEIN 99.712. The court cites Stinnett v. Paramount-Famous Lasky Corp., 37 S.W.2d 145(Tex. Comm'n App. 1931), holding approved, as one of nine decisions in point. But
see, e.g., Massachusetts v. Davis, 140 Tex. 398, 404-07, 168 S.W.2d 216, 222, cert. de-
nied 320 U.S. 210 (1943) (dictum); Morrison v. St. Anthony Hotel, 295 S.W.2d 246,
250 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1956), error ref. n.r.e.; Cullum v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 115 S.W.2d 1196, 1201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938); cf.
Moroney v. Moroney, 286 S.W. 167, 170 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926), judgment adopted.See generally 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAs BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 833, at 353; 3 I.
HILDEBRAND, TExAs CORPORATIONS § 763, at 159.
713. 5A Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 108.04[3]. See generally 6 id. §§
115.01-.06; 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONS §§ 5131-45 (perm. ed. rev.
repl. 1971); LATIN 493; Drinker, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders To Subscribe
to New Shares, 43 HARv. L. REV. 586 (1930); Frey, Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights,
38 YALE L.J. 563 (1929); Morawetz, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders, 42 HARv.
L. REV. 186 (1928).
714. 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5135 (perm. ed. rev. repl.
1971).
715. The preemptive right is said to have been first recognized in Gray v. Portland
Bank, 3 Mass. 364, 3 Am. Dec. 156 (1807), although there is some dispute as to whether
preemptive rights were involved in that case. See Drinker, supra note 713, at 590-93.
The English courts, however, have not recognized the right as one inhering in share-
holders unless otherwise abrogated. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and
American Corporation Law, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1369, 1380 (1956).
716. Cf. CAY 1133; LATTIN 493. For other definitions see Gord v. Iowana Farms
Milk Co., 245 Iowa 1, 15, 60 N.W.2d 820, 828 (1953); Ross Transp., Inc. v. Crothers,
185 Md. 573, 581-82, 45 A.2d 267, 270 (1946); Bonnet v. First Nat'l Bank, 60 S.W.
325, 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), error dismissed; Fuller v. Krogh, 15 Wis. 2d 412, 420,
113 N.W.2d 25, 31 (1962).
717. Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 259 U.S. 247, 252 (1922); Gord v. Iowana
Farms Milk Co., 245 Iowa 1, 15, 60 N.W.2d 820, 828 (1953).
718. E.g., Gord v. lowana Farms Milk Co., 245 Iowa 1, 15, 60 N.W.2d 820, 828(1953); Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364, 3 Am. Dec. 156 (1807); Stokes v. Con-
tinental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 299, 78 N.E. 1090, 1094 (1906).
719. E.g., Rogers v. First Nat'l Bank, 410 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1969); Hodge v. Cuba
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consolidation, 720 compromise a debt,7 21 pay for needed services, 722 or carry
out a plan or reorganization under the federal bankruptcy law. 723  Even
when shares are issued for cash, some uncertainty exists as to whether the
right applies if the shares sold are treasury shares or those originally au-
thorized when the corporation was formed but not yet issued. Most courts
refuse to recognize the right with reference to treasury shares,724 but, under
modern authority at least, will enforce it as to the subsequent issuance of
the originally authorized shares, especially when a much larger number of
shares was authorized than originally issued in obvious contemplation of
being used for future financing. 725  If the corporation has more than one
class of shares, the status of the right becomes more confusing, depend-
ing upon the impact the issue of additional shares of another or entirely
new class will have on the relative rights of other classes.7 26  It was
largely the complexities of applying -the right in multi-class securities capitali-
zation as well as the desire to give management a freer hand in financing
that led to the modern legislation which limits or curtails the right or denies
it entirely unless authorized in the articles. 72 7  Finally, there is no require-
ment that when the right does exist the shareholder be allowed to purchase
the shares at par if less than market value728 or prevent the sale of his pro-
portionate part of the issue if he is financially unable to acquire his allot-
ment.729  So long as the directors act fairly and reasonably and in accord
Co., 142 N.J. Eq. 340, 60 A.2d 88 (Ch. 1948); Meredith v. New Jersey Zinc & Iron
Co., 55 N.J. Eq. 211, 37 A. 539 (Ch. 1897), alf'd, 56 N.J. Eq. 454, 41 A. 1116 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1897). But cf. Fuller v. Krogh, 15 Wis. 2d 412, 113 N.W.2d 25 (1962)
(preemptive right should not 'be denied when stock issued for property unless corporation
has great need for same and acquisition for stock only practical and feasible method of
obtaining it).
720. E.g., Thorn v. Baltimore Trust Co., 158 Md. 352, 148 A. 234 (1930); Bingham
v. Savings Inv. & Trust Co., 102 N.J. Eq. 302, 140 A. 321 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928);
Bonnet v. First Nat'l Bank, 60 S.W. 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), error dismissed.
721. E.g., Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E. 917
(1930); Musson v. New York & Queens Elec. Light & Power Co., 138 Misc. 881, 247
N.Y.S. 406 (1931).
722. E.g., Curtis v. Briscoe, 129 So. 2d 450 (Fla. App. 1961); Milwaukee Sanitar-
ium v. Swift, 238 Wis. 628, 300 N.W. 760 (1941).
723. Cf. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 4.14 (Supp. 1974); see 6 Z. CAVITCH, Busi-
NESS ORGANIZATIONS § 115.02[4][d]; 2 HORNSTEIN 149. In general on the various ex-
ceptions to the preemptive right doctrine see Comment, Corporation Law: Exceptions
to Stockholder's Preemptive Right, 35 U. COLO. L. REv. 482 (1963).
724. E.g., Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1925); Crosby v.
Stratton, 17 Colo. App. 212, 68 P. 130 (1902); Archer v. Hesse, 164 App. Div. 493,
150 N.Y.S. 296 (1914); Runswick v. Floor, 116 Utah 91, 208 P.2d 948 (1949).
725. E.g., Hanny v. Sunnyside Ditch Co., 81 Idaho 271, 353 P.2d 406 (1960); Carl-
son v. Ringgold County Mut. Tel. Co., 252 Iowa 748, 108 N.W.2d 478 (1961); Fuller
v. Krogh, 15 Wis. 2d 412, 113 N.W.2d 25 (1962). Earlier cases held to the contrary;
see, e.g., Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309 (1941); Dunlay v. Avenue
M Garage & Repair Co., 253 N.Y. 247, 170 N.E. 917 (1930). See generally 11 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5136.1 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1971).
726. See generally LATTIN 493.
727. See generally ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 26A, 2; 6 Z. CAvrrcH,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 115.01[2].
728. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Heidelberg Brewing Co., 303 Ky. 739, 199 S.W.2d 127
(Ct. App. 1947); Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 285, 78 N.E. 1090 (1906);
Barsan v. Pioneer Loan Co., 163 Ohio St. 424, 127 N.E.2d 614 (1955). See generally
6 Z. CAvITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 115.04; 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA COR-
PORATIONS § 5138.1 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1971).
729. E.g., Bellows v. Porter, 201 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1953); Hyman v. Velsicol Corp.,
342 IlL. App. 489, 97 N.E.2d 122 (1951); Maguire v. Osborne, 388 Pa. 121, 130 A.2d
1974]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
with their fiducial duties and responsibilities in fixing the price and conditions
under which the right is to be exercised, the shareholder cannot complain. 730
Until 1973, the dimensions of the preemptive right had not clearly been
determined in Texas. 731 The TBCA as originally enacted recognized the
right as one that could be limited or denied in the articles of incorpora-
tion 732 or an amendment -thereto,73 3 but except for extending the right to
both treasury and authorized but unissued shares,734 requiring that any limi-
tation or denial be appropriately noted on the share certificates, 735 and al-
lowing shares to be sold to officers and employees when authorized by the
holders of two-thirds of the voting shares, 736 neither the nature of the right
nor the other exceptions to its exercise were touched upon. These matters
had to be determined on the basis of case law and that consisted of the grand
total of one early civil appeals opinion, Bonnet v. First National Bank.737
The Bonnet case recognized the preemptive right but also acknowledged its
judge-made limits insofar as treasury shares and shares issued for property
were concerned, 738 holding specifically that the right did not apply to a
merger-type transaction. 739 Given this scarcity of authority, it could only
be assumed that Texas would follow the common law concept of the rule
except as modified by the TBCA.740 Now, with the addition of a new article
on preemptive rights, this assumption has been largely confirmed.
The new article, 741 much of which is derived from an alternative provision
157 (1957). On the other hand, if the shares are being offered at a price considerably
less than their market value, the shareholder may complain even if not exercising his
preemptive right. See, e.g., Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 99 A.2d 236 (Del. Ch.
1953); Katzowitz v. Sidler, 24 N.Y.2d 512, 249 N.E.2d 359, 301 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1969);
Steven v. Hale-Haas Co., 249 Wis. 205, 23 N.W.2d 620 (1946) (dictum). This is espe-
cially true if the purpose of the stock issuance is to severely dilute the interest of or
to freeze out a minority shareholder. See, e.g., Browning v. C & C Plywood Corp., 248
Ore. 574, 434 P.2d 339 (1967); compare Burnett v. Word, Inc., 412 S.W.2d 792 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1967), error dismissed by agreement. See generally F. O'NEAL & J.
DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES § 4.14 (1971); Note,
Freezing Out Minority Shareholders Through The Issuance of Additional Shares, 2
MEMPHIS ST. L. REV. 375 (1972).
730. See generally 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5139 (perm. ed.
rev. repl. 1971).
731. 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 399.
732. Ch. 64, arts. 2.22(C), 3.02(A)(8), [1955] Tex. Laws 239.
733. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 4.01(B)(16), 4.03(B)(9) (1956).
734. Id. art. 2.22(C). The other provisions of the TBCA cited in notes 732-33 supra
speak of the preemptive right in terms of the right to acquire "additional" or treasury
shares with article 4.01 (B)(16) adding "whether then or thereafter authorized." The
varying terminology was taken directly from the 1953 revision of the Model Act and
has not been affected by the adoption of article 2.22-1, discussed in the text at notes
741-65 inlra, for while the latter makes it clear that the right extends to "additional,
unissued, or treasury shares of the corporation," there has been no comparable change
in the other provisions cited, particularly article 3.02(A)(8) where consistency would
seem to be demanded.
735. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.22(C) (1956). Under the 1957 TBCA
amendments, any such limitation or denial could be stated in summary form, ch. 54,§§ 3, 4, [1957] Tex. Laws 111, or could be incorporated by reference, ch. 54, §§ 3, 4,
[1957] Tex. Laws 111 (adding TBCA art. 2.19(F)). The latter provision has been sub-
stantially altered; see text at notes 41-60 supra.
736. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.22(D) (1956).
737. 24 Tex. Civ. App. 613, 60 S.W. 325 (1900), error dismissed.
738. Id. at 326.
739. Id. at 327.
740. See 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 399.
741. Ch. 545, § 13, [1973] Tex. Laws 1494, adding TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
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of the Model Act7 42 designed for state acts such as the TBCA that con-
fer the right unless denied or limited 748 rather than as granted in the arti-
cles, 744 states that the preemptive right "shall be only the opportunity to ac-
quire shares or other securities under such terms and conditions as the board
of directors may fix for the purpose of providing a fair and reasonable op-
portunity for -the exercise of such right."' 745 As so defined, the right ap-
plies not only to unissued, additional, and treasury shares, as before, but also
to convertible securities or any warrants, options, or other subscription rights
to acquire shares. 746  On the other hand, the new statute significantly limits
the right by codifying in essence most of the common law exceptions.
Thus, unless the articles otherwise provide, no preemptive right exists to ac-
quire shares sold for other than cash 747 or that have been issued to em-
ployees upon approval by the holders of a majority of the voting shares or
pursuant to a plan permitting such purchases previously approved in the same
manner. 748  The latter provision changes the law in several respects. First,
the range of securities that can be sold to employees free of preemptive
2.22-1 (Supp. 1974). The -provisions relating to preemptive rights that had formerly
been part of article 2.22 along with provisions dealing with stock transfer restrictions
were placed in a separate article both because of the length of article 2.22 as amended
in 1973. and to be consistent with the Model Act which treats preemptive rights in a
separate section. Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.22-1, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. 65 (Supp. 1974); Doty & Parker 1017.
742. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 26A. The provision is an alternative
to section 26 of the Model Act which denies the preemptive right except as conferred
in the articles of incorporation. At the time of the adoption of the TBCA, the 1953
revision of the Model Act contained only a single section that recognized the right unless
denied in the articles and it was this section that became article 2.22(C) of the TBCA.
In 1955 the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws adopted an alternative provision restrict-
ing the right unless conferred. 1 ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 24 (1960). By
the time of the 1969 revision of the Model Act, its draftsmen, in order to accord with
"the modern trend of practice," decided to make the restrictive provision the primary
section and the section recognizing the right an alternative one. 1 ABA MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 26, 26A, at 533. Since relatively few states prohibit the right
unless conferred in the articles, see note 744 infra, it is hard to discern a trend in the
statutes unless the ABA draftsmen assumed that once Delaware made the change from
recognizing the right to denying'it absent a charter provision to the contrary, as it did in
1967, see E. FOLK, supra note 194, at 11, the great majority of states were bound to
follow. Thus far, very few have.
743. The great majority of states (approximately 39) either expressly grant preemp-
tive rights, subject to limitation in the articles, or impliedly recognize their existence by
permitting a provision limiting or curtailing them to be included in the articles as an
optional matter. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 33-343 (Supp. 1974); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 608.42 (1956); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-602 (1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §
157.24 (Supp. 1974); IOWA CODE § 496A.25 (Supp. 1974); Ky. REV. STAT. § 271A.30(Supp. 1972); LA. REV. STAT. § 12.24(c) (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 623(Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. § 301.04(9) (1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 622 (McKin-
ney 1963); OHIO RE6. CODE ANN. § 1701.15 (Page 1964); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 7-
1.1-24 (1969); Wis. STAT. § 180.21 (Supp. 1974). For a complete list of statutes see
6 Z. CAvrrcH, BUSINESS OROANIqZATIONS § 115.01[2], at 289-90 n.25 (however, not all
the citations listed are accurate).1 744. Ten states presently provide that any preemptive rights given shareholders must
be set out in the articles. CAL. CORP. CoDE § 1106 (West 1955); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(3) (Supp. 1970); IND. CODE § 23-1-2-6(i) (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-6002(b)(3) (Supp. 1973); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 20 (1970); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 450.1481(1) (1973); N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:5-29 (1969); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, H§ 1.27, .45 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1611A (Supp. 1974); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1871 (Supp. 1972).
745. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.22-1(B)(5) (Supp. 1974).
746. Id. art. 2.22-1(A).
747. Id. art. 2.22-1(B)(1) (b).
-748. Id. art. 2.22-1(B)(1)(a).
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rights has been expanded as the former provision spoke only of "treasury or
unissued shares. '7 49  Secondly, the shareholders' vote for approval has been
reduced from two-third to a majority vote. 710  Thirdly, the new article refers
only to shares issued to employees, whereas the old law permitted sales to
"officers or employees or employees of any subsidiary corporation."'751 Al-
though officers are sometimes considered employees,752 especially in so-
called employee stock option or purchase plans, 758 their omission in the
new statute seems deliberate, especially since the Model Act source for this
provision denies the preemptive right to shares issued to "directors, officers
or employees" pursuant to shareholder approval.75 4  The omission is con-
sistent with the policy underlying the limitation of a corporation's power to
lend money to755 or guarantee the obligations of its directors or officers; 56
on the other hand, the TBCA also gives the corporation power to fix the
compensation of its officers757 and to establish stock bonus plans "and other
incentive plans" for them, as well as for employees. 758  Nevertheless, since
it appears shareholders will have a premptive right to shares offered to
officers for cash either directly or according to a previously approved plan,
the solution, if a stock incentive for executives is desired, is to specifically
limit or deny the right as to such sales in the articles. A similar provision
would have to be adopted to cover sales of the parent's stock to employees
of its subsidiaries.
To simplify matters when there are several classes of stock, the new arti-
cle flatly denies the right to holders of preferred or other limited classes of
stock, unless the articles otherwise provide.759 This means that there is no
right to acquire even other shares of the class of preferred, 760 although pre-
749. Ch. 64, art. 2.22(D), [1955] Tex. Laws 253.
750. TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.22-1(B)(1)(a) (Supp. 1974). In both ver-
sons, only shareholders having voting rights needed to approve the issuance. Under the
former provision, the shareholder could delegate authority to the directors to issue the
shares if approved by the proper percentage; under the new statute, the shares may also
be issued when authorized by and consistent with a plan previously approved by the vote
of the holders of a majority of the shares. The difference in language seems more a
change in form than in substance.
751. Ch. 64, art. 2.22(D), [1955] Tex. Laws 253.
752. See, e.g., Wooddale, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 378 F.2d 627, 633 (8th Cir.
1967); Williams v. Williams Insulation Materials, Inc., 91 Ariz. 89, 370 P.2d 59, 63(1962). Most courts, however, differentiate between corporate officers and employees.
See cases collected in 14 WORDS & PHRASES 670 (perm. ed. 1952); 29A id. 30 (perm.
ed. 1972).
753. See, e.g., Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 133 (1932) (Stone, J.,
dissenting). See generally CARY 632; 7 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 134.04
[11 G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 604,
624 (3d ed. 1962).
754. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 26A.
755. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.02(A) (6), 2.41 (A)(4) (1956).
756. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.06(B) (Supp. 1974); see discussion in
text accompanying note 133 supra.
757. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(12) (1956).
758. Id. art. 2.02(A)(17).
759. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.22-1(B)(4) (Supp. 1974).
760. The rights of holders of preferred or special classes of shares to purchase addi-
tional shares of common or of the same or other classes of preferred have not been fully
developed by case law. A critical factor seems to be whether holders of preferred have
the right to participate in the distribution of net assets upon dissolution or have general
voting rights. Compare Thomas Branch & Co. v. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills,
139 Va. 291, 123 S.E. 542 (1924); id., 147 Va. 522, 137 S.F_ 614 (1927) (recognizing
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ferred has some protection in its right to a class vote if the shares to be of-
fered must first be authorized by an amendment to the articles. 761 This de-
nial is not likely to be of great consequence when the shares are publicly-
held and if so regarded, can be provided against in the protective provisions
of the preferred share contract; 76 2 but it may have serious consequences
in the close corporation where it may definitely affect a participant's rela-
tive position if such shares are being used to give some of the contributors of
venture capital a priority in distribution of income or assets on liquidation or
is being employed for tax purposes or to shift control in a family corpora-
tion.763  The answer here of course is to provide for the right in the articles.
On the other side of the coin, common shareholders also have no preemptive
rights to preferred or other limited classes or obligations unless such securities
are convertible into common or carry 'a right to subscribe to or acquire com-
mon shares. 764  In addition, if there is more than one class of common,
one with voting power and one without, the holders of the latter have no pre-
emptive right to acquire the voting common.' 65
As the foregoing discussion makes evident, careful consideration must be
given to the preemptive right in corporation planning. In particular, clients
must decide whether they want to modify or eliminate the right to the extent
it remains exercisable under the new amendment or conversely, to grant
the right as to any issuances of shares now statutorily excluded from its
application. Generally, availability of the right can be a hindrance to
equity financing in corporations whose securities are or will be publicly
traded, especially when there are several classes of securities, some of which
are convertible into voting common. 76 6 In such circumstances, either the
promoters or later, management, will want to abolish the right.767  But
care should be taken in doing so not only to properly draft an appropriate
provision in the articles of incorporation but also to be certain that the share
preemptive rights of holders of class preferred as to dividends but without a liquidation
preference and apparently having voting rights to issue of new common), with General
Inv. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 88 N.J. Eq. 237, 102 A. 252 (Ch. 1917) (holders
of preferred with liquidation preference have no preemptive right to new issue of non-
voting prior preferred shares). See generally CARY 1167; 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
CORPORATIONS § 6136.3 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1971); Hills, Preemptive Right of Preferred
Stockholders To Subscribe to New Stock, 5 N.Y.U.L. REv. 207 (1927); Note, Preferred
Stockholder's Right of Preemption, 26 HARV. L. REV. 75 (1912).
761. See TEX. Bus. CoRn'. ACT ANN. art. 4.03(B)(1) (1956). See also discussion
in text accompanying notes 273-96 supra.
762. See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 278, at 293.
763. See generally 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 401; O'NEAL§§ 3.39, 8.09; Note, Pre-emptive Rights in Close Corporations, 23 U. CHI L. REV. 697
(1956); Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders Through the Issuance of Additional
Shares, 2 MEMPHIS ST. L. REV. 375 (1972).
764. TEx. Bus. CORP. AT ANN. art. 2.22-1(B) (3) (Supp. 1974).
765. Id. art. 2.22-1(b)(4).
766. See, e.g., 6 Z. CAvrrcH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 115.01[1], at 287; LATrIN
494.
767. See, e.g., CARY 1145; 6 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 115.01[1], at
284; C. ISRAELS, CORPORATE PRACTICE 158; Campbell, The Drafting of Articles of Incor-
poration and Bylaws Under the Texas Business Corporation Act, in TEXAS BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT PROCEEDINGS 157, reprinted in 3A TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. 455-
56 (1956); Pelletier, Incorporation Planning in Texas, in THE SECTION ON CORPORA-
TION, BANKING & BUSINESS LAW OF THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS, INCORPORATION PLANNING
IN TEXAS 12 (1973).
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certificates carry the legend prescribed by another of the 1973 amend-
ments.768 Presumably since preferred has no preemptive right at all unless
conferred by the articles, there is no need for such a legend on its certifi-
cates.
On the other hand, the preemptive right may be an important ingredient
in a close corporation relationship since normally each participant wants
some assurance his relative status as to voting or participation in earnings
is not diluted by the issuance of additional shares.769 If the corporation is a
defined one managed by its shareholders, 770 the need for preserving the right
is all the more acute, particularly since the statute now specifies a variety
of situations where it does not exist if not otherwise provided for. Conse-
quently, in the process of setting up a close corporation, -the various circum-
stances under which shares may be issued in the future and the impact of
the preemptive right as presently defined and limited should -be explored with
the clients and care taken to spell out those facets of the right they want pre-
served or limited in the articles. If the corporation qualifies as a defined
close corporation and all the shareholders agree, the dimensions of the right
thus worked out can also be protected by an agreement under article 2.30-2,
under the broad authorization conferred by that statute.771 Even if dealt
with in such an agreement, it would be wise to provide for the right in the
articles as well in view of the specific language of the new statute. More-
over, once inserted in the articles, further safeguards may then be needed
to prevent the provision from being later amended or repealed over the ob-
jections of the shareholders whose interests are sought to be protected from
subsequent dilution.772 Clearly one answer is to give them a veto power
over any such amendment or repeal by use of high quorum or voting per-
centages for shareholder action, 778 especially if classification of shares is also
being employed.7 74
768. TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 2.19(B) (2) (Supp. 1974). The limitation or
denial of preemptive rights to acquire unissued or treasury shares (and presumably of
additional shares) must be set out on the face or back of the share certificate or else
it must be stated thereon (although the statute does not say so specifically due to an
oversight in drafting) that the corporation will furnish a copy of the limitation or denial
to any shareholder on request made to the corporation's principal office and that the
same can also be found on file in the secretary of state's office.
769. See, e.g., 6 Z. CAVITcH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 115.01[l], at 283; C. Is-
RAELS, supra note 767, at 157; 2 HORNSTEIN 151; 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS
§§ 3.39, 8.09; W. PAINTER, CLOSELY HELD COR'ORATIONS 142, 432; Campbell, supra
note 767, at 158, reprinted in 3A TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 585 (1956).
770. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-1 (B) (Supp. 1974); see discussion in text
accompanying note 535 supra.
771. Id. art. 2.30-2(A). The shareholders' agreement this article sanctions may reg-
ulate the relations of the shareholders, as well as any phase of the business and affairs
of the corporation, including any arrangement among the relations of the shareholders
and the corporation that would otherwise be appropriate in a partnership. Id. art. 2.30-
2(A) (8). See discussion in text accompanying notes 537-43 supra.
772. See 2 HORNSTEIN 152.
773. Cf. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 9.08 (Supp. 1974). See generally 19 R.
HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 401, at 457; 1 F. O'NWAL, CLOSE CORPO-
RATIONS § 3.39; W. PAINTER, CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS 145.
774. Cf. Shanken v. Wolfman, 370 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1963), er-
ror ref. n.r.e. (shareholder owning all of one class of shares equal to one-third of out-
standing shares unable to prevent amendment to articles increasing numbers of shares
of other two classes held by other two shareholders).
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Right-To Dissent. One of the many innovations the TBCA introduced into
Texas' corporation law was recognition of a new shareholder's right, the
right to dissent. 775 In essence, the right allows a minority shareholder who
properly and timely objects to certain fundamental transactions that signifi-
cantly alter the corporation's structure to have his shares repurchased by the
corporation, either on the basis of an agreed price or, if necessary, by resort
to litigation to have their fair value appraised and adjudged.776 Because
the right is always accompanied by the appraisal remedy it is sometimes
referred to as the shareholder's right of appraisal.77 7  Under the original
TBCA, the right to dissent existed as to three types of corporate actions:
(1) an amendment substantially altering or changing the corporation's pur-
pose; (2) any plan of merger or consolidation to which the corporation was a
party; and (3) a sale, lease, exchange or similar disposition of all or sub-
stantially all of the corporation's assets requiring shareholder approval under
the Act.778  In most states, mergers and sales of assets are the usual
grounds for granting dissenters the appraisal remedy.779 But very few recog-
775. Although Dean Hildebrand stated that a dissenting shareholder could recover
the value of his shares independently of statute in the case of a consolidation, 3 I. HIL-
DERAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS § 990, at 562, it is generally agreed the right is one that
must be conferred by statute and was not available in Texas until adoption of the TBCA.
Massey v. Farnsworth, 353 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962), rev'd, 365
S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1963); 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 911; Wolf,
Dissenting Shareholders: Is the Statutory Appraisal Remedy Exclusive?, 42 TEXAS L.
REV. 58, 63 (1963); cf. Belsheim, The Need for Revising the Texas Corporation Stat-
utes, 27 TEXAS L. REV. 659, 693 (1949); 4 BAYLOR L. REV. 111, 115 (1951). The case
relied upon by Dean Hildebrand to support his statement, International & G.N.R.R. v.
Bremond, 53 Tex. 96 (1880), permitted the dissenting shareholder to recover the value
of his shares because, there being no statutory basis for the consolidation, unanimous
shareholder consent was required for its consummation. By contrast, the TBCA proce-
dure presupposes a validly authorized corporate action. Wolf, supra, at 63.
See generally on the right to dissent 6 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §
112.01-.04; 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 5906.1-.17 (perm. ed. rev. repl.
1970); 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 911-17; HENN § 349; 2
HORNSTEIN §§ 629-34; LATrIN 591.
776. If the dissenting shareholder and corporation cannot agree, either may initiate
the proceeding seeking judicial determination of the fair value of the shares. TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.12(B) (Supp. 1974). Once a shareholder has filed suit, the cor-
poration may then join all shareholders who have demanded payment for their shares
and who, if properly notified, will then be bound by the court's final judgment. Id. In
the absence of fraud in the transaction, the appraisal remedy is the exclusive mode for
a dissenter to recover the value of his shares or money damages. Id. art. 5.12(G). As
to the exclusivity of the Texas appraisal remedy see 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 917; Amsler, supra note 127, at 62; Wolf, supra note 775; Comment
of Bar Committee to Art. 5.12, 3A TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. 135, 136 (Supp. 1974).
777. E.g., 6 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 112.01; 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLO-
PEDIA CORPORATIONS § 59016.1 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1970); 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 911. The Model Act uses the term "light to dissent."
ABA MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 80, 2.
778. TEX. BUS. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.11 (Supp. 1974). The first ground was de-
rived from OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.157(2) (1951); the second and third from sec-
tions 71 and 74 of the 1953 edition of the Model Act.
779. For comprehensive listings of state statutes see 6 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANI-
ZATIONS § 112.02[1], at 10 n.9, § 112.02[2], at 10 n.23. While every state except West
Virginia recognizes the appraisal remedy for at least some types of mergers, ten juris-
dictions (Arizona, California, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Minnesota, Nevada,
West Virginia, and the District of Columbia) do not afford the remedy for sales of all
or substantially all the assets. ABA MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 80, 3.03.
In some states, including Texas, a so-called short form merger between a parent and sub-
sidiary gives only the dissenting shareholders of the subsidiary the right to demand pay-
ment for their shares. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.16 (Supp. 1974)(90% ownership). Some states also deny the right in mergers where the shares involved
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nize the right as to other corporate actions780 such as amendments to the
articles, 78l especially one substantially changing corporate purposes as sin-
gled out in the Texas Act.7 8 2 Nevertheless there was a good reason for in-
cluding the right to dissent for this type of amendment at the time the TBCA
was adopted.
Under the old Texas law, a corporation generally could be organized
only for one purpose and even that purpose had to be one authorized by
statute.7 3  On the other hand, the TBCA as proposed sought to permit in-
corporation for any number of purposes for which general business corpora-
tions could be organized,784 with very minor exceptions.785 Because of the
change of policy involved, the Bar Committee believed the legislature
would be more willing to accept an expanded scope of corporate activity if
any shareholder who might have relied upon the old corporation law in in-
vesting in a corporation limited to a single business purpose had some assur-
ance his investment would be returned at its current fair value once his cor-
poration took advantage of the new law to materially change or alter its
purposes over his objections. 780 Whether this concern was well-founded or
not is conjectural. As it turned out, the need for removing Texas corpora-
tions from 'the strait jacket of the single purpose clause proved to be one
of the strongest arguments for adoption of the TBCA. 78 7  Moreover, there
are listed on a national securities exchange or are held by no less than 2,000 sharehold-
ers. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
6712(k)(1) (Supp. 1973); MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 450.1762 (1973); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 7-1.1-73 (1970); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-75 (1973). In a few jurisdictions
the right to dissent is denied as to a sale of assets if the proceeds are to be distributed
in cash or readily marketable securities within a year of the sale. See, e.g., MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1761(b) (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:11-1(b) (Supp.
1974); S.C. CODE LAWS § 12-21.5 (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48.909(1)(b)
(Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. § 180.72(1) (Supp. 1974).
780. Aside from mergers, sales of assets, and adverse amendments, the only other
corporate action for which the right to dissent is given in a very few states is dissolution,
generally when distributions in liquidation are to be made in something other than cash.
See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1005(a)(3)(A) (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 55-119(b) (1965); see generally 6 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §
112.02[4].
781. Approximately 15 states recognize the right of dissent upon adoption of certain
amendments to the articles. In general, the amendments are those changing the corpo-
rate purpose, extending corporate life, reducing the number of directors, or adversely
affecting or changing the rights of various classes of shares. See ABA MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT ANN. 2d, § 80, 3.03(3); 6 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §
112.02[3] for citations.
782. Six states allow dissent to an amendment changing corporate purposes. IDAHO
CODE § 30-150 (1967); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156, § 46 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
301.40 (1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294.76 (1966); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.74 (Page 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.157 (1953). See also N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 55-101(b) (1965) (change from profit to non-profit corporation or coop-
erative organization).
783. See note 82 supra.
784. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.01(A) (Supp. 1974).
785. See note 84 supra.
786. See Carrington, Experience in Texas With the Model Business Corporation Act,
5 UTAH L. REV. 292, 297 (1957).
787. See, e.g., Baker, A Consideration of Article Three [2.01] of the Proposed Texas
Business Corporation Act, 30 TExAS L. REV. 843 (1952); Brown, Objectives Which Can
Only Be Accomplished by Adoption of the New Corporation Code, in TEXAS BUSINESS
CORPORATION AcT PROCEEDINGS 7, 8, reprinted in 3A TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 447,
448 (1956); Campbell, The Drafting of Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws Under the
Texas Business Corporation Act, in TEXAS CORPORATION AcT PROCEEDINGS 149, 151, re-
printed in 3A TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. 576, 578 (1956).
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have been no reported instances of the appraisal remedy being resorted to
because of a change of purpose.
As previously discussed, one of the 1973 amendments now allows a corpo-
ration to state as its purpose the transaction of any lawful business for which
corporations may be incorporated under the Act. 788  Given this permitted
generality of expression, it is evident the purpose clause is no longer meant
to play a meaningful role in limiting the scope of the corporate enterprise
(and probably has not in most corporations for years). 789 For this reason
and because in the Bar Committee's view affording the right to dissent
for a change of corporate purpose has become archaic and unnecessary, 79 0
this ground for exercise of the right to dissent has been repealed. 791
V. RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES OF CORPORATE
MANAGEMENT AND CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS
Despite the sweep of the 1973 amendments, very little was enacted that
pertained to the duties and liabilities of directors, officers, or controlling
shareholders. Most of the developments arose from litigation.
A. New Legislation
Liability Insurance. As noted earlier,792 one of the additional powers con-
ferred on Texas corporations in 1973 was authorization to purchase and
maintain insurance on behalf of any person who is or has been a direc-
tor, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation or has served in that ca-
pacity at the corporation's request in another corporation, partnership,
joint venture, or trust "against any liability asserted against him and in
curred 'by him in any such capacity or arising out of his status as such,"
whether or not the corporation could otherwise indemnify him under article
2.02. 7 9 3 The new provision is taken directly from the 1967 revision of the
Model Act79 4 and is virtually identical to Delaware's law. 795 It was all the
Bar Committee felt it could salvage from a much more comprehensive arti-
cle on indemnification, derived mainly from the same revised Model Act
788. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 3.02(A) (3) (Supp. 1974); see discussion in text
accompanying notes 82-89 supra.
789. See Doty & Parker 1011; Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 2.01, 3A TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. 9 (Supp. 1974).
790. Doty & Parker 1024; Comment of Bar Committee to Art. 5.11, 3A Tx. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. 131, 132 (Supp. 1974).
791. Ch. 545, § 36, [1973] Tex. Laws 1508, amending TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 5.11 (1956).
792. See text at note 102 supra.
793. Ch. 545, § 3, [1973] Tex. Laws 1486, adding second paragraph to TEx. Bus.
CORP. Acr ANN. art. 2.02(A)(16) (Supp. 1974).
794. ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. 2d, § 5(g).
795. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (Supp. 1968). The coincidence of the Model
Act and Delaware law is not surprising in view of the fact that the insurance provision
is part of a larger statute on indemnification that was the joint product of the ABA
Committee on Corporate Laws and a subcommittee of the Delaware Revision Commis-
sion. Sebring, Recent Legislative Changes in the Law of Indemnification of Directors,
Officers and Others, 23 Bus. LAW. 95, 96 (1967). Indeed, the ABA Committee ex-




section and Delaware law, that had been proposed as part of the 1973
amendment program7 6 but was dropped when some opposition developed
to its more permissive terms,797 leaving the older and more restrictive provi-
sion on indemnification intact. 798
796. The proposed indemnification statute, which would have been added as a new
article 2.02-1, was a somewhat expanded and modified version of section 5 of the Model
Act, as revised in 1967. The latter replaced a much briefer provision in the general
powers section of the Model Act that provided essentially for permissive indemnification
of directors and officers for expenses incurred in defending litigation resulting from their
being or having been a director or officer, unless there had been an adjudication of lia-
bility for negligence or misconduct. The TBCA followed the 1953 version of the sec-
tion. Compare TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(16) (Supp. 1974) with ABA
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 4(o) (rev. ed. 1953). As indicated in note 795 supra, the
current Model Act section was drafted in collaboration with the Delaware revisers; in
turn, their product was undoubtedly inspired and influenced by the earlier, comprehen-
sive, and in the opinion of some commentators, superior New York statute. N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW §§ 721-26 (McKinney 1963); see Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks:
New Trends in Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078,
1080-81 (1968); Cheek, Control of Corporate Indemnification: A Proposed Statute, 22
VAND L. REv. 255, 275 (1969); Sebring, supra note 795, at 100.
As proposed, and in accordance with modern legislation on indemnification, TBCA
article 2.02-1 would have differentiated between third party and derivative actions by
allowing recovery of judgments and fines as well as expenses in third party actions, but
under prescribed conditions and standards. The statute would have also established a
right to indemnification in the event of a successful defense against any civil or criminal
claim made in either a third party or derivative suit. Other provisions sought to detail
the mechanism for determining whether the prescribed standard of conduct permitting
indemnification had been met, allow advancement and proration of expenses, make in-
demnification under the statute non-exclusive and continuing in nature, and require re-
porting to the shareholders of any payments made for indemnification or for insurance
premiums and any insurance proceeds collected. S.B. 202, § 4, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess.
(1973).
The Bar Committee has continued its work on an indemnification statute and at one
point drafted a revised proposal to be submitted to the legislature in 1975, see Haynes,
Report of Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, 37 TEX. B.J. 565 (1974);
however, it has subsequently decided not to press for enactment before 1977.
797. Doty & Parker 1010; Wolf, supra note 9, at 537. The principal opposition came
from Professor Robert Hamilton of the University of Texas at the committee hearing
stage. Although sympathetic to the need for some expansion of the indemnification
power, Professor Hamilton criticized those aspects of the proposal that would have al-
lowed indemnification for (1) criminal fines under some circumstances, (2) civil judg-
ments incurred in actions involving the duties of directors and officers to shareholders
when not opposed to the corporation's best interests, and (3) settlements when indemni-
fication had not been approved by a court or a vote of the disinterested shareholders
or by a written opinion of truly independent legal counsel. He also objected strongly
to mandatory indemnification whenever a director or other person had been successful
in defending an action on some basis other than on the merits. Interestingly, Professor
Hamilton underestimated his powers of persuasion, for in his excellent treatise he had
conceded the probability that the TBCA would be amended to include the revised Model
Act indemnification provision and for that reason quoted it in full in one of his foot-
notes. See 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 731, at 259 n.50.
This was not the initial criticism the Bar Committee had had of its proposal, as Pro-
fessor Alan Bromberg of Southern Methodist University who prepared the drafts of the
amendment for the Bar Committee had raised some of the same objections during the
committee's deliberations (as did this author to some extent); nevertheless the ques-
tioned provisions were retained largely on the vote of the practitioners on the committee.
Professor Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., of Yale, has been the principal critic of the underlying
ABA-Delaware statute, and his views have engendered the same basic dispute between
the concerns expressed by the academicians and those voiced by the corporate bar. See.
e.g., Bishop, Types of Liability to Which Corporate Directors and Officers Are Subject
and Methods of Protection Against Such Liability, in PLI, PROTECTINO THE CORPORATE
OFFICER AND DIRECTOR FROM LIABILITY 327, 344-48 (L. Ratner ed. 1970); Bishop, su-
pra note 796, at 1078; Arsht, Bishop, Chalif & Klink, Panel Discussion on Liab~litifs
Which Can Be Covered Under State Statutes and Corporate By-Laws, 27 Bus. LAW.,
Feb. 1972, at 109; cf. Cheek, supra note 796, at 275; Note, Indemnification of Directors
and Officers: Public Policy v. Corporate Responsibility, 48 J. URBAN L. 957 (1971).
798. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(16) (Supp. 1974). In general on the
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Because the insurance provision was to be part of a more comprehensive
statute on indemnification, its terms do not coincide in all respects with
the older indemnification statute. The latter, for example, applies only to
directors or officers of a corporation or to others who may have served at
its request as a director or officer of another corporation in which it owns
stock or of which it is is a creditor, whereas the insurance provision also in-
cludes agents and employees and those who serve or have served on the
corporation's behalf in noncorporate enterprises. The difference in terminol-
ogy may be somewhat academic, however, as most policies currently avail-
able seem to cover only directors and officers of the parent and its sub-
sidiary companies. 799
Liability insurance to protect the corporation and its executives from the
various liabilities that may be imposed on management under the law is a
comparatively recent development.800 Increasing litigation, especially deriva-
tive suits and third party actions seeking enforcement of rights under cor-
poration, securities, and antitrust laws, has led to a rapid rise in its promo-
tion, procurement (and premiums).801 An extended discussion of such in-
surance and the problems its use presents is beyond the scope of this sur-
vey; however, a good treatment of the subject has recently appeared in the
pages of this Journal.80 2  In general, a typical policy combines what is in
reality two separate insurance contracts, one covering the corporation and
providing for reimbursement of amounts it is obligated or permitted to pay
by way of indemnification, and the other providing direct coverage for di-
rectors and officers for insurable liability in situations where corporate indem-
nification is not available.803 Normally the corporation pays ninety percent
of the premium to cover the reimbursement part of the policy, while the re-
current Texas indemnification provisions, see 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANI-
ZATIONS § 731; Knepper, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Corpo-
ration Officers and Directors, 25 Sw. L.J. 240, 246 (1971 ).
799. See, e.g., ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY ON INSURING CORPORATE PERSONNEL AND
PROFESSIONAL ADVISERS UNDER EXPANDING CONCEPTS OF RESPONSIBILITY 9, A-2, A-6(1970); 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 733; W. KNEPPER, LIABIL-
ITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS §§ 10.03, 10.06 (1969).
800. Although Lloyd's of London has had a directors' and officers' liability policy
for over twenty-five years, it was not until the 1960's that the policies currently in use
were further developed and intensively sold. See, e.g., ALI-ABA, supra note 799, at 5;
W. KNEPPER, supra note 799, at 173; Note, Liability Insurance For Corporate Execu-
tives, 80 HARV. L. REV. 648 (1967).
801. See, e.g., Bishop, New Cure For An Old Ailment: Insurance Against Directors'
and Officers' Liability, 22 Bus. LAW. 92, 103 (1966). For example, Professor Cheek,
writing in 1969, noted that insurance firms handling indemnity and liability policies in
1968 had reported phenomenal increases in sales. Cheek, supra note 796, at 271. As
to the rise in cost of premiums, a policy that would have cost $30,000 in 1965 cost
$85,000 three years later. W. KNEPPER, supra note 799, at 180. See also Gray,
Forum-Insurance Against Liabilities of Directors and Officers, 22 RECORD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 342, 357 (1967) for examples of three-year premium costs for various poli-
cies. Nevertheless, it appears to be difficult for other than well-established companies
with a history of stable management to procure such policies. W. KNEPPER, supra note
799, at 180; see Panel Discussion, Principal Areas of Insurance Coverage: Markets; Ap-
plications; Public Policy Considerations; Other Forms, in PLI, supra note 797, at 213;
Gray, supra, at 357.
802. Knepper, supra note 798; cf. Comment, The Liability of Outside Directors as
Aiders and Abettors Under Rule lOb-5, 28 Sw. L.J. 391, 411 (1974).
803. See, e.g., W. KNEPPER, supra note 799, at 177; Cheek, supra note 796, at 271;
Panel Discussion, History of Insurance Coverage; Format of Policies, Analysis of Policy
Provisions, in PLI, supra note 797, at 121; Note, supra note 800, at 650.
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maining ten percent is paid by the executives covered. 80 4  Nevertheless, the
1973 amendment makes quite clear -that -the corporation, by virtue of the
power conferred to procure and maintain such insurance, can choose to pay
all the premiums, 80 5 perhaps on the rationalization that the part of the pre-
mium covering the personal liability of corporate executives is no more
than another form of compensation. 806
The notion of insuring corporate management against liabilities for non-
indemnifiable breaches of fiducial duties of loyalty and care has always
raised the fairly obvious question of its propriety as a matter of public policy,
especially if corporate funds are used to pay the premiums. 80 7  Arguably
whatever deterrent the imposition of liability for managerial misconduct
or mismanagement is designed to attain is invariably weakened to the ex-
tent the wrongdoer knows he will not have to suffer the economic conse-
quences of his actions to a large extent. 808 On the other hand, given the
growing complexity of governmental regulation of corporate and business ac-
tivities and the broadening scope of potential liabilities that even the best-in-
tentioned and prudent director or officer must face these days, the services
of highly competent and qualified managers and outside directors may be
difficult to acquire or retain unless some assurance can be given that the
risks of litigation that can arise from their official conduct or status can be
minimized. In weighing these competing factors, the balance has been
shifting towards adoption of liberalized indemnification and insurance stat-
utes,809 as exemplified by the Model Act and Delaware provisions that in-
spired the partially aborted TBCA amendment on the subject. And it
was to overcome possible doubts as to the power of the corporation to pro-
cure insurance and maintain it in behalf of directors, officers, and others,
804. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 796, at 1090; Cheek, supra note 796, at 272.
805. See Arsht & Stapleton, Delaware's New Corporation Law, 23 Bus. LAw. 75, 80
(1967), so stating with respect to the Delaware counterpart to the new TBCA provision.
806. Arsht and Stapleton make this argument with respect to the Delaware statute:
"Thus, a corporation may pay premiums on an insurance policy which indemnifies an
executive against liability for negligence or other misconduct in the performance of his
duty to the corporation. This . ., . merely recognizes that to the extent an executive
or the corporation may be able to obtain such insurance for the executive's benefit, the
corporation may make the premium payments, if it so desires, as part of his compen-
sation." Arsht & Stapleton, supra note 805, at 80. See, e.g., CARY 1005; Cheek, supra
note 796, at 273; Note, supra note 800, at 669. Professor Bishop, however, regards this
view as "sophistical," arguing that no form of "compensation" through the device of in-
surance purchased by the corporation should be permitted that allows directors and offi-
cers to evade their duties of good faith and care. Bishop, supra note 796, at 1091.
807. See, e.g., ALI-ABA, supra note 799, at 149; Bishop, supra note 801, at 107;
Cheek, supra note 796, at 273; Note, Public Policy and Director's Liability Insurance,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 716 (1967); Note, supra note 800, at 653; cf. Symposium-Rule
JOb-5 Developments in the Law: Insuring Corporate Executives Against Liability Un-
der Rule lOb-5: First Principles and Second Thoughts, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 544 (1968).
808. The director or officer, assuming he has not been wholly indemnified, will have
to bear some of the financial burden of claims covered by the insurance. Generally,
policies are issued with a $20,000 deductible and contain co-insurance clauses that re-
quire the insured to contribute 5% of any losses above the deductible. Knepper suggests
this may be sufficient to sensitize management to its potential liabilities. W. KNEPPER,
supra note 799, at 179. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 801, at 357; Hinsey & De Lancey,
Directors and Officers Liability Insurance-An Approach To Its Evaluation and a
Checklist, 23 Bus. LAw. 869, 870 (1968).
809. See generally 6 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 129.01-.05; W. KNEP-
PER, supra note 799, §§ 9.01-10.17; Bishop, supra note 796; Panel Discussion, Indemnifi-fication of Officers and Directors and Insurance, 27 Bus. LAw., Feb. 1972, at 109.
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whether for liabilities asserted against them in their official capacity or
their status as such, that the draftsmen of the ABA and Delaware indemni-
fication statutes added the insurance provisions that became part of the
TBCA, even though logically they might have been set out separately.
810
Despite the broad and seemingly unlimited power to obtain "D & 0" insur-
ance the 1973 amendment now confers, 8 1' serious doubts remain as to the
extent public policy still will allow recovery under such policies for obvi-
ously willful violations of criminal or securities laws81 2 or for gross negligence
or other intentional misconduct. 81 3  This may be so whether the premiums
are paid entirely by the corporation or in part by the directors and offi-
cers.a84 Yet these concerns may be more theoretical than real815 in light
810. Sebring, supra note 795, at 106.
811. Professor Bishop contends that taken literally, the Delaware provision (and
Model Act-TBCA counterpart) permits a corporation to insure its management against
any obligation to account for profits made through self-dealing, the liability for which
he regards as the principal deterrent to such misconduct. Bishop, supra note 796, at
1086. This is disputed by Samuel Arsht, one of the draftsmen of the Delaware law,
who argues that the power conferred does no more than authorize the corporation to
pay premiums on a policy and does not sanction the issuance of a policy insuring against
a risk which could or would not be covered in the absence of the statutory authorization.
Panel Discussion, supra note 809, at 127. Cf. Note, Indemnification of the Corporate
Insider: Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance, 54 MINN. L. REV. 667, 681 (1970).
812. Although the SEC frowns on indemnification of directors, officers, or control-
ling persons for liabilities arising under the Securities Act of 1933 as violative of public
policy, going so far as to condition acceleration on inclusion of an undertaking in the
registration statement that the registrant will test the issue in court unless indemnifica-
tion is waived, note (a) to Rule 460, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460, note (a) (1973), it will not
consider insurance against such liabilities a bar to acceleration. Guide 46 for Prepara-
tion and Filing of Registration Statements, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec.
11, 1968). Cf. Globus v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1287 (2d Cir. 1969);
in general, see, e.g., 1 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 163, §§ 8.27[2], [3]; 3 L. Loss,
supra. note 66, at 1829; Kroll, Some Reflection on Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C.
Liability Insurance in the Light of BarChris and Globus, 24 Bus. LAW. 681 (1969);
Comment, Indemnification of Directors For Section 11 Liability, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 661,
677 (1970).
The extent to which insurance can permissibly cover liabilities under other federal se-
curities laws depends to some degree on whether the purpose of imposing liability is to
compensate investors harmed by securities law fraud or to punish the wrongdoer.
Bishop, Protecting Corporate Executives Against Liability and Expenses Under the Fed-
eral Securities Laws, in EMERGING FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW: POTENTIAL LIABILITY 155,
163 (1969). Most commentators agree that coverage against liability for non-willful vi-
olations of rule lOb-5 should not be against public policy; on the other hand, since the
purpose of section 16(b) liability under the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78p(b) (1970), is punitive, insurance coverage should not be permitted; perhaps for this
reason, section 16(b) liability is uniformly excluded in virtually all D & 0 policies. See
note 817 infra. In general, see, e.g., ALI-ABA, supra note 799, at 59; Kramer, Insur-
ance Against Liabilities of Directors and Officers: A Forum-Federal Securities Laws,
22 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 349 (1967); Symposium, supra note 807.
813. See, e.g., 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 733, at 266;
Forum, supra note 801, at 368; Knepper, supra note 798, at 249; Note, supra note
800, at 666; cf. Panel Discussion, supra note 809, at 129.
814. Professor Bishop believes strongly directors and officers should procure and pay
for their own liability insurance, although acknowledging any such requirement could
easily be subverted by increases in salary for the tacit purpose of paying premiums.
Bishop, supra note 801, at 112; cf. CARY 1005; Note, supra note 800, at 666 (suggesting
the corporation might reimburse the executive for his premiums and contending such use
of corporate funds would be justifiable).
815. Professor Bishop doubts there will be many challenges to a corporation's deci-
sion to obtain insurance protection for its directors and officers even if policies could
be found that would compensate them for intentional wrongdoing. He reasons that the
amount of premiums that might be recovered would not make the recovery attractive
enough for the complaining shareholder's attorney; that there is little danger insurance
regulatory authorities will deem such policies illegal to the extent payment is made for
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of the exclusion clauses commonly found in "D & 0" policies presently
available.816 For example, the Directors' and Officers' Liability part of
such policies will normally exclude, among other matters, claims based on
personal profit or advantages gained to which directors and officers
"were not legally entitled" or brought about or contributed to by their dis-
honesty or to recover short-swing profits under section 16(b) of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act.8 17 Unfortunately, these exclusion clauses leave much
to be desired in their draftsmanship 88 and their latent ambiguities make the
degree of protection they afford somewhat questionable. 81 9 Even so, the
clear-cut authority now granted Texas corporations to obtain liability insur-
ance means honest corporate executives can be given a good deal more pro-
tection than the present limited Texas indemnification provision can assure,
particularly in regard to third party litigation that attacks actions taken in
good faith that were in, or not opposed to, the best interests of the corpora-
tion.8 20
Liabilities of Managing Shareholders in Close Corporations. In discussing
some of the facets of the new close corporation legislation in this survey,8 2'
it was pointed out that the shareholders of a defined close corporation, if
they chose, could dispense with management by a board of directors and run
the corporation themselves,8 22 or by a unanimous agreement, regulate any
phase of the corporation's business and affairs even though they might
otherwise impinge on the managerial prerogatives of the board if one were
non-indemnifiable conduct (in light of the explicit language of the TBCA provision per-
mitting non-indemnifiable acts to be covered, such a determination in Texas seems quite
improbable); nor is it likely an insurer will resist payment by claiming the insurance
policy contravenes public policy. Bishop, supra note 812, at 167; Bishop, supra note
797, at 354.
816. See W. KNEPPER, supra note 799, § 10.11, for a list of typical exclusions. The
Company Reimbursement part of the policy normally excludes excess insurance, pyra-
miding of coverage, or claims based on personal injury, death, or property damage. The
Directors' and Officers' part usually excludes the above, too, plus the matters listed in
the text, as well as liability for libel and slander or for remuneration received from the
corporation that had been held illegal by a court. Knepper, supra note 798, at 256. See
also ALI-ABA, supra 799, at 82; Forum, supra note 801, at 362.
817. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). For discussion of the section 16(b) liability exclu-
sion see, e.g., ALI-ABA, supra note 799, at 65; Bishop, supra note 801, at 111; Forum,
supra note 801, at 364; Hinsey & De Lancey, supra note 808, at 877.
818. As might be expected, Professor Bishop has also been quite critical of the drafts-
manship of D & 0 policies, particularly those that first came on the scene, although con-
ceding later policies have been somewhat improved in language. Thus, in 1966 he
thought the policies exhibited "such serious defects of coverage and clarity" he would
have approached them with considerable reserve even if he had no questions concerning
their propriety and validity. Bishop, supra note 801, at 103. Later he observed that
the policies currently on the market were "so ambiguous and obscure that it is difficult
to say whether and to what extent they cover liability." Bishop, supra note 812, at 165.
See also Knepper, supra note 798, at 251.
819. See, e.g., ALI-ABA, supra note 799, at 95; CARY 1004; Bishop, supra note 796,
at 1088; Knepper, supra note 798, at 255.
820. Such conduct may be actionable simply because of the director's or officer's sta-
tus as such in the corporation, as in rule lOb-5 cases involving possible misuses of inside
information, or suits under section 11 of the Securities Act for falsities or omissions in
a registration statement, or possibly antitrust actions. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 801,
at 95; Forum, supra note 801, at 345; Hinsey & De Lancey, supra note 808, at 873.
821. See discussion in text accompanying notes 530-70 supra.
822. TEX. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-1(B) (Supp. 1974); see discussion in text
accompanying notes 535-36 supra.
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retained. 23  But such assumption of the directors' rights of management has
a price: to the degree the shareholders act in place of the board or agree
to limit or control its powers of management, they assume the liabilities im-
posed by the TBCA or other law on directors.8 24 This means, for example,
the shareholders may not only become liable for various fiscal improprieties,
such as the declaration of illegal dividends 25 or making loans to officers
and directors,8 26 as specified in article 2.41, but also for violation of the gen-
eral duties of care and loyalty evolved by case law.82 7 Presumably a
shareholder against whom such liabilities are asserted can also utilize the
defenses afforded directors by law.8 28  Also, in the case of liabilities that
might be imposed because of a shareholders' agreement limiting the board's
power, only those shareholders who voted for or assented to the transaction
in question will be held accountable.8 29
Criminal Responsibility. The newly revised Texas Penal Code, as observed
earlier,8 30 not only makes corporations and other business enterprises crim-
inally responsible for the first time, but also makes clear that anyone acting
in the corporation's name or behalf or failing to discharge a duty imposed on
the corporation by law for which he has primary responsibility may be
equally culpable.831 In addition, two of the new crimes that have been de-
fined can affect corporate officers. One deals with commercial bribery and
prohibits a fidudiary (defined to include a corporate officer, director, man-
ager, or other participant in the direction of the affairs of a corporation)
from receiving any benefits for violating a duty to his beneficiary (defined
as the person for whom the fiduciary is acting) .832 The section is designed
to deal primarily with kickbacks and of course also applies to the person
823. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-2(A) (Supp. 1974); see discussion in text
accompanying notes 538-43 supra.
824. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.30-1(B) (2), 2.30-2(E) (Supp. 1974).
825. Id. art. 2.41(A)(1) (1956).
826. Id. art. 2.41(A)(4).
F27. See generally 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 711-26;
HENN §§ 231-42; LATTIN §§ 78-83; Lebowitz, Director Misconduct and Shareholder Ra-
tification in Texas, 6 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1953); Lewis, The Business Judgment Rule
and Corporate Directors' Liability for Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REV. 157 (1970);
Comment, The Interested Director in Texas, 21 Sw. L.J. 794 (1967).
828. The TBCA provides two defenses for the liabilities asserted under article 2.41:
reliance in good faith and in the exercise of ordinary care upon written financial state-
ments of the corporation represented or certified as being correct and similarly, non-
negligent good faith reliance upon a written opinion of an attorney for the corporation.
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 2.41(C), (D) (1956). The latter provides a broader
defense in that it pertains to any act arising from the discharge of a duty or power im-
posed or conferred by the corporation, whereas the former is limited to liabilities for
illegal dividends, repurchases of shares or distributions in liquidation. In addition, a di-
rector can enter a dissent in the minutes or file one with the secretary of the corporation
to avoid the presumption of having assented to a transaction that is later questioned.
Id. art. 2.41(B). Also possibly available is the business judgment rule, a common law
defense that is sometimes used in mismanagement cases. See generally 20 R. HAMIL-
TON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 720-21.
829. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.30-2(E) (Supp. 1974). The provision is sim-
ilar to the language contained in article 2.41 pertaining to liability of directors.
830. See discussion in text accompanying notes 147-84 supra. See also Bubany, The
Texas Penal Code of 1974, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 292, 309 (1974).
831. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.23 (1974); cf. Myers v. State, 184 S.W.2d 924
(Tex. Crim. App. 1945).
832, TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 32.43 (1974).
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offering or making the bribe.833 Another section prohibits misapplication
of fiduciary property or property of a financial institution 814 and includes
an officer, manager, employee, or agent carrying on fiduciary functions in
behalf of a fiduciary. 83 5 Such misapplication, however, must be knowingly
or recklessly done and in a manner that involves a substantial risk of loss to
the property owner or the person for whose benefit the property is held. 36
On the other hand, the offense can be committed even though neither actor
nor anyone else receives a benefit from the misapplication; if a benefit has
been gained, then the crime of theft may be involved. 83 7
B. Case Law Developments
Management Compensation: Bonuses. Among the variety of means for
compensating corporate executives and high managerial employees, the cash
bonus ranks high as an incentive.838 While the corporation undoubtedly has
power to pay bonuses to its officers and employees,139 their validity may de-
pend upon several factors. If key executives are the recipients of bonuses
or profit-sharing plans and comprise a majority of the board of directors,
there may be problems of self-dealing. 40 Even if authorized by a disinter-
ested board, the amounts paid must bear some relationship to the services
rendered or else they may constitute a gift or waste of corporate assets.84'
833. Id., Comment.
834. Id. § 32.45.
835. Id. § 32.45(a)(1)(C).
836. Id. § 32.45(b).
837. Id. § 32.45, Comment.
838. Bonus and profit-sharing plans, which had been almost unknown prior to 1914,
came into widespread use shortly thereafter and by 1929 were common in most large,
publicly-held corporations. G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 753, at 6.
See generally 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2143; HENN § 246; 1 F.
O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 8.11; G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, supra note
753, at 52; Cohen, Corporate Bonuses and Stockholders' Rights, 14 TENN. L. REV. 87
(1936); Note, Corporate Bonus and Pension Plans: A "Legitimate Business Purpose"
Test, 48 MINN. L. REV. 947 (1964).
839. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(17) (Supp. 1974).
840. A.J. Anderson Co. v. Kinsolving, 262 S.W. 150, 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-San An-
tonio 1924), error dismissed; see Todd v. Southland Broadcasting Co., 231 F.2d 225,
231 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 845 (1956); Greathouse v. Martin, 100 Tex. 99,
101, 94 S.W. 322, 323 (1906); Nelms v. A & A Liquor Stores, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 256,
258 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Hamilton & Shields,
supra note 400, at 99; Shultz v. Resthaven Cemetery, Inc., 375 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1964), error ref. n.r.e. See generally 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
CORPORATIONS § 2129; 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 716; 1
HORNSTEIN § 440; Comment, supra note 827, at 796 (1967). In such cases, shareholder
ratification may be the only way to cure the effect of adverse interest. See Dowdle v.
Texas Am. Oil Corp., 503 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973) (dictum);
Western Inn Corp. v. Heyl, 452 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1970),
error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Hamilton & Shields, supra note 400, at 93; Wiberg v. Gulf
Coast Land & Dev. Co., 360 S.W.2d 563, 567 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1962), error
ref. n.r.e., noted in 41 TEXAS L. REV. 726 (1963); Pruitt v. Westbrook, 11 S.W.2d 562,
565 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1928); G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, supra note
753, at 228; Lebowitz, Recent Decisions on Fiduciary Duties to Corporations, 2 BULL.
OF SECTION ON CORP., BANKING & Bus. L., May 1963, at 3; Lebowitz, supra note 827,
at 25.
841. "If a bonus payment has no relation to the value of services for which it is
given, it is in reality a gift in part and the majority of stockholders have no power to
give away corporate property against the protest of the minority." Rogers v. Hill, 289
U.S. 582, 591-92 (1933). This famous case involving a bonus plan for American To-
bacco Company is discussed in some detail in G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, supra
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Similarly, bonuses given for services already rendered when there was no
expectation they would be paid may be subject to the same infirmity since
they cannot be justified as providing an incentive for better work, more prof-
itable operations, expanded sales, etc.842 Finally, any promise or plan to pay
bonuses for future services must be properly authorized and sufficiently defi-
nite to become a contractual obligation, 843 as one of the survey cases co-
gently brings out.
In Douglass v. Panama, Inc.844 former employees sued Panama and its
parent corporation to recover certain bonuses they claimed Panama's presi-
dent 845 had promised them for services to be rendered in 1965. The evi-
dence showed that while bonuses had been paid in the past they were negligi-
ble in amount except for one year that had been extremely profitable,8 46 and
that the company had lost almost $300,000 in 1965. The jury, however,
found that certain of the president's statements did not condition payment of
,the bonuses on Panama's making a substantial profit for 1965.847 Neverthe-
less the evidence was clear that the president told the employees he had no
authority to write checks for the bonuses without approval of the parent
company's 'board of directors and that the boards of both Panama and the
parent subsequently refused to authorize their payment. The trial court
granted defendants a judgment non obstante veredicto.
In affirming, the Houson (14th District) court of civil appeals concluded the
president's statements were ,too indefinite and vague to constitute an enforce-
note 753, at 880; Washington, The Corporation Executive's Living Wage, 54 HARV. L.
REv. 733, 741 (1941); ci. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd with-
out opinion, 263 App. Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1941), rearg. denied, 263 App.
Div. 852, 32 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1942), a sequel American Tobacco Co. case quoted
in part in 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BuSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 716, at 211. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Dunlap, 269 Ala. 97, 111 So. 2d 1, 3 (1959); Hackley v. Oltz, 105 So. 2d 20,
23 (Fla. App. 1958); Beacon Wool Corp. v. Johnson, 331 Mass. 214, 119 N.E.2d 195,
200 (1954); 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2143, at 616; HENN 491.
842. E.g., Todd v. Southland Broadcasting Co., 231 F.2d 225, 231 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 845 (1956); Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F.2d 52 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 828 (1947); A.J. Anderson Co. v. Kinsolving, 262 S.W. 150,
151 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1924), error dismissed; see Dowdle v. Texas Am.
Oil Corp., 503 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1973). See generally 5 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2143; G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCmL, supra
note 753, at 213.
843. See, e.g., Dowdle v. Texas Am. Oil Corp., 503 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Tex. Civ. App.
-El Paso 1973); Schultz v. Resthaven Cemetery, Inc., 375 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1964), error ref. n.r.e.; A.J. Anderson Co. v. Kinsolving, 262 S.W. 150,
151 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1924), error dismissed; Southwestern Portland Ce-
ment Co. v. Latta & Happer, 193 S.W. 1115, 1125 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1917),
error ref.; cf. Marvin Turner Eng'rs v. Allen, 326 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1959). See generally HENN 490; G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 753,
at 203.
844. 487 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972), af 'd, 504 S.W.2d
776 (Tex. 1974).
845. The president, M.E. "Panama" Shiflett, had organized Panama and was in sole
control until 1962 when 80% of its shares were acquired by Associated Oil and Gas
Company. Shiflett continued as president until 1966 when he and most of the employ-
ees were discharged after Associated decided to liquidate Panama and sell most of its
equipment. 487 S.W.2d at 231-32.
846. In 1964, net income before taxes was $1,963,335 and bonuses totalling $138,956
were paid. Id. at 231.
847. These remarks included: "Get with it and there will be a good bonus next
year;" "your bonus will be as good or better next year." Id. When Panama was in
the process of liquidation, Shiflett asked that the bonuses be paid for 1965 but his recom-
mendation was disapproved. Id. at 231-32.
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able agreement. Moreover, even if they had not been, the probative evidence
showed the bonuses were dependent upon Panama making a reasonable profit
in 1965. More importantly, the president had no authority to promise or
pay bonuses or gratuities, 848 as he himself acknowledged in the absence of
any delegation of authority or subsequent ratification by the board nor was
there any evidence showing such delegation or any pleading or submission
of issues indicating he had implied or apparent authority under the circum-
stances. The Texas Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the Houston
court's decision on substantially the same grounds.8 49
Liabilities to Third Parties. Generally speaking, the duties of care and
loyalty the law imposes on directors and officers are owed only to the corpo-
ration and its shareholders, not its creditors.850 While such duties may be
ultimately enforced by a receiver or trustee in bankruptcy primarily for the
benefit of creditors, even then the action is essentially one by a represen-
tative in behalf of the corporation. 85' Similarly, those who represent the cor-
poration in its dealings with others are normally not liable in contract if the
corporation fails to carry out its undertakings,85 2 although if a director or
848. Accord, Parks v. Midland Ford Tractor Co., 416 S.W.2d 22, 29 (Mo. App.
1967). The holding reflects the general view that despite the frequency with which
bonuses are used as a form of incentive compensation, their award is sufficiently outside
the ordinary or usual course of business that formal action of the board of directors or
shareholders must authorize them unless there is some basis for showing informal acqui-
escence in their payment by the board. See, e.g., Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co.,
159 F.2d 52, 59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 828 (1947); Sacks v. Helene Curtis
Indus., Inc., 340 111. App. 76, 91 N.E.2d 127, 133 (1950); Felsenheld v. Bloch Bros.
Tobacco Co., 119 W. Va. 167, 192 S.E. 545, 553 (1937); Thauer v. Gaebler, 202 Wis.
296, 232 N.W. 561, 563 (1930); 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS 675; 5 id.
622; but cf. Jaffe v. Chicago Warehouse Lumber Co., 4 Ill. App. 2d 415, 124 N.E.2d
618, 624 (1954) (close corporation). It is also consistent with Texas cases limiting the
authority of the president to enter into long-term employment contracts. See, e.g.,
Nelms v. A & A Liquor Stores, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1969), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Hamilton & Shields, supra note 400, at 99; Brown
v. Grayson Enterprises, Inc., 401 S.W.2d 653, 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966), error
ref. n.r.e.; Leak v. Halaby Galleries, 49 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1932),
error ref. But see Miller v. Angelina & N.R.R.R., 476 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1972), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Lebowitz, supra note 166, at 95 (president
employed plaintiff as vice-president and general manager for twelve years; but bylaw au-
thorized president to employ general manager). See generally 2 W. FLETCHER, CYCLO-
PEDIA CORPORATIONS § 597.1; Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 929 (1953) (power of corporate offi-
cer or agent to hire employee for life).
849. Douglass v. Panama, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1974). The decision will be
discussed more fully in the Southwestern Law Journal's 1975 Annual Survey of Texas
Law, but the supreme court agreed with the court of civil appeals that the bonuses were
conditional on substantial profits being made, but even so were too indefinite and uncer-
tain to be enforceable. It also concurred there was no evidence showing the president
had express authority to pay the bonuses; neither was there a basis for apparent author-
ity, especially since the employees had notice of the limits on the president's power. Id.
at 779.
850. E.g., Allen v. Cochran, 160 La. 425, 107 So. 292, 293 (1926); Sutton v. Reagan
& Gee, 405 S.W.2d 828, 835 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966), error ref. n.r.e., dis-
cussed in Pelletier, supra note 133, at 139; Conrick v. Houston Civic Opera Ass'n, 99
S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936); 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 737.
851. See 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 1180.
852. E.g., Maxey v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 507 S.W.2d 722, 726 (Tex. 1974), discussed
in text accompanying note 492 supra; West Tex. Util. Co. v. Pirtle, 444 S.W.2d 202,
204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1969); American Appraisal Co. v. Constantin, 98
S.W.2d 1003, 1005 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1936). See generally 3 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONS § 1118.
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officer induces a breach of contract maliciously or for his personal gain he
may become liable in tort.853 By the same token, of course, a member of
management who, in the scope of his employment, himself commits a tort,
85 4
or as observed earlier, a crime,8 55 may be held responsible therefor along with
his corporation. Moreover, despite the general rules of non-liability, there
may be a variety of situations where, either by case law or legislation, di-
rectors or officers are made directly accountable to creditors or others. For
example, liability can be imposed when insolvency has occurred and there
is need to protect creditors generally8 56 or to assure that franchise or other
taxes are paid8 57 or to effectuate other statutory policies.8 58  In addition,
there is the always omnipresent doctrine of disregard of the corporate entity
that can be invoked to impose personal liability on a controlling shareholder-
director-officer if as the principal actor he has caused harm or economic
loss to another in conducting his corporation's affairs.8 5 9 A number of cases
decided during the survey period illustrate these principles.
Insolvency and the Trust Fund Doctrine. The most important of the deci-
sions is Fagan v. La Gloria Oil & Gas Co.,8 60 in which Chief Justice Tunks of
the Houston (14th District) court of civil appeals, in a well-written opinion,
discusses several bases on which directors and officers can become liable
for corporate obligations. The action was one in the nature of a creditor's
bill brought by La Gloria, an unsatisfied judgment creditor of Cooper Petro-
leum Company, against the four persons who were Cooper's shareholders, di-
rectors, and officers. La Gloria had originally obtained a judgment in 1967 in
a suit first brought in 1964 against Cooper and Albert Fagan, Cooper's major-
ity shareholder, as guarantors of obligations of International Marketing, Inc.
853. See, e.g., Slavenburg Soelling Corp. v. W.A. Assomull & Co., 29 Misc. 2d 232,
213 N.Y.S.2d 308 (Sup. Ct. 1961); cf. Russell v. Edgewood Ind. School Dist., 406
S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966), error ref. n.r.e.; Southwood
States Oil & Gas. Co. v. Sovereign Resources, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 417, 422 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1963), error ref. n.r.e. See generally CARY 865; 1 HORNSTEIN § 445;
Avins, Liability For Inducing a Corporation To Breach Its Contract, 43 CORNELL L.Q.
55 (1957); Note, Interference With Contract Rights and the Stockholder's Privilege, 54
Nw. U.L. REV. 483 (1959).
854. E.g., Western Rock Co. v. Davis, 432 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1968); Penroc Oil Corp. v. Donahue, 476 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1972), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Lebowitz, supra note 166, at 93; Sutton v.
Reagan & Gee, 405 S.W.2d 828, 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966), error ref.
n.r.e., discussed in Pelletier, supra note 133, at 139; Bower v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 S.W.2d
708, 710 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1929), error ref.; cf. Mayflower Inv. Co. v.
Stephens, 345 S.W.2d 786, 795 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1960), error ref. n.r.e. See
generally CARY 863; 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§ 1134-66.
855 TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.23 (1974).
856. E.g., Waggoner v. Herring-Showers Lumber Co., 120 Tex. 605, 618, 40 S.W.2d
1, 6 (1931); Wortham v. Lachman-Rose Co., 440 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1969); Love v. Gamer, 64 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1933), error dismissed.
857. E.g., TEX. TAx.-GEN. ANN. art. 12.14 (1969); First Nat'l Bank v. Silberstein,
398 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex. 1966); Sheffield v. Nobles, 378 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1964), error ref.
858. E.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.41(A) (6) (1956); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 1302-2.02 (1962).
859. See generally 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 234-38; Ham-
ilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 979 (1971); Lebowitz, supra note 131,
at 142-53.
860. 494 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973).
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(IMI), a company controlled by Fagan. The judgment was appealed,861 ul-
timately resulting in the case being remanded,862 and upon retrial La
Gloria obtained a second judgment which became final and non-appealable
in 1971 .863 In the interim, Cooper's shareholders apparently did all they
could to prevent La Gloria from being able to enforce either of its judg-
ments. For example, Fagan, by virtue of having purchased an assignment
of a judgment which the trustee in bankruptcy of IMI had gotten against
Cooper and himself,8 64 filed judgment liens in the counties where Cooper
owned most of its realty, thereby hampering any attempt by La Gloria to
levy execution on the properties. All of Cooper's accounts receivable were
assigned to Fagan and his son and its bank accounts concealed under an-
other name or manipulated in such a way as to prevent La Gloria from
reaching any funds Cooper had on deposit.8 65  Cooper's officers awarded
themselves large bonuses in 1966 as a means of siphoning off cash even
though the corporation operated at a loss that year. 6 6  Thereafter, most of
Cooper's business was diverted into another family owned and controlled cor-
poration and its physical assets acquired either by the latter or by Fagan
family members. In the process, all of Cooper's creditors were paid, except,
of course, La Gloria and an amount remaining unsatisfied on Fagan's IMI
judgment.8 67 As a result, when La Gloria tried to enforce its second judg-
ment, no assets of significant value could be found. Thus, the present ac-
tion ensued, resulting in a substantial judgment for La Gloria, this time
against the four Cooper shareholders.
On appeal, La Gloria sought to uphold its judgment on trust fund, denuding
861. Cooper Petroleum Co. v. La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 423 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967), discussed in Amsler, supra note 124, at 103, rev'd,
436 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1969).
862. Cooper Petroleum Co. v. La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 436 S.W.2d 889 (Tex.
1969), discussed in Contracts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 116, 117
(1970), Ray, Evidence, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 154 (1970).
863. The second judgment was affirmed in an unpublished opinion by the Houston
(1st Dist.) court of civil appeals and writ of error was not granted. 494 S.W.2d at 627.
864. IMI went into bankruptcy and thereafter its trustee sued Cooper and Albert Fa-
gan for having received voidable preferences, recovering a judgment in June 1966 against
Cooper for $81,000 and against Fagan for $59,000. On appeal, the judgment against
Cooper was increased to $121,000 and by December 1967 the total judgment in favor
of the trustee against both together with interest and costs came to about $220,000. At
that time, Fagan paid the trustee $100,000 to release the judgment against himself and
for an assignment of the judgment against Cooper. Id.
865. In July 1966 Cooper reduced its bank account to a nominal amount and opened
a concealed account in the name of a trustee, through which most of its commercial
transactions were handled. When La Gloria's attorney learned of the subterfuge,
Cooper then, in order to keep La Gloria from reaching any of its deposited funds, would
hold its collections from its customers until checks it had written its creditors were pre-
sented to the bank for payment at which time the collections would be deposited. If
the deposits were more than enough to pay the creditors' checks, Cooper would buy
cashier's checks for the excess. Id. at 630.
866. Fagan had a contract with Cooper by which he was to receive 35% of its net
profits annually. In September 1966 Cooper's board authorized giving each of the other
three defendants a bonus of 15% of the net profits. As a result more than $100,000
was paid to the four. The accountant who computed the bonuses was told that despite
the net loss for the year the provision for paying them only out of net profits had been
waived. Id.
867. After the trustee in bankruptcy assigned the IMI judgment to Fagan, he appar-
ently sought to enforce it by levying execution on some of Cooper's service stations that
were valued at from $64,000 to $94,000, but how much of the proceeds of the execution
sales was applied to the judgment is not stated. Id. at 631.
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corporate assets, and alter ego theories, while the Cooper shareholders con-
tended that La Gloria's debt was owed only by Cooper for which they had no
personal liability under any of the theories. The Houston court of civil ap-
peals considered each issue at some length. It began by noting the general
rule, stated above, that ordinarily actions against directors and officers for
mismanagement or misconduct can be prosecuted only by the corporation
or someone permitted to act in its behalf and cannot be enforced by cred-
itors individually. But it noted a well recognized exception to the rule, the
so-called trust fund doctrine, said to be followed in Texas,8 68 that regards the
officers and directors as trustees for the benefit of creditors of the assets of
a corporation that (1) has become insolvent and (2) has ceased doing busi-
ness.8 69  If these two requisites are present, corporate managers then
have a fiduciary duty to administer and to ratably distribute the corpora-
tion's assets for the creditor' benefit; if they breach that duty, the creditors
may sue them directly.
The court next determined whether the two grounds for invocation of the
trust fund doctrine had been met. Although Cooper's balance sheet on
June 30, 1966, the close of its fiscal year, showed an earned surplus of
$102,000, it failed to reflect a judgment IMI's trustee in bankruptcy had
obtained against Cooper for $81,000 a month earlier nor did it indicate any
contingent liability based on La Gloria's pending suit that later ended with
its winning a $160,000 judgment. Moreover, an asset of $192,000, repre-
senting an advance to an oil and gas venture payable only out of profits,
was deemed overstated. On this basis the court concluded Cooper was in-
solvent on June 30, 1966. But in so holding, it is evident the court applied
a balance sheet or bankruptcy test of insolvency870 despite the fact the TBCA
adopts the equity standard that defines insolvency in terms of the corpo-
ration's inability to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of
its business. 871 Nothing in the facts suggests that on the date selected by the
court to test insolvency Cooper was not able to pay its debts as they ma-
tured, particularly since neither the IMI nor the La Gloria claims had become
final, the former having been appealed and the latter still pending in the
trial court.
In determining whether the second requirement had been satisfied, the
court was confronted with the fact that after June 30, 1966, Cooper contin-
ued its business at least on paper on apparently a somewhat substantial
scale in that until 1971 it showed gross receipts that ranged from six and a
half million dollars in 1967 to one half million in 1971 with profits earned
868. Id. at 629. See 20 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 734, at
268.
869. E.g, Waggoner v. Herring-Showers Lumber Co., 120 Tex. 605, 615, 40 S.W.2d
1, 5 (1931); Orr & Lindsley Shoe Co. v. Thompson, 89 Tex. 501, 35 S.W. 473 (1896);
Lyons-Thomas Hardware Co. v. Perry Stove Mfg. Co., 86 Tex. 143, 163, 24 S.W. 16,
25 (1893); Wortham v. Lachman-Rose Co., 440 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [lst Dist.] 1969); Temple Lumber Co. v. Pineland Naval Stores Co., 25
S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1930). See generally 3 I. HILDEBRAND,
TEXAS CORPORATIONS § 932.
870. See HENN 821.
871. TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 1.02(A)(16) (1956).
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in three of the years between those dates. Nevertheless, the Houston
court regarded the various actions the Fagan family took to thwart La Glo-
ria from 1966 on as evidencing a scheme to continue the business only for
the purpose of paying off their own claims or those of creditors to whom
they were secondarily liable and to strip Cooper of its assets and business in
such a way as to leave it an empty shell with nothing for La Gloria to levy on.
This, in the court's judgment, was not a "good faith" continuation of busi-
ness that would prevent the trust fund doctrine from being applied. Instead,
Cooper's managers carried through a nonstatutory process of dissolution that
deprived La Gloria of its equitable shares of the assets. As a consequence
they became personally liable not only because their corporation had be-
come insolvent but also because it had ceased doing business in good faith,
even if actual operations continued for five years after its supposed in-
solvency.
The court's strained construction of the facts is explainable primarily
by its need to fit them into the two requisites the Texas courts have mech-
anistically adhered to in invoking the trust fund doctrine and that often de-
feats creditors' rights, as Dean Hildebrand pointed out.8 72 That doctrine, after
all, is no more than a device whereby equity can assure that shareholders
will contribute to and not improperly withdraw from the assets they have
committed themselves to maintain for the benefit of creditors.-78  If a
"trust" must be imposed to thwart an obvious scheme to defraud an indi-
vidual creditor, as the facts in Fagan divulge, a court sitting in equity should
frankly acknowledge it is acting to prevent an obvious injustice, and not
simply invoke an artificial formula that may preclude a needed remedy if
its terms are not met.
Given the nature of the defendants' actions, the court could have readily
rested its decision on the second ground relied on to affirm La Gloria's judg-
ment, namely that by their actions, they had so "denuded" their corporation
for their own benefit there remained nothing left to pay La Gloria. Thus to
the extent they appropriated Cooper's assets, they became personally liable
on its claims. There is respectable authority for this result87 4 and the rule
applied more nearly squares with the facts that transpired.
As to the alter ego theory, the court acknowledged it was not really a
rule but a way of preventing the corporate entity from being used to work a
fraud or injustice, that is sometimes misapplied in cases of this sort.8 7 1
For example, when Cooper guaranteed IMI's obligations in 1964 and La
Gloria's claim was first established, Cooper appeared to be a bona fide
corporation acting in its own behalf and in furtherance of its own busi-
ness. Nor was there any evidence showing that it was then being used
872. See 3 I. HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS § 932, at 483.
873. See, e.g., HENN 315; R. STEVENS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS § 190 (2d ed. 1949).
874. E.g., A.R. Clark Inv. Co. v. Green, 375 S.W.2d 425, 437 (Tex. 1964); World
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Bass, 160 Tex. 261, 267, 328 S.W.2d 863, 866 (1959); Bur-
ton Mill & Cabinet Works, Inc. v. Truemper, 422 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waca
1967), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in Amsler, supra note 124, al 99.
875. 494 S.W.2d at 632; see 19 R. HAMILTON, TEXAS BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS § 237,
at 257-58; LATrIN 86; Lebowitz, supra note 131, at 144 n.302.
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simply as an agent to carry out the shareholders' personal business or act-
ing as their alter ego. Thus, liability could not be imposed on a disregard
basis. However, the court did apply a limited form of the disregard doc-
trine by ruling that any claim that Fagan had against Cooper's assets based
on the IMI judgment he had acquired8 76 would have to be subordinated to
La Gloria's claim, under the famous "Deep Rock" doctrine,8 77 presumably
because of Fagan's inequitable conduct.
Liability as an "Alter Ego." Two cases were decided, however, that did
find an officer individually liable for a corporate obligation on essentially
an alter ego rationalization. In one,878 an action was brought against a cot-
ton merchant, his almost wholly-owned corporation, and others for damages
resulting from the purchase of warehouse receipts from the corporation for
cotton later found to be nonexistent. Judgment was rendered against the
merchant as well as his corporation for breach of both express and implied
warranties despite his contention that he should not have been held person-
ally liable. The record showed, however, that as president and 99.6%
owner of all the corporation's shares, the defendant exercised complete and
independent control of the company which was no more than the conduit
for the transaction of his own private business.8 79 Under these circum-
stances, the court ruled, the trial court was warranted in holding him per-
sonally liable. Not enough facts are given in the opinion to judge whether
holding on this point was sound; however, the result is another cogent re-
minder that the danger of piercing the corporate veil is perhaps more acute
in the incorporated proprietorship than in other corporate businesses,880
despite the assurances that are sometimes given that mere ownership of all
876. The court noted that when Fagan paid the trustee $100,000 for the assignment
of the IMI judgment, he apportioned the payment so that all of his personal judgment
of $59,000 was taken care of to get his release, meaning he had paid something less
than $41,000 for the judgment against Cooper which by then amounted to more than$138,000. He then recouped more than the amount he had thus paid by levying execu-
tion on service stations belonging to Cooper. Under the circumstances, the court held,
any claim he asserted against Cooper's assets in excess of what he had paid for the judg-
ment, which he had already recovered, could have been subordinated to La Gloria's
claim. 494 S.W.2d at 631.
877. The name is derived from the subsidiary involved in the leading case of Taylor
v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939), wherein a parent's claim against
the subsidiary in bankruptcy reorganization was subordinated to creditors and preferred
shareholders because of mismanagement and inadequate capitalization. See, e.g., 19 R.
HAMILTON, TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 238, at 255; HENN 269; 2 HORNSTEIN §
756; Israels, The Implications and Limitations of the "Deep Rock" Doctrine, 42 COLUM.
L. REV. 376 (1942); Krotinger, The "Deep Rock" Doctrine, A Realistic Approach to
Parent Subsidiary Law, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1124 (1942); Comment, Deep Rock Duz
Everything: Creditors Interests of Controlling Stockholders in Corporate Reorganiza-
tions, 29 TEXAS L. REV. 71 (1950).
878. Simon v. Estate of W.P. Allen, 497 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973),
error ref. n.r.e.
879. See, e.g., McDonald Co. v. Kemper, 3,86 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1965); Moore v. Savage, 359 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco), error
ref. n.r.e., 362 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1962); Bush v. Gaffney, 84 S.W.2d 759, 761-62 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1935).
880. See, e.g., HENN § 147; Cataldo, Limited Liability With One-Man Companies
and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 473 (1953); Fuller, The Incor-
porated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1373 (1938);




the shares of stock does not per se defeat limited liability.88
The other opinion was a Fifth Circuit decision88 2 and involved an action
by a law firm against the president and holder of twenty percent of the
shares of a corporation to recover the reasonable value of services rendered
in prosecuting a patent infringement case for the corporation. It appeared
that when the attorneys learned the corporation was a shell organized solely
to hold the patent and bring the infringement suit, they were assured by
the president, who said he made all the corporation's decisions, they
should proceed with the litigation88 3 and ,that he would "take care" of ,the fee.
Having been found personally liable for unpaid fees, the president argued
that the services had been rendered to the corporation, not himself, and that
he had only promised to guarantee payment by the corporation which prom-
ise being oral was barred by the Texas statute of frauds. s84 As to -the first
point, the court observed that since the only asset the corporation would
have was its expected recovery in the infringement suit in which the presi-
dent would share directly, he could have received no more benefit from the
firm's services than if the corporation had never existed. Secondly, the
president's promise was to protect his personal interest, i.e., his share of
the contemplated recovery,8s 5 and not simply to answer for a debt of his
corporation in which his only benefit would be the corporation's continued
prosperity-something that accrues to all shareholders alike.8 8 6 Moreover, it
was clear that the president personally promised to pay the fee; hence the
statute of frauds would be inapplicable in any case.
Liability for Conversion. If a corporate officer in acting for his corporation
commits 'the tort of conversion, he cannot escape personal liability because he
took his action for the corporation's best interest.88 7 The rule is demon-
strated in Permian Petroleum Co. v. Barrow888 in which the president of
the corporation was held liable for converting secured property even though
881. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Davis, 140 Tex. 398, 408-11, 168 S.W.2d 216, 222-
23 (1942); Nat'l Educators Life Ins. Co. v. Master Video Systems, 398 S.W.2d 358, 364
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1965), error ref. n.r.e.; Evans v. General Ins. Co. of
America, 390 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965); Hake v. Dilworth, 96
S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1936), error dismissed.
882. Pravel, Wilson & Matthews v. Voss, 471 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1973).
883. The corporation ultimately lost the patent infringement suit. See V & S Ice Ma-
chine Co. v. Eastex Poultry Co., 437 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1971). Thereafter the law
firm withdrew from the case and sent several bills for attorneys' fees to the president's
home for approximately fourteen thousand dollars which were not paid. 471 F.2d at
1188.
884. Thx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (1968).
885. His. "leading object" in making the promise was to secure a direct benefit for
himself and not for another; hence his promise did not fall within the statute of frauds.
See, e.g., Haas Drilling Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 456 S.W.2d 886, 890 (Tex. 1970); Gulf
Liquid Fertilizer Co. v. Titus, 163 Tex. 260, 354 S.W.2d 378, 382 (1962); Walker v.
Lorehn, 355 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962), error ref. n.r.e.
886. See, e.g., Cooper Petroleum Co. v. La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 436 S.W.2d 889,
895 (Tex. 1969), discussed in Contracts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 116,
117 (1970); South Spindletop Oil & Dev. Co. v. Toney, 15 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1929), error dismissed.
887. See, e.g., Lone Star Mining Co. v. Texeramics, Inc., 363 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1962), error ref. n.r.e.; Bower v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 S.W.2d 708,
710 (Tex. Civ. App.-E Paso 1929), error ref. See generally CARY 864; 3 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 1140-42.
888. 484 S.W.2d 631 (Tex, Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1972).
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the proceeds were used to pay off corporate debts. The facts showed the
president had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff creditor to assign
it the proceeds of an auction sale of equipment belonging to the corpora-
tion, subject to prior liens, and that at the auction, the president, being dis-
satisfied with the apparent sales price of a truck, bought it for the corpora-
tion and later sold it at a private sale to pay off other debts. The trial
court found for the defendant, ruling there was no basis in the evidence to
warrant a disregard of the corporate entity on the ground the corporation
had become the president's alter ego. The El Paso court of civil appeals
reversed, correctly holding that the case was not one for disregard, but
rather for the imposition of liability on a corporate officer for his own
wrongdoing, in this case for selling off secured property and misapplying
the proceeds.
Statutory Liability. In three cases, a director or officer faced personal lia-
bility because of statutory provisions. In Cannon Ball Truck Stop, Inc.
v. Mobil Oil Corp.889 a service station dealer and his apparently wholly-
owned corporation were held liable for the amount of taxes on diesel fuel
paid by their customers which their supplier (Mobil) had previously paid
for them89 0 but neglected to collect for four-and-a-half years. The corpo-
ration's liability, however, was limited to the amount of taxes not remitted
after it was incorporated, for though a corporation is sometimes held respon-
sible for the personal debts of its controlling shareholder,8 91 such liability
normally does not extend to debts incurred prior to incorporation, in the
absence of fraud. The dealer, on the other hand, was held liable not only for
the taxes collected from the public prior to incorporation but also for those
not remitted afterwards on the theory that since all the invoices for the
fuel were made out to him, he was in effect a supplier to his corporation
and in that capacity should have collected the tax from it for transmittal to
the state. Not having done so, he was therefore accountable.
In Bottoms v. Lyonss92 a corporate officer who in his individual capacity
indorsed a note to a law firm in partial payment for legal fees owed by his
corporation to the firm was held personally liable as an indorser on the
note, even though he claimed he acted under a unilateral mistake in indors-
ing the note individually and not as an agent for the corporation. Under
the Uniform Commercial Code an indorser is liable to the holder of an in-
strument unless the indorsement specifies otherwise.893  There being no
fraud or misrepresentation or mutual mistake of fact, the parole evidence
would prevent the officer from testifying as to his unilateral intent.
889. 501 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
890. Under the Diesel Fuel Tax Law, TEx. TAx.-GEN. ANN. arts. 10.01-.25 (1969),
the supplier is to collect the tax from each non-bonded dealer who in turn collects it
from the consuming public. Id. art. 10.03 (Supp. 1974). The dealer has the primary
responsibility for collecting the tax, as the supplier is merely the agent for the state. If
the supplier pays the tax, he then becomes legally subrogated to the state's cause of ac-
tion to collect the tax. 501 S.W.2d at 929.
891. E.g., American Petroleum Exchange, Inc. v. Lord, 399 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1966), error ref. n.r.e.
892. 487 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972).
893. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.414(a) (1968).
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Finally, in Nuclear Corp. of America v. Hale,8 94 a federal court action, a
materialman (Nuclear) brought an action against three persons who were
the sole shareholders, directors, and officers of Mac Steel, Inc., a defunct in-
corporated subcontractor, for materials Nuclear had furnished Mac Steel on
two construction jobs, one in Texas and one in Oklahoma, for which it had
not been paid even though Mac Steel had been compensated for its work
by the general contractor for each job. Nuclear's primary causes of action
were based on statutes of Texas895 and Oklahoma896 that make proceeds
paid to a subcontractor a trust fund for the benefit of materialmen who fur-
nish construction materials to the subcontractor; in addition, the Texas
statute makes any officer, director, or agent of the subcontractor "having
control or direction" of the subcontractor the trustee of such funds,8 97 and the
Oklahoma statute makes the "managing officers" of an incorporated sub-
contractor personally liable for the proper application of such trust funds.898
In applying the two statutes, 899 including the finding of an implied civil
cause of action in the Texas statute, 900 the court considered the corporate
role of each of the three defendants and concluded that the two who had
been active in Mac Steel's management would be held accountable even
though the funds they collected had been paid out in the ordinary course of
business, but that the third whose role was passive and was confined to that
of a director who was sometimes consulted about the company's financial
condition and on one occasion loaned it money but who made no manage-
rial decisions could not be held liable under either statute. On the other
hand, the court declined to impose common law liability against the three
for having caused Mac Steel to undertake the two projects when they knew
it was in financial trouble in the absence of any showing they had not acted
in good faith or with an intent to defraud Nuclear. The court applied the
general Texas rule, previously discussed in this section, that when officers
act in good faith and with due care they are not personally liable to cor-
porate creditors for the corporation's insolvency absent fraud or some spe-
cific provision of the law to the contrary.91
894. 355 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd per curiam, 479 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1973),
discussed in Baade, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 221-
23 (1974).
895. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5472e (Supp. 1974).
896. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 141-43 (Supp. 1974).
897. TEX. REV. COv. STAT. ANN. art. 5472e, § 1 (Supp. 1974).
898. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 143 (Supp. 1974).
899. The court determined that since a materialman's lien is a creature of the law
of the state where the real property benefited by the materials furnished is situated,
Oklahoma law applied to any agreement for the supply of materials that benefited prop-
erty there and Texas law applied to property benefited in that state. Professor
Baade observes that since both laws were applied uniformly to produce the same result
as to liability or non-liability of the defendants, the decision was really a false-conflicts
case as that term is understood. Baade, supra note 894, at 222.
900. The court invoked the rule that when a statute is both penal and remedial it
should be considered as a penal statute when being used to enforce a penalty and as
a remedial statute when it is being employed to enforce a civil remedy. See, e.g., Board
of Ins. Comm'rs v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 150 Tex. 258, 266, 239 S.W.2d 803,
809 (1951).
901. See authorities cited in note 850 supra.
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